Abstract not found

Abstract not found

Region-based memory management is an alternative to standard tracing garbage collection that makes potentially dangerous operations such as memory deallocation explicit but verifiably safe. In this article, we present a new compiler intermediate language, called the Capability Calculus, that supports region-based memory management and enjoys a provably safe type system. Unlike previous region-based type systems, region lifetimes need not be lexically scoped and yet the language may be checked for safety without complex analyses. Therefore, our type system may be deployed in settings such as extensible operating systems where both the performance and safety of untrusted code is important.

This article shines some light in the "four dark corners," exposing problems and proposing solutions. We show that all descriptions involved in requirements engineering should be descriptions of the environment. We show that certain control information is necessary for sound requirements engineering, and we explain the close association between domain knowledge and refinement of requirements. Together these conclusions explain the precise nature of requirements, specifications, and domain knowledge, as well as the precise nature of the relationships among them. They establish minimum standards for what information should be represented in a requirements language. They also make it possible to determine exactly what it means for requirements engineering to be successfully completed.

Certified code is a general mechanism for enforcing security properties. In this paradigm, untrusted mobile code carries annotations that allow a host to verify its trustworthiness. Before running the agent, the host checks the annotations and proves that they imply the host's security policy. Despite the flexibility of this scheme, so far, compilers that generate certified code have focused on simple type safety properties rather than more general security properties.

Replication is an area of interest to both distributed systems and databases. The solutions developed from these two perspectives are conceptually similar but differ in many aspects: model, assumptions, mechanisms, guarantees provided, and implementation. In this paper, we provide an abstract and “neutral ” framework to compare replication techniques from both communities. The framework has been designed to emphasize the role played by different mechanisms and to facilitate comparisons. The paper describes the replication techniques used in both communities, compares them, and points out ways in which they can be integrated to arrive to better, more robust replication protocols. 1.

Processes that roam a network---agents---present new technical challenges. Two are discussed here. The first problem, which arises in connection with implementing fault-tolerant agents, concerns how a voter authenticates the agents comprising its electorate. The second is to characterize security policies that are enforceable as well as approaches for enforcing those policies.

. In this survey paper we present some of the recent developments in the temporal formal system for the specification, verification and development of reactive programs. While the general methodology remains very much the one presented in some earlier works on the subject, such as [MP83c, MP83a, Pnu86], there have been several technical improvements and gained insights in understanding the computational model, the logic itself, the proof system and its presentation, and connections with alternative formalisms, such as finite automata. In this paper we explicate some of these improvements and extensions. The main difference between this and preceding versions is that here we consider a notion of validity for temporal formulae, which is anchored at the initial state of the computation. The paper discusses some of the consequences of this decision. Key words: Temporal Logic, Reactive Systems, Concurrent Programs, Specification, Verification, Proof System, Classification of Prtoperties, Sa...

Machine We have described the type constructor language of CL and the typing rules for the main term-level constructs. In fact, the previous section contains all of the ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems, Vol. TBD, No. TDB, Month Year. 20 D. Walker, K. Crary, and G. Morrisett #; #;# # h at r : # # # # f : Type #; ## # ; #{f :# f , x 1 :# 1 , . . . , xn :# n}; C # e # # f = #[# # ].(C, # 1 , . . . , #n ) # 0 at r f, x 1 , . . . , xn ## Dom(#) # #; #;# # fix f[# # ](C, x 1 :# 1 , . . . , xn :# n ).e at r : # f (h-fix) #; #;# # v i : # i (for 1 # i # n) # # r : Rgn #; #;# # #v 1 , . . . , vn # at r : ## 1 , . . . , #n # at r (h-tuple) #; #;# # h at r : # # # # # # = # : Type #; #;# # h at r : # (h-eq) #; #;# # v : # #; #;# # x : # (#(x) = #) (v-var) #; #;# # i : int (v-int) #; #;# # v : #[#:#, # # ].(C, # 1 , . . . , #n ) # 0 at r # # c : # #; #;# # v[c] : (#[# # ].(C, # 1 , . . . , #n ) # 0)[c/#] at r (v-type) #; #;# # v : #[# # C ## , # # ].(C # , # 1 , . . . , #n ) # 0 at r # # C # C ## #; #;# # v[C] : (#[# # ].(C # , # 1 , . . . , #n ) # 0)[C/#] at r (v-sub) #; #;# # v : # # # # # # = # : Type #; #;# # v : # (v-eq) Fig. 6. Capability static semantics: Heap and word values. information programmers or compilers require to write type-safe programs in CL. However, in order to prove a type soundness result in the style of Wright and Felleisen [Wright and Felleisen 1994], we must be able to type check programs at every step during their evaluation. In this section, we give the static semantics of the run-time values that are not normally manipulated by programmers, but are nevertheless necessary to prove our soundness result. At first, the formal definition ...

We show how to determine statically whether it is safe for untrusted machine code to be loaded into a trusted host system. Our safety-checking technique operates directly on the untrusted machine-code program, requiring only that the initial inputs to the untrusted program be annotated with typestate information and linear constraints. This approach opens up the possibility of being able to certify code produced by any compiler from any source language, which gives the code producers more freedom in choosing the language in which they write their programs. It eliminates the dependence of safety on the correctness of the compiler because the final product of the compiler is checked. It leads to the decoupling of the safety policy from the language in which the untrusted code is written, and consequently, makes it possible for safety checking to be performed with respect to an extensible set of safety properties that are specified on the host side. We have implemented a prototype safety checker for SPARC machine-language programs, and applied the safety checker to several examples. The safety checker was able to either prove that an example met the necessary safety conditions, or identify the places where the safety conditions were violated. The checking times ranged from less than a second to 14 seconds on an UltraSPARC machine.