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This paper introduces a logic ILED derived from standard intuitionistic sentence logic by adding two operators Dj for "Definitely j" and ~j for "Experience rejects j". A further negation j = def (j®^) Ú ~j , which we call real negation, is introduced. Real negation is like intuitionistic negation when there are no D-operators but deviates when there are. We see that Dj j is valid but Dj ® j is not and hence that contraposition fails for real negation. We give a semantics for this logic, axiomatise it and prove the axiomatisation complete. Finally we show that real negation behaves as standard intuitionistic negation within D-free contexts. The logic ILED is proposed as an extension of intuitionistic logic apt for use as a general logic. Introduction The use of intuitionistic logic as a general logic is made difficult by the usual interpretation of intuitionistic negation: to assert not-j is to assert that j derives absurdity. This is constrained by the definition of j by j®^ and the...

Since the seventies, it has been customary to assume that intentionality is independent of consciousness. Recently, a number of philosophers have rejected this assumption, claiming that intentionality is closely tied to consciousness, inasmuch as non-conscious intentionality in some sense depends upon conscious intentionality. Within this alternative framework, the question arises of how to account for unconscious intentionality, and different authors have offered different accounts. A central goal of this paper is to argue for a broadly Dennettian, interpretivist account of unconscious intentionality. A second goal is to argue that an upshot of interpretivism is that all unconscious intentionality is ultimately grounded is a specific kind of cognitive phenomenology, namely, the phenomenology of conscious interpretive acts.

If a possible-worlds semantic theory for modal logics is pure, then the assertion of the theory, taken at face-value, can bring no commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds (genuine or ersatz). But if we consider an applied theory (an application of the pure theory) in which the elements of the models are required to be possible worlds, then assertion of such a theory, taken at face-value, does appear to bring commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds. Or at least that is so if the applied theory is adequate. For an applied possible-worlds semantic theory that is constrained to contain only one-world models is bound to deliver results on validity, soundness and completeness that are apt to seem disastrous. I attempt to steer a course between commitment to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds and commitment to such a disastrous applied possible-worlds semantics by noting, and developing, the position of one who asserts such a theory at face-value but who remains agnostic about the existence of other (non-actualized) possible worlds. Thus, a novel interpretation of applied possible-worlds semantics is offered on which we may lay claim to whatever benefits such a theory offers while avoiding realism about (other) possible worlds. Thereby, the contention that applied possible-worlds semantics gives us reason to be realists about possible worlds is (further) undermined. 1.

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Antirealists have hitherto offered at best sketches of a theory of truth. This paper presents an antirealist theory of truth in some formal detail. It is shown that the theory is able to deal satisfactorily with some problems that are standardly taken to beset antirealism. According to antirealists, there is an intimate connection between truth and human cognitive capacities which holds of conceptual necessity. While antirealists differ about the exact nature of the connection, the point of conceptual necessity is undisputed; it distinguishes the antirealist conception of truth from a realist one accompanied by some methodological view to the effect that, by natural selection or just by good fortune perhaps, our epistemic powers happen to be so attuned to the world we inhabit that there exist no truths which are beyond our ken in principle. So far antirealists have proposed constraints to be met by antirealist theories of truth, and even a sporadic “informal elucidation ” of antirealist truth (Putnam [1981:56]), but an antirealist theory of truth, comparable, if only just remotely, in formal precision to Tarski’s [1956] theory

The aim of this article is to show that the prospects for intentional irrealism are much brighter than it is generally thought. In the first section, I provide a general characterization of some of the various forms that the realism/irrealism debates might take. In the second, I ask whether there is any defensible form of realism about intentional states. I show that most candidates are nearly trivially false, and that the only form of intentional realism which is not, is a restricted one which is prima facie no more plausible than the corresponding form of irrealism. In the third and last section, I defend my interpretation of what intentional irrealism amounts to against some possible misunderstandings, give some reasons why it should be taken seriously and argue that it could plausibly be attributed to Davidson. Zòt kwè nou se woman men lè w byen gade se blag nou ye, pa plis. (Some people believe that we are narratives, but seen from a different perspective,

conference at the University of Connecticut in the Fall of 2002. I am grateful for the help of these audiences, and especially to Prof. Soames. againstgaps.tex: March 7, 2003 (13:13) Many things are neither true nor false: shoes and ships and sealing wax, to name a few. But these things are neither true nor false because they are not the kinds of things that can be either. There are also some things that are apt for being true or false. Preferences vary on exactly what these things are. Common candidates include utterances, interpreted sentences paired with contexts, and propositions. Can there be something that is apt to be true or false, but fails to be either? This is the question of whether there are substantial truth-value gaps. It has been a persistent idea in the philosophy of language that there are substantial truthvalue gaps. This view was held, at some moments, by Strawson1 and by Frege. 2 More recently, Scott Soames3 has presented an argument in favor of the view, and has applied it to some issues related to semantic paradoxes and to vagueness. In its own right, the question is deeply involved with some of the very basic issues in the philosophy of language: content, assertion, and truth. In this essay, I shall argue that there are no substantial truth-value gaps. There are some

This thesis is concerned with the challenge truth-value gaps pose to the principle of bivalence. The central question addressed is: are truth-value gaps counterexamples to bivalence and is the supposition of counterexamples coherent? My aim is to examine putative cases of truth-value gaps against an argument by Timothy Williamson, which shows that the supposition of counterexamples to bivalence is contradictory. The upshot of his argument is that either problematic utterances say nothing, or they cannot be neither true nor false. I start by identifying truth-bearers: an utterance, for instance, is a truth-bearer if it says that something is the case. Truth-bearers are evaluable items, with truth- and falsityconditions statable in corresponding instances of schemas for truth and falsehood. A genuine case of a truth-value gap should be an utterance that is neither true nor false but says something to be the case. But it is inconsistent to accept the schemas for truth and falsehood and the existence of genuine cases of truth-value gaps. Secondly, I expound Williamson’s argument, which explores this inconsistency, and I identify two kinds of strategy to disarm