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441
How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats
 Psychological Review
, 1995
"... Is the mind, by design, predisposed against performing Bayesian inference? Previous research on base rate neglect suggests that the mind lacks the appropriate cognitive algorithms. However, any claim against the existence of an algorithm, Bayesian or otherwise, is impossible to evaluate unless one s ..."
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Cited by 233 (21 self)
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Is the mind, by design, predisposed against performing Bayesian inference? Previous research on base rate neglect suggests that the mind lacks the appropriate cognitive algorithms. However, any claim against the existence of an algorithm, Bayesian or otherwise, is impossible to evaluate unless one specifies the information format in which it is designed to operate. The authors show that Bayesian algorithms are computationally simpler in frequency formats than in the probability formats used in previous research. Frequency formats correspond to the sequential way information is acquired in natural sampling, from animal foraging to neural networks. By analyzing several thousand solutions to Bayesian problems, the authors found that when information was presented in frequency formats, statistically naive participants derived up to 50 % of all inferences by Bayesian algorithms. NonBayesian algorithms included simple versions of Fisherian and NeymanPearsonian inference. Is the mind, by design, predisposed against performing Bayesian inference? The classical probabilists of the Enlightenment, including Condorcet, Poisson, and Laplace, equated probability theory with the common sense of educated people, who were known then as “hommes éclairés.” Laplace (1814/1951) declared that “the theory of probability is at bottom nothing more than good sense reduced to a calculus which evaluates that which good minds know by a sort of instinct,
Using confidence intervals in withinsubject designs
 Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
, 1994
"... Wolford, and two anonymous reviewers for very useful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Correspondence may be addressed to ..."
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Cited by 193 (22 self)
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Wolford, and two anonymous reviewers for very useful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Correspondence may be addressed to
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection
 67 – 215535 Deliverable 4.1
, 1994
"... Human reasoning in hypothesistesting tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed ..."
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Cited by 166 (9 self)
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Human reasoning in hypothesistesting tasks like Wason's (1966, 1968) selection task has been depicted as prone to systematic biases. However, performance on this task has been assessed against a now outmoded falsificationist philosophy of science. Therefore, the experimental data is reassessed in the light of a Bayesian model of optimal data selection in inductive hypothesis testing. The model provides a rational analysis (Anderson, 1990) of the selection task that fits well with people's performance on both abstract and thematic versions of the task. The model suggests that reasoning in these tasks may be rational rather than subject to systematic bias. Over the past 30 years, results in the psychology of reasoning have raised doubts about human rationality. The assumption of human rationality has a long history. Aristotle took the capacity for rational thought to be the defining characteristic of human beings, the capacity that separated us from the animals. Descartes regarded the ability to use language and to reason as the hallmarks of the mental that separated it from the merely physical. Many contemporary philosophers of mind also appeal to a basic principle of rationality in accounting for everyday, folk psychological explanation whereby we explain each other's behavior in terms of our beliefs and desires (Cherniak, 1986; Cohen, 1981; Davidson, 1984; Dennett, 1987; but see Stich, 1990). These philosophers, both ancient and modern, share a common view of rationality: To be rational is to reason according to rules (Brown, 1989). Logic and mathematics provide the normative rules that tell us how we should reason. Rationality therefore seems to demand that the human cognitive system embodies the rules of logic and mathematics. However, results in the psychology of reasoning appear to show that people do not reason according to these rules. In both deductive (Evans, 1982, 1989;
A knowledge plane for the Internet
 In SIGCOMM
, 2003
"... One of the Internet’s greatest strengths is that it does not know or care what its applications are or what they are doing: it simply forwards data. Yet network users experience the network through the functioning and performance of applications. This divergence of perspective leads to a number of p ..."
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Cited by 135 (3 self)
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One of the Internet’s greatest strengths is that it does not know or care what its applications are or what they are doing: it simply forwards data. Yet network users experience the network through the functioning and performance of applications. This divergence of perspective leads to a number of problems. For example, a user whose local DNS service has failed may perceive the network as broken, even though from a network perspective, data continues to flow correctly. If an email server or a Web server fails, the user will say the network is broken; the network operator will say the network is fine. We need a way to make the network more aware of itself and its applications, without destroying the open and transparent data plane. To meet this need we propose the creation of an Internet knowledge plane. The knowledge plane is a distributed and decentralized construct within the network that gathers, aggregates, and manages information about network behavior and operation, and provides an integrated view to all parties (operators, users, and the network itself). The goal is to enlarge our view of what constitutes the network to match the intuition of a user, and to enhance our ability to manage the network intelligently, without disturbing the open and unknowing forwarding plane. The knowledge plane is intelligent: it can reason about the network’s behavior and act upon the results of its reasoning. It can remember and learn from past behavior. To achieve that goal, we propose to adapt and employ recent work in cognition such as the separation of algorithm, policy and goals, and new models for knowledge representation.
Decision Theory in Expert Systems and Artificial Intelligence
 International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
, 1988
"... Despite their different perspectives, artificial intelligence (AI) and the disciplines of decision science have common roots and strive for similar goals. This paper surveys the potential for addressing problems in representation, inference, knowledge engineering, and explanation within the decision ..."
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Cited by 93 (18 self)
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Despite their different perspectives, artificial intelligence (AI) and the disciplines of decision science have common roots and strive for similar goals. This paper surveys the potential for addressing problems in representation, inference, knowledge engineering, and explanation within the decisiontheoretic framework. Recent analyses of the restrictions of several traditional AI reasoning techniques, coupled with the development of more tractable and expressive decisiontheoretic representation and inference strategies, have stimulated renewed interest in decision theory and decision analysis. We describe early experience with simple probabilistic schemes for automated reasoning, review the dominant expertsystem paradigm, and survey some recent research at the crossroads of AI and decision science. In particular, we present the belief network and influence diagram representations. Finally, we discuss issues that have not been studied in detail within the expertsystems sett...
