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29
Principles of Metareasoning
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1991
"... In this paper we outline a general approach to the study of metareasoning, not in the sense of explicating the semantics of explicitly specified metalevel control policies, but in the sense of providing a basis for selecting and justifying computational actions. This research contributes to a devel ..."
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In this paper we outline a general approach to the study of metareasoning, not in the sense of explicating the semantics of explicitly specified metalevel control policies, but in the sense of providing a basis for selecting and justifying computational actions. This research contributes to a developing attack on the problem of resourcebounded rationality, by providing a means for analysing and generating optimal computational strategies. Because reasoning about a computation without doing it necessarily involves uncertainty as to its outcome, probability and decision theory will be our main tools. We develop a general formula for the utility of computations, this utility being derived directly from the ability of computations to affect an agent's external actions. We address some philosophical difficulties that arise in specifying this formula, given our assumption of limited rationality. We also describe a methodology for applying the theory to particular problemsolving systems, a...
Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics
 Philosophy of Science
, 1987
"... you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact inform ..."
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Cited by 14 (0 self)
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you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at.
De Finetti was right: Probability does not exist. Theory and Decision 51: 89–124
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A Mistake in Dynamic Coherence Arguments
 Philosophy of Science 60
, 1993
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, noncommercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at.
Computers in mathematical inquiry
 in The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice
, 2008
"... Computers are playing an increasingly central role in mathematical practice. What are we to make of the new methods of inquiry? In Section 2, I survey some of the ways that computers are used in mathematics. These raise questions that seem to have a generally epistemological character, ..."
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Computers are playing an increasingly central role in mathematical practice. What are we to make of the new methods of inquiry? In Section 2, I survey some of the ways that computers are used in mathematics. These raise questions that seem to have a generally epistemological character,
Introductory Remarks on Metastatistics for The Practically Minded Non–Bayesian Regression Runner Contents
, 2008
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Plausibilities of plausibilities’: an approach through circumstances. Being part I of “From ‘plausibilities of plausibilities’ to stateassignment methods” (2006), eprint arXiv:quantph/0607111
"... Probabilitylike parameters appearing in some statistical models, and their prior distributions, are reinterpreted through the notion of ‘circumstance’, a term which stands for any piece of knowledge that is useful in assigning a probability and that satisfies some additional logical properties. The ..."
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Probabilitylike parameters appearing in some statistical models, and their prior distributions, are reinterpreted through the notion of ‘circumstance’, a term which stands for any piece of knowledge that is useful in assigning a probability and that satisfies some additional logical properties. The idea, which can be traced to Laplace and Jaynes, is that the usual inferential reasonings about the probabilitylike parameters of a statistical model can be conceived as reasonings about equivalence classes of ‘circumstances ’ — viz., real or hypothetical pieces of knowledge, like e.g. physical hypotheses, that are useful in assigning a probability and satisfy some additional logical properties — that are uniquely indexed by the probability distributions they lead to. PACS numbers: 02.50.Cw,02.50.Tt,01.70.+w MSC numbers: 03B48,62F15,60A05 If you can’t join ’em, join ’em together. 0
Dynamically consistent updating of multiple prior beliefs  An algorithmic approach
 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF APPROXIMATE REASONING
, 2011
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Carnap and the logic of inductive inference
 Handbook of the history of logic. Volume 10: Inductive logic
, 2009
"... This chapter discusses Carnap’s work on probability and induction, using the notation and terminology of modern mathematical probability, viewed from the perspective of the modern Bayesian or subjective school of probability. (It is a much expanded and more mathematical version of [Zabell, 2007]). C ..."
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This chapter discusses Carnap’s work on probability and induction, using the notation and terminology of modern mathematical probability, viewed from the perspective of the modern Bayesian or subjective school of probability. (It is a much expanded and more mathematical version of [Zabell, 2007]). Carnap initially