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257
Boosting and differential privacy
, 2010
"... Abstract—Boosting is a general method for improving the accuracy of learning algorithms. We use boosting to construct improved privacypreserving synopses of an input database. These are data structures that yield, for a given set Q of queries over an input database, reasonably accurate estimates of ..."
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Cited by 306 (8 self)
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Abstract—Boosting is a general method for improving the accuracy of learning algorithms. We use boosting to construct improved privacypreserving synopses of an input database. These are data structures that yield, for a given set Q of queries over an input database, reasonably accurate estimates of the responses to every query in Q, even when the number of queries is much larger than the number of rows in the database. Given a base synopsis generator that takes a distribution on Q and produces a “weak ” synopsis that yields “good ” answers for a majority of the weight in Q, our Boosting for Queries algorithm obtains a synopsis that is good for all of Q. We ensure privacy for the rows of the database, but the boosting is performed on the queries. We also provide the first synopsis generators for arbitrary sets of arbitrary lowsensitivity
Lossy Trapdoor Functions and Their Applications
 ELECTRONIC COLLOQUIUM ON COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY, REPORT NO. 80 (2007)
, 2007
"... We propose a new general primitive called lossy trapdoor functions (lossy TDFs), and realize it under a variety of different number theoretic assumptions, including hardness of the decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) problem and the worstcase hardness of standard lattice problems. Using lossy TDFs, we ..."
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Cited by 84 (18 self)
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We propose a new general primitive called lossy trapdoor functions (lossy TDFs), and realize it under a variety of different number theoretic assumptions, including hardness of the decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) problem and the worstcase hardness of standard lattice problems. Using lossy TDFs, we develop a new approach for constructing many important cryptographic primitives, including standard trapdoor functions, CCAsecure cryptosystems, collisionresistant hash functions, and more. All of our constructions are simple, efficient, and blackbox. Taken all together, these results resolve some longstanding open problems in cryptography. They give the first known (injective) trapdoor functions based on problems not directly related to integer factorization, and provide the first known CCAsecure cryptosystem based solely on worstcase lattice assumptions.
Simultaneous hardcore bits and cryptography against memory attacks
 IN TCC
, 2009
"... This paper considers two questions in cryptography. Cryptography Secure Against Memory Attacks. A particularly devastating sidechannel attack against cryptosystems, termed the “memory attack”, was proposed recently. In this attack, a significant fraction of the bits of a secret key of a cryptograp ..."
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Cited by 75 (8 self)
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This paper considers two questions in cryptography. Cryptography Secure Against Memory Attacks. A particularly devastating sidechannel attack against cryptosystems, termed the “memory attack”, was proposed recently. In this attack, a significant fraction of the bits of a secret key of a cryptographic algorithm can be measured by an adversary if the secret key is ever stored in a part of memory which can be accessed even after power has been turned off for a short amount of time. Such an attack has been shown to completely compromise the security of various cryptosystems in use, including the RSA cryptosystem and AES. We show that the publickey encryption scheme of Regev (STOC 2005), and the identitybased encryption scheme of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan (STOC 2008) are remarkably robust against memory attacks where the adversary can measure a large fraction of the bits of the secretkey, or more generally, can compute an arbitrary function of the secretkey of bounded output length. This is done without increasing the size of the secretkey, and without introducing any
Biometric Template Security
 EURASIP JOURNAL ON ADVANCES IN SIGNAL PROCESSING
, 2008
"... Biometric recognition offers a reliable and natural solution to the problem of user authentication in identity management systems. With the widespread deployment of biometric systems in various applications, there are increasing concerns about the security and privacy of biometric technology. Public ..."
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Cited by 68 (10 self)
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Biometric recognition offers a reliable and natural solution to the problem of user authentication in identity management systems. With the widespread deployment of biometric systems in various applications, there are increasing concerns about the security and privacy of biometric technology. Public confidence and acceptance of the biometrics technology will depend on the ability of system designers to demonstrate that these systems are robust, have low error rates and are tamper proof. We present a highlevel categorization of the various vulnerabilities of a biometric system and discuss countermeasures that have been proposed to address these vulnerabilities. In particular, we focus on biometric template security which is an important issue because unlike passwords and tokens, compromised biometric templates cannot be revoked and reissued. Due to intrauser variability in the acquired biometric traits, ensuring the security of the template while maintaining the recognition performance is a challenging task. We present an overview of various biometric template protection schemes and discuss their advantages and limitations in terms of security, revocability and impact on matching accuracy. A template protection scheme with provable security and acceptable recognition performance has thus far remained elusive. Development of such a scheme is crucial as biometric systems are beginning to proliferate into the core physical and information infrastructure of our society.
Reusable cryptographic fuzzy extractors
 ACM CCS 2004, ACM
, 2004
"... We show that a number of recent definitions and constructions of fuzzy extractors are not adequate for multiple uses of the same fuzzy secret—a major shortcoming in the case of biometric applications. We propose two particularly stringent security models that specifically address the case of fuzzy s ..."