Minimum Description Length Induction, Bayesianism, and Kolmogorov Complexity
 IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
, 1998
"... The relationship between the Bayesian approach and the minimum description length approach is established. We sharpen and clarify the general modeling principles MDL and MML, abstracted as the ideal MDL principle and defined from Bayes's rule by means of Kolmogorov complexity. The basic conditi ..."
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Cited by 67 (7 self)
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The relationship between the Bayesian approach and the minimum description length approach is established. We sharpen and clarify the general modeling principles MDL and MML, abstracted as the ideal MDL principle and defined from Bayes's rule by means of Kolmogorov complexity. The basic condition under which the ideal principle should be applied is encapsulated as the Fundamental Inequality, which in broad terms states that the principle is valid when the data are random, relative to every contemplated hypothesis and also these hypotheses are random relative to the (universal) prior. Basically, the ideal principle states that the prior probability associated with the hypothesis should be given by the algorithmic universal probability, and the sum of the log universal probability of the model plus the log of the probability of the data given the model should be minimized. If we restrict the model class to the finite sets then application of the ideal principle turns into Kolmogorov's mi...
Soft Computing: the Convergence of Emerging Reasoning Technologies
 Soft Computing
, 1997
"... The term Soft Computing (SC) represents the combination of emerging problemsolving technologies such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), Probabilistic Reasoning (PR), Neural Networks (NNs), and Genetic Algorithms (GAs). Each of these technologies provide us with complementary reasoning and searching methods to so ..."
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Cited by 54 (8 self)
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The term Soft Computing (SC) represents the combination of emerging problemsolving technologies such as Fuzzy Logic (FL), Probabilistic Reasoning (PR), Neural Networks (NNs), and Genetic Algorithms (GAs). Each of these technologies provide us with complementary reasoning and searching methods to solve complex, realworld problems. After a brief description of each of these technologies, we will analyze some of their most useful combinations, such as the use of FL to control GAs and NNs parameters; the application of GAs to evolve NNs (topologies or weights) or to tune FL controllers; and the implementation of FL controllers as NNs tuned by backpropagationtype algorithms.
From Laplace To Supernova Sn 1987a: Bayesian Inference In Astrophysics
, 1990
"... . The Bayesian approach to probability theory is presented as an alternative to the currently used longrun relative frequency approach, which does not offer clear, compelling criteria for the design of statistical methods. Bayesian probability theory offers unique and demonstrably optimal solutions ..."
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Cited by 52 (2 self)
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. The Bayesian approach to probability theory is presented as an alternative to the currently used longrun relative frequency approach, which does not offer clear, compelling criteria for the design of statistical methods. Bayesian probability theory offers unique and demonstrably optimal solutions to wellposed statistical problems, and is historically the original approach to statistics. The reasons for earlier rejection of Bayesian methods are discussed, and it is noted that the work of Cox, Jaynes, and others answers earlier objections, giving Bayesian inference a firm logical and mathematical foundation as the correct mathematical language for quantifying uncertainty. The Bayesian approaches to parameter estimation and model comparison are outlined and illustrated by application to a simple problem based on the gaussian distribution. As further illustrations of the Bayesian paradigm, Bayesian solutions to two interesting astrophysical problems are outlined: the measurement of wea...
Detection of Stochastic Processes
 IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory
, 1998
"... This paper reviews two streams of development, from the 1940's to the present, in signal detection theory: the structure of the likelihood ratio for detecting signals in noise and the role of dynamic optimization in detection problems involving either very large signal sets or the joint optimiz ..."
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Cited by 41 (6 self)
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This paper reviews two streams of development, from the 1940's to the present, in signal detection theory: the structure of the likelihood ratio for detecting signals in noise and the role of dynamic optimization in detection problems involving either very large signal sets or the joint optimization of observation time and performance. This treatment deals exclusively with basic results developed for the situation in which the observations are modeled as continuoustime stochastic processes. The mathematics and intuition behind such developments as the matched filter, the RAKE receiver, the estimatorcorrelator, maximumlikelihood sequence detectors, multiuser detectors, sequential probability ratio tests, and cumulativesum quickest detectors, are described. Index Terms Dynamic programming, innovations processes, likelihood ratios, martingale theory, matched filters, optimal stopping, reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces, sequence detection, sequential methods, signal detection, signal estimation.
Formal Rules for Selecting Prior Distributions: A Review and Annotated Bibliography
 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION
, 1994
"... Subjectivism has become the dominant philosophical foundation for Bayesian inference. Yet, in practice, most Bayesian analyses are performed with socalled "noninformative" priors, that is, priors constructed by some formal rule. We review the plethora of techniques for constructing such p ..."
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Cited by 40 (0 self)
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Subjectivism has become the dominant philosophical foundation for Bayesian inference. Yet, in practice, most Bayesian analyses are performed with socalled "noninformative" priors, that is, priors constructed by some formal rule. We review the plethora of techniques for constructing such priors, and discuss some of the practical and philosophical issues that arise when they are used. We give special emphasis to Jeffreys's rules and discuss the evolution of his point of view about the interpretation of priors, away from unique representation of ignorance toward the notion that they should be chosen by convention. We conclude that the problems raised by the research on priors chosen by formal rules are serious and may not be dismissed lightly; when sample sizes are small (relative to the number of parameters being estimated) it is dangerous to put faith in any "default" solution; but when asymptotics take over, Jeffreys's rules and their variants remain reasonable choices. We also provi...