Abstract not found

We propose a straightforward analysis of counterfactual donkey sentences, by combining the Lewis/Stalnaker analysis of counterfactuals with standard dynamic semantics. The main idea is to define a similarity relation between world-assignment pairs such that two such pairs are unconnected if their assignments differ. We show that with the help of this ordering relation we can also account for a number of related problems involving disjunctions and the use of any in counterfactuals and permission sentences. 1

In this paper I discuss how to account for the performative effects of imperatives, and concentrate mainly on permission sentences. In the first part of the paper I argue that the performative effects of permission sentences should be accounted for in terms of a context change theory by making use of contraction defined in terms of an ordering relation, and show also how this ordering relation evolves from permission to permission. In the second part a problem for this analysis is discussed, i.e. the problem of conjunctive permission sentences. I develop two ways to solve this problem. First, I suggest that this problem is due to the wrong way of accounting for contraction, and propose an alternative way in which contraction can be defined that accounts for the performative effects of conjunctive permissions in a more satisfactory way. Although the analysis is appealing, I will argue that we should account for the problem by means of a type-shift analysis.

Extending the proposal made by Schulz (2003), we put forward a pragmatic account of the meaning of existential and universal FC items, where the ‘ignorance or indifference ’ inference triggered by the former and the ‘universal ’ inference triggered by the latter are treated as implicatures obtained by standard gricean reasoning formalized in terms of the two operations grice and competence. On this account, the implicatures of a sentence are generated with respect to a number of relevant alternatives. The difference between existential and universal FCs is due only to the choice of these alternatives. 1

The notes for this course have been evolving for years now, starting with some old notes from the early 1990s by Angelika Kratzer, Irene Heim, and myself, which have since been modified and expanded every year by Irene or myself. Because this version of the notes has not been seen by my co-author, I alone am responsible for any defects. – Kai von Fintel, Spring 2010 This is a work in progress. We may eventually publish these materials as a followup volume to Heim & Kratzer’s Semantics in Generative Grammar, Blackwell 1998. In the meantime, we encourage the use of these notes in courses at other institutions. Of course, you need to give full credit to the authors and you may not use the notes for any commercial purposes. If you use the notes, we would like to be notified and we would very much appreciate any comments, criticism, and advice on these materials. We have already profited from feedback sent in by several people who have used the notes and the more the better. Direct your communication to:

Conditional sentences with quantifying expressions are systematically ambigous. In one reading, the if -clause restricts the domain of the overt quantifier; in the other, the if -clause restricts the domain of a covert quantifier, which defaults to epistemic necessity. Although the ambiguity follows directly from the LewisKratzer line on if, it is not generally acknowledged, which has led to pseudoproblems and spurious arguments.

ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof.dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op dinsdag 15 december 2009, te 10.00 uur door

Not the final draft, guaranteed to change

Abstract Free choice permission is a long-standing puzzle in deontic logic and in natural language semantics. It involves what appears to be a conjunctive use of or: from You may eat an apple or a pear, we can infer that You may eat an apple and that You may eat a pear — though not that You may eat an apple and a pear. Following Lokhorst (1997), I argue that because permission is a limited resource, a resource-sensitive logic such as Girard’s Linear Logic is better suited to modeling permission talk than, say, classical logic. A resource-sensitive approach enables the semantics to track not only that permission has been granted and what sort of permission it is (i.e., permission to eat apples versus permission to eat pears), but also how much permission has been granted, i.e., whether there is enough permission to eat two pieces of fruit or only one. The account here is primarily semantic (as opposed to pragmatic), with no special modes of composition or special pragmatic rules. The paper includes an introduction to Linear Logic.

Abstract. Free choice permission is a long-standing puzzle in deontic logic and natural language semantics involving what appears to be a conjunctive use of or: from You may eat an apple or a pear, we can infer that You may eat an apple and that You may eat a pear—though not that You may eat an apple and a pear. Following Lokhorst 1997, I argue that because permission is a limited resource, a resource-sensitive logic such as Girard’s Linear Logic is better suited to modeling permission talk than, say, classical logic. A resourcesensitive approach enables the semantics to track not only that permission has been granted and what sort of permission it is (i.e., permission to eat apples versus permission to eat pears), but also how much permission has been granted, i.e., whether there is enough permission to eat two pieces of fruit or only one. The account here is primarily semantic, with no special modes of composition or special pragmatic rules. The paper includes an introduction to (multiplicative, additive) Linear Logic. Since Ross 1941, it has been clear that the logic of obligation and permission behaves dramatically differently than other sorts of ordinary reasoning: (1) a. You may eat an apple or a pear. b. You may eat an apple. c. You may eat a pear. If (1a) is true, then it is certainly true that you may eat an apple. Likewise, it is equally true that you have it within your power to safely eat a pear. So an adequate account of the meaning of (1a) must explain how it comes to entail (1b) and (1c).