In [15],[16] Kreisel introduced the no-counterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated "-substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of first-order Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals \Phi A of order type ! " 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A of A. Subsequently more

this paper we present such a method. Applied to I \Sigma

A well-known result of D. Leivant states that, over basic Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA, the induction schema for \Sigma n formulas is equivalent to the uniform reflection principle for \Sigma n+1 formulas. We show that fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by various forms of induction rules admit a precise axiomatization in terms of reflection principles as well. Thus, the closure of EA under the induction rule for \Sigma n (or \Pi n+1 ) formulas is equivalent to ! times iterated \Sigma n reflection principle. Moreover, for k ! !, k times iterated \Sigma n reflection principle over EA precisely corresponds to the extension of EA by k nested applications of \Sigma n induction rule. The above relationship holds in greater generality than just stated. In fact, we give general formulas characterizing in terms of iterated reflection principles the extension of any given theory (containing EA) by k nested applications of \Sigma n or \Pi n induction rules. In particular, the closure of a ...

Predicative mathematics in the sense originating with Poincaré andWeylbegins by taking the natural number system for granted, proceeding immediately to real analysis and related fields. On the other hand, from a logicist or set-theoretic standpoint, this appears problematic, for, as the story is usually told, impredicative

In this paper the numerical strength of fragments of arithmetical comprehension, choice and general uniform boundedness is studied systematically. These principles are investigated relative to base systems T n in all finite types which are suited to formalize substantial parts of analysis but nevertheless have provably recursive function(al)s of low growth. We reduce the use of instances of these principles in T n -proofs of a large class of formulas to the use of instances of certain arithmetical principles thereby determining faithfully the arithmetical content of the former. This is achieved using the method of elimination of Skolem functions for monotone formulas which was introduced by the author in a previous paper. As

This paper was written while the first author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (Stanford, CA) whose facilities and support, under grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation and the National Science Foundation, have been greatly appreciated.

It is well-known by now that large parts of (non-constructive) mathematical reasoning can be carried out in systems T which are conservative over primitive recursive arithmetic PRA (and even much weaker systems). On the other hand there are principles S of elementary analysis (like the Bolzano-Weierstra principle, the existence of a limit superior for bounded sequences etc.) which are known to be equivalent to arithmetical comprehension (relative to T ) and therefore go far beyond the strength of PRA (when added to T ). In this paper

. We study the fragment of Peano arithmetic formalizing the induction principle for the class of decidable predicates, I1 . We show that I1 is independent from the set of all true arithmetical 2-sentences. Moreover, we establish the connections between this theory and some classes of oracle computable functions with restrictions on the allowed number of queries. We also establish some conservation and independence results for parameter free and inference rule forms of 1-induction. An open problem formulated by J. Paris (see [4, 5]) is whether I1 proves the corresponding least element principle for decidable predicates, L1 (or, equivalently, the 1 -collection principle B1 ). We reduce this question to a purely computation-theoretic one. 1 Introduction and motivation The schema of induction for decidable predicates I 1 is considered to be rather exotic. Indeed, the stronger schema of induction for r.e. predicates I 1 appears more naturally in the formalization of va...

Progressions of iterated reflection principles can be used as a tool for ordinal analysis of formal systems. Technically, in some sense, they replace the use of omega-rule. We compare the information obtained by this kind of analysis with the results obtained by the more usual proof-theoretic techniques. In some cases the techniques of iterated reflection principles allows to obtain sharper results, e.g., to define proof-theoretic ordinals relevant to logical complexity Π 0 1. We provide a more general version of the fine structure formulas for iterated reflection principles (due to U. Schmerl [24]). This allows us, in a uniform manner, to analyze main fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by restricted forms of induction, including IΣn, IΣ − n, IΠ − n and their combinations. We also obtain new conservation results relating the hierarchies of uniform and local reflection principles. In particular, we show that (for a sufficiently broad class of theories T) the uniform Σ1-reflection principle for T is Σ2-conservative over the corresponding local reflection principle. This bears some corollaries on the hierarchies of restricted induction schemata in arithmetic and provides a key tool for our generalization of Schmerl’s theorem. 1

Let I# 1 be the fragment of elementary Peano Arithmetic in which induction is restricted to #1-formulas. More than three decades ago, Charles Parsons showed that the provably total functions of I# 1 are exactly the primitive recursive functions. In this paper, we observe that Parsons' result is a consequence of Herbrand's theorem concerning the of universal theories. We give a self-contained proof requiring only basic knowledge of mathematical logic.