“Origins of communicative disorders ” to Elizabeth Bates, and by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. We are grateful to Larry Juarez and Meiti Opie The effects of focal brain injury are investigated in the first stages of language development, during the passage from first words to grammar. Parent report and/or free speech data are reported for 53 infants and preschool children between 10- 44 months of age. All children had suffered a single, unilateral brain injury to the left or right hemisphere, incurred before six months of age (usually in the pre- or perinatal period). This is the period in which we should expect to see maximal plasticity, but it is also the period in which the initial specializations of particular cortical regions ought to be most evident. In direct contradiction of hypotheses based on the adult aphasia literature, results from 10- 17 months suggest that children with righthemisphere injuries are at greater risk for delays in word comprehension, and in the gestures that normally precede and accompany language onset. Although there were no differences between left- vs. right-hemisphere injury per se on expressive language, children whose lesions include the left temporal lobe did show significantly greater delays in expressive vocabulary and

n Localized, task-induced decreases in cerebral blood �ow are a frequent �nding in functional brain imaging research but remain poorly understood. One account of these phenomena postulates processes ongoing during conscious, resting states that are interrupted or inhibited by task performance. Psychological evidence suggests that conscious humans are engaged almost continuously in adaptive processes involving semantic knowledge retrieval, representation in awareness, and directed manipulation of represented knowledge for organization, problem-solving, and planning. If interruption of such “conceptual” processes accounts for task-induced deactivation, tasks that also engage these conceptual processes should not cause deactivation. Furthermore, comparisons between conceptual and nonconceptual tasks should show activation during conceptual tasks of the same brain areas that are “deactivated ” relative to rest.

Triune Ethics Theory (TET) is a psychological theory developed to meet three goals. First, it attempts to harvest critical findings from neurobiology, affective neuroscience, and cognitive science and to integrate them into moral psychology for the purpose of informing psychological research on the moral life of persons. In contrast to dominant theories that focus on top-down, deliberative reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg), TET is a bottom-up theory that focuses on motivational orientations which are sculpted by unconscious emotional systems that predispose one to react to and act on events in particular ways. Second, it seeks to explain differences in moral functioning through a person by context interaction. Individuals differ in early emotional experiences that influence personality formation and behavior in context, while at the same time situations can evoke particular reactions which vary with personality. Third, it suggests the initial conditions for optimal human moral development.

Our understanding of political phenomena, including political attitudes and sophistication, can be enriched by incorporating the theories and tools of cognitive neuroscience— in particular, the cognitive neuroscience of nonconscious habitual cognition (akin to bicycle riding). From this perspective, different types of informational “building blocks” can be construed from which different types of political attitudes may arise. A reflectionreflexion model is presented that describes how these blocks combine to produce a given political attitude as a function of goals, primes, expertise, and inherent conflict in considerations relevant to the attitude. The ways in which neuroimaging methods can be used to test hypotheses of political cognition are reviewed. KEY WORDS: social cognitive neuroscience, automaticity, habit, political sophistication Scholars since Plato and Aristotle have asked themselves many questions about the intriguingly political nature of the human mind. It is unlikely, however, that many have asked themselves whether political thinking is like riding a bicycle. This isn’t altogether surprising, of course, given that casting a vote and pedaling down the road seem like very different behaviors. Beneath this surface of dissimilarity, however, political thinking and bike riding may frequently depend on flexing a common set of mental “muscles ” that support the formation and expression of habits across a variety of domains (Lieberman, 2000). Political thinking and bicycle riding may seem to be very dissimilar behaviors. But in some circumstances, they may both depend on a common set of mental “muscles ” that support the formation and expression of habits across a variety of domains

A combined neurophysiological and computational approach is reviewed that leads to a proposal for how neural networks in the temporal cortical visual areas of primates could function to produce invariant object representation and identification. A similar approach is then reviewed which leads to a theory of how the hippocampus could rapidly store memories, especially episodic memories including spatial context, and how later recall of the information to the neocortex could occur. Third, it is argued that the visual and memory mechanisms described could operate without consciousness, and that a different type of processing is related to consciousness. It is suggested that the type of processing related to consciousness involves higher-order thoughts ("thoughts about thoughts"), and evolved to allow plans, formulated in a language, with many steps, to be corrected. It is suggested that it would feel like something to be a system that can think linguistically (using syntax) about its own thoughts, and that the subjective or phenomenal aspects of consciousness arise in this way. It is further suggested that "raw sensory feels" arise in evolution because once some types of processing feel like something by virtue of a system capable of higher-order thoughts, it is then parsimonious to postulate that sensory and related processing, which has to be taken into account in that processing system, should feel like something. It is suggested that it is this type of processing, which must be implemented in neural networks, which is related to consciousness.

