W’e present a formal s \ ntax and semantics for SNePS considered as the (modeled) mind of a cogn:ti\e agent. The semantics is based on a Meinongian theory of ’ the intensional objects of ’ thought that is appropriate for 41 considered as “computational philosophy ” or “computational psychology”. 1. INTRODUCTION. W’e present a formal syntax and semantics for the SNePS Semantic Network P recessing System (Shapiro 1979), based on a \leinongian theory of the intensional objects of thought (Rapaport 198Sa). Such a theory avoids possible worlds and is appropriate

This paper discusses the theoretical background and some of the results of an interdisciplinary, cognitive-science research project on the comprehension of narrative text. The unifying theme of our work has been the notion of a deictic center: a mental model of spatial, temporal, and character information contributed by the reader of the narrative and used by the reader in understanding the narrative. We examine the deictic center in the light of our investigations from the viewpoints of linguistics, cognitive psychology, individual differences (language pathology), literary theory of narrative, and artificial intelligence.

rapaport%buffaloecsnet-relay We present a computational analysis of de re, de dicto, and de se belief and knowledge reports. Our analysis solves a problem first observed by Castaneda, namely, that the simple rule • (A knows that p) implies P, apparently does not hold if P contains a quasi-indicator. We present a single rule, in the context of an AI representation and reasoning system, that holds for all propositions P, including quasi-indexical ones. In so doing, we demonstrate the importance of representing proper names explicitly, and we provide support for the necessity of considering sentences in the context of extended text (e.g., discourse or narrative) in order to fully capture certain features of their semantics. 1. INTRODUCTION. How are knowledge and belief related? The standard philosophical analysis, dating back at least to Plato (Theaetetus 201), is that knowledge is justified true belief (but cf. Gettier 1963). In this paper, we describe some issues that are literally in the field of knowledge representation-issues in the representation of knowledge reports, where knowledge is treated as true belief. I In particular, we