Results 1  10
of
234
Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols
, 2013
"... We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved ..."
Abstract

Cited by 611 (34 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We present a general framework for representing cryptographic protocols and analyzing their security. The framework allows specifying the security requirements of practically any cryptographic task in a unified and systematic way. Furthermore, in this framework the security of protocols is preserved under a general protocol composition operation, called universal composition. The proposed framework with its securitypreserving composition operation allows for modular design and analysis of complex cryptographic protocols from relatively simple building blocks. Moreover, within this framework, protocols are guaranteed to maintain their security in any context, even in the presence of an unbounded number of arbitrary protocol instances that run concurrently in an adversarially controlled manner. This is a useful guarantee, that allows arguing about the security of cryptographic protocols in complex and unpredictable environments such as modern communication networks.
Efficient Group Signature Schemes for Large Groups (Extended Abstract)
, 1997
"... A group signature scheme allows members of a group to sign messages on the group's behalf such that the resulting signature does not reveal their identity. Only a designated group manager is able to identify the group member who issued a given signature. Previously proposed realizations of group sig ..."
Abstract

Cited by 264 (26 self)
 Add to MetaCart
A group signature scheme allows members of a group to sign messages on the group's behalf such that the resulting signature does not reveal their identity. Only a designated group manager is able to identify the group member who issued a given signature. Previously proposed realizations of group signature schemes have the undesirable property that the length of the public key is linear in the size of the group. In this paper we propose the first group signature scheme whose public key and signatures have length independent of the number of group members and which can therefore also be used for large groups. Furthermore, the scheme allows the group manager to add new members to the group without modifying the public key. The realization is ba...
Bit Commitment Using PseudoRandomness
 Journal of Cryptology
, 1991
"... We show how a pseudorandom generator can provide a bit commitment protocol. We also analyze the number of bits communicated when parties commit to many bits simultaneously, and show that the assumption of the existence of pseudorandom generators suffices to assure amortized O(1) bits of communicat ..."
Abstract

Cited by 228 (15 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We show how a pseudorandom generator can provide a bit commitment protocol. We also analyze the number of bits communicated when parties commit to many bits simultaneously, and show that the assumption of the existence of pseudorandom generators suffices to assure amortized O(1) bits of communication per bit commitment.
On the Composition of ZeroKnowledge Proof Systems
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 1990
"... : The wide applicability of zeroknowledge interactive proofs comes from the possibility of using these proofs as subroutines in cryptographic protocols. A basic question concerning this use is whether the (sequential and/or parallel) composition of zeroknowledge protocols is zeroknowledge too. We ..."
Abstract

Cited by 190 (14 self)
 Add to MetaCart
: The wide applicability of zeroknowledge interactive proofs comes from the possibility of using these proofs as subroutines in cryptographic protocols. A basic question concerning this use is whether the (sequential and/or parallel) composition of zeroknowledge protocols is zeroknowledge too. We demonstrate the limitations of the composition of zeroknowledge protocols by proving that the original definition of zeroknowledge is not closed under sequential composition; and that even the strong formulations of zeroknowledge (e.g. blackbox simulation) are not closed under parallel execution. We present lower bounds on the round complexity of zeroknowledge proofs, with significant implications to the parallelization of zeroknowledge protocols. We prove that 3round interactive proofs and constantround ArthurMerlin proofs that are blackbox simulation zeroknowledge exist only for languages in BPP. In particular, it follows that the "parallel versions" of the first interactive proo...
Noninteractive ZeroKnowledge
 SIAM J. COMPUTING
, 1991
"... This paper investigates the possibility of disposing of interaction between prover and verifier in a zeroknowledge proof if they share beforehand a short random string. Without any assumption, it is proven that noninteractive zeroknowledge proofs exist for some numbertheoretic languages for which ..."
Abstract

Cited by 188 (19 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper investigates the possibility of disposing of interaction between prover and verifier in a zeroknowledge proof if they share beforehand a short random string. Without any assumption, it is proven that noninteractive zeroknowledge proofs exist for some numbertheoretic languages for which no efficient algorithm is known. If deciding quadratic residuosity (modulo composite integers whose factorization is not known) is computationally hard, it is shown that the NPcomplete language of satisfiability also possesses noninteractive zeroknowledge proofs.
Limits on the Provable Consequences of Oneway Permutations
, 1989
"... We present strong evidence that the implication, "if oneway permutations exist, then secure secret key agreement is possible" is not provable by standard techniques. Since both sides of this implication are widely believed true in real life, to show that the implication is false requires a new m ..."
Abstract

