Market e#ciency survives the challenge from the literature on long-term return anomalies. Consistent with the market e#ciency hypothesis that the anomalies are chance results, apparent overreaction to information is about as common as underreaction, and post-event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is about as frequent as post-event reversal. Most important, consistent with the market e#ciency prediction that apparent anomalies can be due to methodology, most long-term return anomalies tend to disappear with reasonable changes in technique. # 1998 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

forthcoming Journal of Finance Non-U.S. firms cross-listing shares on U.S. exchanges as American Depositary Receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing, an additional 1.20 percent during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing. We show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing. Our tests provide support for the

This paper presents a signalling model in which high-quality firms underprice at the initial public offering (IPO) in order to obtain a higher price at a seasoned offering. The main assumptions are that low-quality firms must invest in imitation expenses to appear to be high-quality firms, and that with some probability this imitation is discovered between offerings. Underpricing by high-quality firms at the IPO can then add sufficient signalling costs to these imitation expenses to induce low-quality firms to reveal their quality voluntarily. The model is consistent with several documented empirical regnlarities and offers new testable implications. In addition, the paper provides empirical evidence that many firms raise substantial amounts of additional equity capital in the years after their IPO.

Carolina at Chapel Hill for helpful comments and suggestions and Jay Ritter and Michel Vetsuypens for We examine data on analyst following for a sample of initial public offerings completed over the 1975-1987 period to see how they relate to three well-documented IPO anomalies. We find that higher underpricing leads to increased analyst following. Analysts are overoptimistic about the earnings potential of recent IPOs and about their long term growth prospects. More firms complete IPOs when analysts are particularly optimistic about the growth prospects of recent IPOs. In the long run, IPOs have better stock price performance when analysts ascribe low growth potential to these firms than when they ascribe high growth potential. These results suggest that the anomalies documented in the IPO market may, at least partially, be driven by overoptimism. 1 1.

We review the theory and evidence on IPO activity: why firms go public, why they reward first-day investors with considerable underpricing, and how IPOs perform in the long run. Our perspective is threefold: First, we believe that many IPO phenomena are not stationary. Second, we believe research into share allocation issues is the most promising area of research in IPOs at the moment. Third, we argue that asymmetric information is not the primary driver of many IPO phenomena.

This paper examines aftermarket trading of underwriters and unaffiliated market makers in the three month period after an IPO. We find that the lead underwriter is always the dominant market maker, he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co-managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading. The lead underwriter engages in stabilization activity for less successful IPOs, and uses the overallotment option to reduce his inventory risk. Compensation to the underwriter arises primarily from fees, but aftermarket trading does generate positive profits, which are positively related to the degree of underpricing.

During the 1980s, U.S. firms announcing stock repurchases earned favorable long-run returns. Recently, concerns have been raised over the robustness of these findings. This concern comes at a time of explosive growth in repurchase programs. Thus, we study new evidence from the 1990s for 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs. Moreover, because of Canadian law, we can carefully track repurchase activity monthly. Similar to the U.S., the Canadian stock market discounts the information in repurchase announcements, particularly for value stocks. Completion rates in Canada are sensitive to mispricing. Trades also appear linked to price movements; managers buy more shares when prices fall. 1 In recent years, corporations have dramatically increased the amount of capital devoted to repurchasing their own shares. In the mid-1980s, repurchase program announcements in the U.S. amounted to roughly $25 billion per year. Between 1996 and 1998 however, more than 4,000 open market repurchase programs w...

Modern finance has generated a set of formal models of the workings of financial markets that certainly excel in terms of mathematical elegance. But abstract beauty and logical appeal do not guarantee scientific validity. The illustrious late Richard Feynman, professor of physics at Caltech, made the same observation when he discussed the derivation of the law of gravitational potential energy from the "axiom" of conservation of energy. (See the above quote.) Fortunately for physicists, there is ample evidence that the law of gravitational potential energy is correct (to a certain degree). In contrast, there appears to be surprisingly little scientific support for even the most widely used financial model, namely, the CAPM. One can sympathize with E. Fama and K. French when they have recently begun to promote a pricing model that is based entirely on statistical regularities, even if it begs the question why it is more successful. To put this di#erently, asset pricing is paradoxical

go to Girts Graudins and Eric Nierenberg for their outstanding contributions to this project. Harvard Business School’s Division of Research provided financial support. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of asset-pricing behavior. They indicate either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or inadequacies in the underlying asset-pricing model. The evidence in this paper shows that the size effect, the value effect, the weekend effect, and the dividend yield effect seem to have weakened or disappeared after the papers that highlighted them were published. At about the same time, practitioners began investment vehicles that implemented the strategies implied by some of these academic papers. The small-firm turn-of-the-year effect became weaker in the years after it was first documented in the academic literature, although there is some evidence that it still exists. Interestingly, however, it does not seem to exist in the portfolio returns of practitioners who focus on small-capitalization firms. All of these findings raise the possibility that anomalies are more apparent than real. The notoriety associated with the findings of unusual evidence tempts authors to further investigate puzzling anomalies and later to try to explain them. But even if the anomalies existed in the sample