Results 1  10
of
38
Inefficiency in Legislative PolicyMaking: A Dynamic Analysis
, 2005
"... This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a publi ..."
Abstract

Cited by 38 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense or air quality) and the distributive spending is districtspecific transfers (e.g., pork barrel spending). Investment in the public good creates a dynamic linkage across policymaking periods. The analysis explores the dynamics of legislative policy choices, focusing on the efficiency of the steady state level of taxation and allocation of tax revenues. The model sheds new light on the efficiency of legislative policymaking and has a number of novel positive implications.
Whither Political Economy? Theories, Facts and Issues
 In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Volume 1 (Econometric Society Monographs
, 2006
"... In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current research on four of the fundamental institutions of a political economy: voters, politicians, parties and governments. For each of these topics ..."
Abstract

Cited by 34 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper, I discuss recent developments in political economy. By focusing on the microeconomic side of the discipline, I present an overview of current research on four of the fundamental institutions of a political economy: voters, politicians, parties and governments. For each of these topics, I identify and discuss some of the salient questions that have been posed and addressed in the literature, present some stylized models and examples, and summarize the main theoretical findings. Furthermore, I describe the available data, review the relevant empirical evidence, and discuss some of the challenges for empirical research in political economy.
Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo
, 2007
"... We analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a new dollar is divided among committee members in each of an infinity of periods. In each period, a committee member is recognized and offers a proposal for the division of the dollar. The proposal is implemented if it is approved by a majority. If t ..."
Abstract

Cited by 11 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a new dollar is divided among committee members in each of an infinity of periods. In each period, a committee member is recognized and offers a proposal for the division of the dollar. The proposal is implemented if it is approved by a majority. If the proposal is rejected, then last period’s allocation is implemented. We show existence of equilibrium in Markovian strategies. It is such that irrespective of the initial status quo, the discount factor, or the probabilities of recognition, the proposer extracts the entire dollar in all periods but the initial two. We also derive a fully strategic version of McKelvey’s (1976), (1979) dictatorial agenda setting, so that a player with exclusive access to the formulation of proposals can extract the entire dollar in all periods except the first. The equilibrium collapses when within period payoffs are sufficiently concave. Winning coalitions may comprise players with high instead of low recognition probabilities, ceteris paribus.
Dynamic Legislative Policy Making
, 2007
"... We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinitehorizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all s ..."
Abstract

Cited by 7 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinitehorizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable almost everywhere. We establish upper hemicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence, and we derive conditions under which each equilibrium of our model determines a unique invariant distribution characterizing long run policy outcomes. We illustrate the equilibria of the model in a numerical example of policy making in a single dimension, and we discuss extensions of our approach to accommodate much of the institutional structure observed in realworld politics.
2007), “Generalized PoincareHopf Theorem for Compact Nonsmooth Regions
 Mathematics of Operations Research
"... This paper presents an extension of the PoincaréHopf Theorem to generalized critical points of a function on a compact region with nonsmooth boundary, M, defined by a finite number of smooth inequality constraints. Given a function F: M ↦ → Rn, we define the generalized critical points of F over M, ..."
Abstract

Cited by 7 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
This paper presents an extension of the PoincaréHopf Theorem to generalized critical points of a function on a compact region with nonsmooth boundary, M, defined by a finite number of smooth inequality constraints. Given a function F: M ↦ → Rn, we define the generalized critical points of F over M, define the index for the critical point, and show that the sum of the indices of the critical points is equal to the Euler characteristic of M. We use the generalized PoincaréHopf Theorem to present sufficient (local) conditions for the uniqueness of solutions to finitedimensional variational inequalities and the uniqueness of stationary points in nonconvex optimization problems for the region M. 1
Bicameral Winning Coalitions and Equilibrium Federal Legislatures
, 2002
"... We analyze the legislative interaction of representatives from big and small states in a Bicameral legislature that decides for the allocation of a fxed resource among the states. We assume that the two houses are malapportioned and big states are underrepresented in the upper house. We study th ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We analyze the legislative interaction of representatives from big and small states in a Bicameral legislature that decides for the allocation of a fxed resource among the states. We assume that the two houses are malapportioned and big states are underrepresented in the upper house. We study the effect of this and other institutional features on the relative welfare of big and small states and on equilibrium coalitions. Contrary to common belief, an increase in the representation of small states may reduce their expected payoff, ceteris paribus. Also, contrary to interpretations of minimum winning coalition theorems, excess majorities may occur in one of the two houses. When proposal making tends to be dominated by big (small) states, excess majorities occur in the upper (lower) house. We find that higher proposal power increases the payoff of a group of states. Changes in the majority requirements in the two houses and expansion to encompass more small (big) states have a nonmonotonic effect on the relative welfare of the two groups. We conclude our analysis with an empirical application using calibrations results for the 103d US Congress and the legislative institutions of the European Union before and after the Treaty of Nice.
Structure and Power in Multilateral Negotiations: An Application to French Water Policy
, 2006
"... Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. In this paper, w ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Stakeholder negotiation is an increasingly important policymaking tool. However, relatively little is understood about the relationship between the structure of the negotiating process and the effectiveness with which participating stakeholders can pursue their individual interests. In this paper, we apply the RausserSimon multilateral bargaining model to a specific negotiation process, involving water storage capacity and use in the upper part of the Adour Basin in southwestern France. In the RausserSimon model, the elements of negotiation structure include: the list of participants at the bargaining table; the set of issues being negotiated; the decision rule; political weights (“access”); and the nature of the outcome if agreement cannot be reached. The richness of the data and institutional information available to us provides a realistic environment in which to examine the effect of negotiation structure on participant power. We focus in particular on
Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default
, 2013
"... Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard BaronFerejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper st ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard BaronFerejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the BaronFerejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. By contrast, the unique equilibrium outcome in a unanimity committee coincides with that in the corresponding BaronFerejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discounts then every equilibrium is inefficient, irrespective of the quota.
Noncooperative foundation of bargaining power in committees and the ShapleyShubik index
 Games and Economics Behavior
, 2008
"... In this paper we explore the non cooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule confers to its users in a ’bargaining committee’. That is, a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we mod ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In this paper we explore the non cooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule confers to its users in a ’bargaining committee’. That is, a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining protocols whose stationary subgame perfect equilibria are investigated. It is also shown how previous results obtained by us from a cooperative approach, which provided axiomatic foundations for an interpretation of the ShapleyShubik index and other power indices as measures of ’bargaining power ’ appear in this light as limit cases.
A continuoustime model of multilateral bargaining
, 2010
"... We propose a finitehorizon continuoustime framework for coalitional bargaining that has the following features: (i) Expected payoffs in Markovperfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics investigations; (ii) MPE are the only subgameperfe ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We propose a finitehorizon continuoustime framework for coalitional bargaining that has the following features: (i) Expected payoffs in Markovperfect equilibrium (MPE) are unique, generating sharp predictions and facilitating comparative statics investigations; (ii) MPE are the only subgameperfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of the model that can be approximated by SPNE of nearby discretetime bargaining models satisfying a genericity condition, providing justification for focusing on MPE in our model; (iii) The model is relatively tractable analytically. We investigate MPE payoffs as the time horizon goes to infinity. In convex games, we connect these limit payoffs to the core of the characteristic function underlying the bargaining game.