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Cited by 65 (2 self)
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We show that a number of recent definitions and constructions of fuzzy extractors are not adequate for multiple uses of the same fuzzy secret—a major shortcoming in the case of biometric applications. We propose two particularly stringent security models that specifically address the case of fuzzy secret reuse, respectively from an outsider and an insider perspective, in what we call a chosen perturbation attack. We characterize the conditions that fuzzy extractors need to satisfy to be secure, and present generic constructions from ordinary building blocks. As an illustration, we demonstrate how to use a biometric secret in a remote error tolerant authentication protocol that does not require any storage on the client’s side. 1
Secure remote authentication using biometric data
 In EUROCRYPT
, 2005
"... We show two efficient techniques enabling the use of biometric data to achieve mutual authentication or authenticated key exchange over a completely insecure (i.e., adversarially controlled) channel. In addition to achieving stronger security guarantees than the work of Boyen, we improve upon his so ..."
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Cited by 60 (12 self)
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We show two efficient techniques enabling the use of biometric data to achieve mutual authentication or authenticated key exchange over a completely insecure (i.e., adversarially controlled) channel. In addition to achieving stronger security guarantees than the work of Boyen, we improve upon his solution in a number of other respects: we tolerate a broader class of errors and, in one case, improve upon the parameters of his solution and give a proof of security in the standard model. 1 Using Biometric Data for Secure Authentication Biometric data, as a potential source of highentropy, secret information, havebeen suggested as a way to enable strong, cryptographicallysecure authentication of human users without requiring them to remember or store traditionalcryptographic keys. Before such data can be used in existing cryptographic protocols, however, two issues must be addressed: first, biometric data are not uniformly distributed and hence do not offer provable security guarantees if used
Correcting errors without leaking partial information
 In 37th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC
, 2005
"... This paper explores what kinds of information two parties must communicate in order to correct errors which occur in a shared secret string W. Any bits they communicate must leak a significant amount of information about W — that is, from the adversary’s point of view, the entropy of W will drop sig ..."
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Cited by 55 (9 self)
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This paper explores what kinds of information two parties must communicate in order to correct errors which occur in a shared secret string W. Any bits they communicate must leak a significant amount of information about W — that is, from the adversary’s point of view, the entropy of W will drop significantly. Nevertheless, we construct schemes with which Alice and Bob can prevent an adversary from learning any useful information about W. Specifically, if the entropy of W is sufficiently high, then there is no function f(W) which the adversary can learn from the errorcorrection information with significant probability. This leads to several new results: (a) the design of noisetolerant “perfectly oneway” hash functions in the sense of Canetti et al. [7], which in turn leads to obfuscation of proximity queries for high entropy secrets W; (b) private fuzzy extractors [11], which allow one to extract uniformly random bits from noisy and nonuniform data W, while also insuring that no sensitive information about W is leaked; and (c) noise tolerance and stateless key reuse in the Bounded Storage Model, resolving the main open problem of Ding [10]. The heart of our constructions is the design of strong randomness extractors with the property that the source W can be recovered from the extracted randomness and any string W ′ which is close to W.
Efficient lattice (H)IBE in the standard model
 In EUROCRYPT 2010, LNCS
, 2010
"... Abstract. We construct an efficient identity based encryption system based on the standard learning with errors (LWE) problem. Our security proof holds in the standard model. The key step in the construction is a family of lattices for which there are two distinct trapdoors for finding short vectors ..."
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Cited by 52 (10 self)
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Abstract. We construct an efficient identity based encryption system based on the standard learning with errors (LWE) problem. Our security proof holds in the standard model. The key step in the construction is a family of lattices for which there are two distinct trapdoors for finding short vectors. One trapdoor enables the real system to generate short vectors in all lattices in the family. The other trapdoor enables the simulator to generate short vectors for all lattices in the family except for one. We extend this basic technique to an adaptivelysecure IBE and a Hierarchical IBE. 1
PublicKey Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
"... Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture sidechannel attacks. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. Inspired by recent sidec ..."
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Cited by 51 (6 self)
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Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture sidechannel attacks. Such attacks exploit various forms of unintended information leakage, which is inherent to almost all physical implementations. Inspired by recent sidechannel attacks, especially the “cold boot attacks ” of Halderman et al. (USENIX Security ’08), Akavia, Goldwasser and Vaikuntanathan (TCC ’09) formalized a realistic framework for modeling the security of encryption schemes against a wide class of sidechannel attacks in which adversarially chosen functions of the secret key are leaked. In the setting of publickey encryption, Akavia et al. showed that Regev’s latticebased scheme (STOC ’05) is resilient to any leakage of
On the Foundations of Quantitative Information Flow
"... Abstract. There is growing interest in quantitative theories of information flow in a variety of contexts, such as secure information flow, anonymity protocols, and sidechannel analysis. Such theories offer an attractive way to relax the standard noninterference properties, letting us tolerate “sma ..."
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Cited by 51 (6 self)
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Abstract. There is growing interest in quantitative theories of information flow in a variety of contexts, such as secure information flow, anonymity protocols, and sidechannel analysis. Such theories offer an attractive way to relax the standard noninterference properties, letting us tolerate “small ” leaks that are necessary in practice. The emerging consensus is that quantitative information flow should be founded on the concepts of Shannon entropy and mutual information.Butauseful theory of quantitative information flow must provide appropriate security guarantees: if the theory says that an attack leaks x bits of secret information, then x should be useful in calculating bounds on the resulting threat. In this paper, we focus on the threat that an attack will allow the secret to be guessed correctly in one try. With respect to this threat model, we argue that the consensus definitions actually fail to give good security guarantees—the problem is that a random variable can have arbitrarily large Shannon entropy even if it is highly vulnerable to being guessed. We then explore an alternative foundation based on a concept of vulnerability (closely related to Bayes risk) and which measures uncertainty using Rényi’s minentropy, rather than Shannon entropy. 1