A rational model of human categorization behavior is presented that assumes that categorization reflects the derivation of optimal estimates of the probability of unseen features of objects. A Bayesian analysis is performed of what optimal estimations would be if categories formed a disjoint partitioning of the object space and if features were independently displayed within a category. This Bayesian analysis is placed within an incremental categorization algorithm. The resulting rational model accounts for effects of central tendency of categories, effects of specific instances, learning of linearly nonseparable categories, effects of category labels, extraction of basic level categories, base-rate effects, probability matching in categorization, and trial-by-trial learning functions. Al-though the rational model considers just I level of categorization, it is shown how predictions can be enhanced by considering higher and lower levels. Considering prediction at the lower, individual level allows integration of this rational analysis of categorization with the earlier rational analysis of memory (Anderson & Milson, 1989). Anderson (1990) presented a rational analysis ot 6 human cog-nition. The term rational derives from similar "rational-man" analyses in economics. Rational analyses in other fields are sometimes called adaptationist analyses. Basically, they are ef-forts to explain the behavior in some domain on the assump-tion that the behavior is optimized with respect to some criteria of adaptive importance. This article begins with a general char-acterization ofhow one develops a rational theory of a particu-lar cognitive phenomenon. Then I present the basic theory of categorization developed in Anderson (1990) and review the applications from that book. Since the writing of the book, the theory has been greatly extended and applied to many new phenomena. Most of this article describes these new develop-ments and applications. A Rational Analysis Several theorists have promoted the idea that psychologists might understand human behavior by assuming it is adapted to the environment (e.g., Brunswik, 1956; Campbell, 1974; Gib-

A neuropsychological theory is proposed that assumes category learning is a competition between separate verbal and implicit (i.e., procedural-learning-based) categorization systems. The theory assumes that the caudate nucleus is an important component of the implicit system and that the anterior cingulate and prefrontal cortices are critical to the verbal system. In addition to making predictions for normal human adults, the theory makes specific predictions for children, elderly people, and patients suffering from Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, major depression, amnesia, or lesions of the prefrontal cortex. Two separate formal descriptions of the theory are also provided. One describes trial-by-trial learning, and the other describes global dynamics. The theory is tested on published neuropsychological data and on category learning data with normal adults.

We describe a distributed model of information processing and memory and apply it to the representation of general and specific information. The model consists of a large number of simple processing elements which send excitatory and inhibitory signals to each other via modifiable connections. Information processing is thought of as the process whereby patterns of activation are formed over the units in the model through their excitatory and inhibitory interactions. The memory trace of a processing event is the change or increment to the strengths of the interconnections that results from the processing event. The traces of separate events are superimposed on each other in the values of the connection strengths that result from the entire set of traces stored in the memory. The model is applied to a number of findings related to the question of whether we store abstract representations or an enumeration of specific experiences in memory. The model simulates the results of a number of important experiments which have been taken as evidence for the enumeration of specific experiences. At the same time, it shows how the functional equivalent of abstract representations—prototypes, logogens

Experiments were conducted in which Ss made classification, recognition, and similarity judgments for 34 schematic faces. A multidimensional scaling (MDS) solution for the faces was derived on the basis of the similarity judgments. This MDS solution was then used in conjunction with an exemplar-similarity model to accurately predict Ss ' classification and recognition judgments. Evidence was provided that Ss allocated attention to the psychological dimensions differentially for classification and recognition. The distribution of attention came close to the ideal-observer distribution for classification, and some tendencies in that direction were observed for recognition. Evidence was also provided for interactive effects of individual exemplar frequencies and similarities on classification and recognition, in accord with the predictions of the exemplar model. Unexpectedly, however, the frequency effects appeared to be larger for classification than for recognition. The purpose of this study was to provide tests of a model for relating perceptual classification performance and oldnew recognition memory. The model under investigation is the context theory of classification proposed by Medin and

We previously introduced an exemplar model, named GCM-ISW, that exploits a highly flexible weighting scheme. Our simulations showed that it records faster learning rates and higher asymptotic accuracies on several artificial categorization tasks than models with more limited abilities to warp input spaces. This paper extends our previous work; it describes experimental results that suggest human subjects also invoke such highly flexible schemes. In particular, our model provides significantly better fits than models with less flexibility, and we hypothesize that humans selectively weight attributes depending on an item's location in the input space. We need more flexible models of concept learning Many theories of human concept learning posit that concepts are represented by prototypes (Reed, 1972) or exemplars (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). Prototype models represent concepts by the "best example" or "central tendency" of the concept. 1 A new item belongs in a category C if it is relat...

The contribution of the striatum to category learning was examined by having patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) and matched controls solve categorization problems in which the optimal rule was linear or nonlinear using the perceptual categorization task. Traditional accuracy-based analyses, as well as quantitative model-based analyses were performed. Unlike accuracy-based analyses, the model-based analyses allow one to quantify and separate the effects of categorization rule learning from variability in the trial-by-trial application of the participant's rule. When the categorization rule was linear, PD patients showed no accuracy, categorization rule learning, or rule application variability deficits. Categorization accuracy for the PD patients was associated with their performance on a test believed to be sensitive to frontal lobe functioning. In contrast, when the categorization rule was nonlinear, the PD patients showed accuracy, categorization rule learning, and rule application variability deficits. Furthermore, categorization accuracy was not associated with performance on the test of frontal lobe functioning. Implications for neuropsychological theories of categorization learning are discussed. (JINS, 2001, 7, 710 --727.) Keywords: Categorization, Parkinson's disease, Striatum, Memory, Learning

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ositive side, though, the second person might have some advantage over the first person in learning how to shift gears, because the second person would not have to overcome negative transfer from experience with automatic transmissions. As another example, imagine that you are an explorer visiting a remote island, with the purpose of writing a book about the people that you see there. You bring to this island many forms of prior knowledge that will guide you in learning about these new people. For example, based on your experiences in other places, you would expect to see males and females, younger and older people, shy people and arrogant people. You would also have certain hypotheses at a more abstract level, for example, that the clothes that someone wears may be related to the person's age and gender. (Goodman, 1955, referred to such abstract hypotheses as overhypotheses.) In a way, these biases due to previous knowledge might seem to be undesirable. After all, wouldn't be it be be

Introduction In most applications of formal models of categorization, category learning is portrayed as the building-up of a representation in memory for members of the category that have been observed. This assumption is perhaps the most basic that is made for models of categorization, that the representation of a category describes its observed members. Yet if category representations are to serve a purpose such as recognizing new members of a category, then simply relying on memory for known members would be a poor strategy in many situations. For example, if you are learning to distinguish the Smith family from the Jones family, and you have observed a tall, red-haired 45 year old woman who is the mother in the Smith family, and you then see another tall, red-haired 45 year old woman, you would probably classify her as belonging to the Jones family, despite her similarity to an observed member of the Smith family. This example highlights the point that when few members of a categor