Cited by 162 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We present strong evidence that the implication, "if oneway permutations exist, then secure secret key agreement is possible" is not provable by standard techniques. Since both sides of this implication are widely believed true in real life, to show that the implication is false requires a new model. We consider a world where dl parties have access to a black box or a randomly selected permutation. Being totally random, this permutation will be strongly oneway in provable, informationthevretic way. We show that, if P = NP, no protocol for secret key agreement is secure in such setting. Thus, to prove that a secret key greement protocol which uses a oneway permutation as a black box is secure is as hrd as proving F NP. We also obtain, as corollary, that there is an oracle relative to which the implication is false, i.e., there is a oneway permutation, yet secretexchange is impossible. Thus, no technique which relativizes can prove that secret exchange can be based on any oneway permutation. Our results present a general framework for proving statements of the form, "Cryptographic application X is not likely possible based solely on complexity assumption Y." 1
How to Construct ConstantRound ZeroKnowledge Proof Systems for NP
 Journal of Cryptology
, 1995
"... Constantround zeroknowledge proof systems for every language in NP are presented, assuming the existence of a collection of clawfree functions. In particular, it follows that such proof systems exist assuming the intractability of either the Discrete Logarithm Problem or the Factoring Problem for ..."
Abstract

Cited by 157 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Constantround zeroknowledge proof systems for every language in NP are presented, assuming the existence of a collection of clawfree functions. In particular, it follows that such proof systems exist assuming the intractability of either the Discrete Logarithm Problem or the Factoring Problem for Blum Integers.
Using Secure Coprocessors
, 1994
"... The views and conclusions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or endorsements of any of the research sponsors. How do we build distributed systems that are secure? Cryptographic techniques can be used to secure the communications between p ..."
Abstract

Cited by 150 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The views and conclusions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or endorsements of any of the research sponsors. How do we build distributed systems that are secure? Cryptographic techniques can be used to secure the communications between physically separated systems, but this is not enough: we must be able to guarantee the privacy of the cryptographic keys and the integrity of the cryptographic functions, in addition to the integrity of the security kernel and access control databases we have on the machines. Physical security is a central assumption upon which secure distributed systems are built; without this foundation even the best cryptosystem or the most secure kernel will crumble. In this thesis, I address the distributed security problem by proposing the addition of a small, physically secure hardware module, a secure coprocessor, to standard workstations and PCs. My central axiom is that secure coprocessors are able to maintain the privacy of the data they process. This thesis attacks the distributed security problem from multiple sides. First, I analyze the security properties of existing system components, both at the hardware and
A note on efficient zeroknowledge proofs and arguments (Extended Abstract)
, 1992
"... In this note, we present new zeroknowledge interactive proofs and arguments for languages in NP. To show that z G L, with an error probability of at most 2k, our zeroknowledge proof system requires O(lzlc’) + O(lg ” l~l)k ideal bit commitments, where c1 and cz depend only on L. This construction ..."
Abstract

Cited by 146 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In this note, we present new zeroknowledge interactive proofs and arguments for languages in NP. To show that z G L, with an error probability of at most 2k, our zeroknowledge proof system requires O(lzlc’) + O(lg ” l~l)k ideal bit commitments, where c1 and cz depend only on L. This construction is the first in the ideal bit commitment model that achieves large values of k more efficiently than by running k independent iterations of the base interactive proof system. Under suitable complexity assumptions, we exhibit a zeroknowledge arguments that require O(lg ’ Izl)ki bits of communication, where c depends only on L, and 1 is the security parameter for the prover.l This is the first construction in which the total amount of communication can be less than that needed to transmit the NP witness. Our protocols are based on efficiently checkable proofs for NP [4].
Universally Composable Commitments
, 2001
"... We propose a new security measure for commitment protocols, called Universally Composable ..."
Abstract

Cited by 140 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We propose a new security measure for commitment protocols, called Universally Composable