This paper describes proof-carrying code (PCC), a mechanism by which a host system can determine with certainty thatitissafetoexecute a program supplied (possibly in binary form) by anuntrusted source. For this to be possible, the untrusted code producer must supply with the code a safety proof that attests to the code's adherence to a previously de ned safety policy. The host can then easily and quickly validate the proof without using cryptography and without consulting any external agents. In order to gain preliminary experience with PCC, we have performed several case studies. We showinthis paper how proof-carrying code mightbeusedtodevelop safe assembly-language extensions of ML programs. In the context of this case study, we present and prove the adequacy of concrete representations for the safety policy, the safety proofs, and the proof validation. Finally, we brie y discuss how we use proof-carrying code to develop network packet lters that are faster than similar lters developed using other techniques and are formally guaranteed to be safe with respect to a given operating system safety policy.

Numerous systems have been designed which use virtualization to subdivide the ample resources of a modern computer. Some require specialized hardware, or cannot support commodity operating systems. Some target 100 % binary compatibility at the expense of performance. Others sacrifice security or functionality for speed. Few offer resource isolation or performance guarantees; most provide only best-effort provisioning, risking denial of service. This paper presents Xen, an x86 virtual machine monitor which allows multiple commodity operating systems to share conventional hardware in a safe and resource managed fashion, but without sacrificing either performance or functionality. This is achieved by providing an idealized virtual machine abstraction to which operating systems such as Linux, BSD and Windows XP, can be ported with minimal effort. Our design is targeted at hosting up to 100 virtual machine instances simultaneously on a modern server. The virtualization approach taken by Xen is extremely efficient: we allow operating systems such as Linux and Windows XP to be hosted simultaneously for a negligible performance overhead — at most a few percent compared with the unvirtualized case. We considerably outperform competing commercial and freely available solutions in a range of microbenchmarks and system-wide tests.

We describe an operating system architecture that securely multiplexes machine resources while permitting an unprecedented degree of application-specific customization of traditional operating system abstractions. By abstracting physical hardware resources, traditional operating systems have significantly limited the performance, flexibility, and functionality of applications. The exokernel architecture removes these limitations by allowing untrusted software to implement traditional operating system abstractions entirely at application-level. We have implemented a prototype exokernel-based system that includes Aegis, an exokernel, and ExOS, an untrusted application-level operating system. Aegis defines the low-level interface to machine resources. Applications can allocate and use machine resources, efficiently handle events, and participate in resource revocation. Measurements show that most primitive Aegis operations are 10–100 times faster than Ultrix,a mature monolithic UNIX operating system. ExOS implements processes, virtual memory, and inter-process communication abstractions entirely within a library. Measurements show that ExOS’s application-level virtual memory and IPC primitives are 5–50 times faster than Ultrix’s primitives. These results demonstrate that the exokernel operating system design is practical and offers an excellent combination of performance and flexibility. 1

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Multi-threaded programming is difficult and error prone. It is easy to make a mistake in synchronization that produces a data race, yet it can be extremely hard to locate this mistake during debugging. This paper describes a new tool, called Eraser, for dynamically detecting data races in lock-based multi-threaded programs. Eraser uses binary rewriting techniques to monitor every shared memory reference and verify that consistent locking behavior is observed. We present several case studies, including undergraduate coursework and a multi-threaded Web search engine, that demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach. 1

We propose a new design for highly concurrent Internet services, whichwe call the staged event-driven architecture (SEDA). SEDA is intended

Since 1984, the Condor project has enabled ordinary users to do extraordinary computing. Today, the project continues to explore the social and technical problems of cooperative computing on scales ranging from the desktop to the world-wide computational grid. In this chapter, we provide the history and philosophy of the Condor project and describe how it has interacted with other projects and evolved along with the field of distributed computing. We outline the core components of the Condor system and describe how the technology of computing must correspond to social structures. Throughout, we reflect on the lessons of experience and chart the course traveled by research ideas as they grow into production systems.

We present a flexible architecture for trusted computing, called Terra, that allows applications with a wide range of security requirements to run simultaneously on commodity hardware. Applications on Terra enjoy the semantics of running on a separate, dedicated, tamper-resistant hardware platform, while retaining the ability to run side-by-side with normal applications on a generalpurpose computing platform. Terra achieves this synthesis by use of a trusted virtual machine monitor (TVMM) that partitions a tamper-resistant hardware platform into multiple, isolated virtual machines (VM), providing the appearance of multiple boxes on a single, general-purpose platform. To each VM, the TVMM provides the semantics of either an “open box, ” i.e. a general-purpose hardware platform like today’s PCs and workstations, or a “closed box, ” an opaque special-purpose platform that protects the privacy and integrity of its contents like today’s game consoles and cellular phones. The software stack in each VM can be tailored from the hardware interface up to meet the security requirements of its application(s). The hardware and TVMM can act as a trusted party to allow closed-box VMs to cryptographically identify the software they run, i.e. what is in the box, to remote parties. We explore the strengths and limitations of this architecture by describing our prototype implementation and several applications that we developed for it.

drivers remain a significant cause of system failures. In Windows XP, for example, drivers account for 85 % of recently reported failures. This article describes Nooks, a reliability subsystem that seeks to greatly enhance operating system (OS) reliability by isolating the OS from driver failures. The Nooks approach is practical: rather than guaranteeing complete fault tolerance through a new (and incompatible) OS or driver architecture, our goal is to prevent the vast majority of driver-caused crashes with little or no change to the existing driver and system code. Nooks isolates drivers within lightweight protection domains inside the kernel address space, where hardware and software prevent them from corrupting the kernel. Nooks also tracks a driver’s use of kernel resources to facilitate automatic cleanup during recovery. To prove the viability of our approach, we implemented Nooks in the Linux operating system and used it to fault-isolate several device drivers. Our results show that Nooks offers a substantial increase in the reliability of operating systems, catching and quickly recovering from many faults that would otherwise crash the system. Under a wide range and number of fault conditions, we show that Nooks recovers automatically from 99 % of the faults that otherwise cause Linux to crash.

Region-based memory management is an alternative to standard tracing garbage collection that makes potentially dangerous operations such as memory deallocation explicit but verifiably safe. In this article, we present a new compiler intermediate language, called the Capability Calculus, that supports region-based memory management and enjoys a provably safe type system. Unlike previous region-based type systems, region lifetimes need not be lexically scoped and yet the language may be checked for safety without complex analyses. Therefore, our type system may be deployed in settings such as extensible operating systems where both the performance and safety of untrusted code is important.