Converging evidence suggests that temporal representations of brief durations are derived subcortically. We tested split-brain patient JW in order to investigate whether these representations project bilaterally or unilaterally to cortex. Using visual stimuli to signal time intervals, JWwas asked to compare the duration of a pair of standard stimuli that were presented bilaterally with a comparison stimulus that was presented to either the left or right visual field. Assuming the hand of response is controlled by the contralateral cerebral hemisphere, a hand by visual field interaction was predicted if the representation of stimulus duration was restricted to the cerebral hemisphere receiving the lateralized stimulus. However, we failed to observe this interaction for two different ranges of stimulus durations, both in the hundred (Experiment 2) to hundreds (Experiment 1) of milliseconds range. Instead, there was a consistent right hemisphere advantage in task performance. When the task then required a discrimination based on the physical size of the stimuli rather than their duration, an interaction between response hand and visual field was obtained (Experiment 3). Taken together, these results suggest that (1) even though the comparison stimulus was presented unilaterally, the representation of its duration was available to both cerebral hemispheres, and (2) a right hemisphere advantage in psychophysical tasks requiring the comparison of successive stimuli is observed for temporal and non-temporal judgments.

Development and early focal brain injury 2 Over the past ten years, we have made significant progress in addressing key questions concerning deficit and development after early stroke. We found evidence of subtle early impairment and subsequent development in each domain examined. However, the profiles of impairment and development differed across domains. Deficits of language acquisition are initially pervasive in that they are observed following injury to widely distributed brain areas. Spatial analytic deficits exhibit more specific patterns of brain-behavior association, similar to those observed among adults with injury to comparable brain regions. Had we been working in isolation, the separate investigators associated with this project may have reached very different conclusions about the nature of development following early injury. Instead, we were forced to look for ways to resolve the apparent disparity in our cross-domain findings. The model that best fits our data focuses on redefining the nature of early plasticity. Recent animal studies provide strong evidence that plasticity plays a central role in brain development. Brain organization is to a large extent

Children with early brain damage, unlike adult stroke victims, often go on to develop nearly normal language. However, the route and extent of their linguistic development are still unclear, as is the relationship between lesion site and patterns of delay and recovery. Here we address these questions by examining narratives from children with early brain damage. Thirty children (ages 3;7–10;10) with preor perinatal unilateral focal brain damage and their matched controls participated in a storytelling task. Analyses focused on linguistic proficiency and narrative competence. Overall, children with brain damage scored significantly lower than their age-matched controls on both linguistic (morphological and syntactic) indices and those targeting broader narrative qualities. Rather than indicating that children with brain damage fully catch up, these data suggest that deficits in linguistic abilities reassert themselves as children face new linguistic challenges. Interestingly, after age 5, site of lesion does not appear to be a significant factor and the delays we have witnessed do not map onto the lesion profiles observed in adults with analogous brain injuries. 1998 Academic Press More than 120 years ago, research on the effects of unilateral brain injury in adults led to the conclusion that the left hemisphere plays a specialized The research reported here has been supported by NINDS-NIH Grant P250-NS-22343 and NIDCD Grant R29 DC00539. We also thank Judi Fenson, Gretchen Chapman, and Shelley Flores for their help in data collection and transcription as well as the families who have graciously participated in this study. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Judy Snitzer Reilly, San Diego State University,

comments on earlier drafts. Haidt and Bjorklund offer two important correctives to the longstanding cognitive perspective of moral reasoning. As Haidt and Bjorklund point out, psychological science is in the process of abandoning the view that humans make decisions in the classical sense, as rational decision makers who reason deliberately under full conscious control. Instead, human cognition and decision making is influenced to a large degree by non-conscious systems. The second corrective endorsed by Haidt and Bjorklund is the fact that human cognition is a social phenomenon, highly influenced by one’s social situation and community, and not the individualistic activity that western tradition has emphasized. Although these are important and worthwhile correctives, the socialintuitionist model has several worrisome elements that bear some reflection.

In a pair of recent papers and his new book, Peacocke (2007, 2008a, 2008b) takes up and defends the claim that our awareness of our own actions is immediate and not perceptually based, and extends it into the domain of mental action. 1 He aims to provide an account of action-awareness that will generalize to explain how we have immediate awareness of our own judgments, decisions, imaginings, and so forth. These claims form an important component in a much larger philosophical edifice, with many implications for the philosophy of mind and for epistemology. The present paper advances multiple criticisms of Peacocke’s account. In particular, it shows that he has given insufficient grounds for thinking that we have non-perceptual awareness of our own actions; and it shows that the account of action-awareness that he provides doesn’t, in any case, generalize to mental actions of the sort that he intends. 1