Results 1 - 10
of
94
Language-Based Information-Flow Security
- IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS
, 2003
"... Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker throug ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 458 (37 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow.
Java Security: From HotJava to Netscape and Beyond
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 1996
"... The introduction of Java applets has taken the World Wide Web by storm. Information servers can customize the presentation of their content with server-supplied code which executes inside the Web browser. We examine the Java language and both the HotJava and Netscape browsers which support it, and f ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 186 (5 self)
- Add to MetaCart
The introduction of Java applets has taken the World Wide Web by storm. Information servers can customize the presentation of their content with server-supplied code which executes inside the Web browser. We examine the Java language and both the HotJava and Netscape browsers which support it, and find a significant number of flaws which compromise their security. These flaws arise for several reasons, including implementation errors, unintended interactions between browser features, differences between the Java language and bytecode semantics, and weaknesses in the design of the language and the bytecode format. On a deeper level, these flaws arise because of weaknesses in the design methodology used in creating Java and the browsers. In addition to the flaws, we discuss the underlying tension between the openness desired by Web application writers and the security needs of their users, and we suggest how both might be accommodated. 1.
Protecting privacy using the decentralized label model
- ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
, 2000
"... Stronger protection is needed for the confidentiality and integrity of data, because programs containing untrusted code are the rule rather than the exception. Information flow control allows the enforcement of end-to-end security policies, but has been difficult to put into practice. This article d ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 180 (22 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Stronger protection is needed for the confidentiality and integrity of data, because programs containing untrusted code are the rule rather than the exception. Information flow control allows the enforcement of end-to-end security policies, but has been difficult to put into practice. This article describes the decentralized label model, a new label model for control of information flow in systems with mutual distrust and decentralized authority. The model improves on existing multilevel security models by allowing users to declassify information in a decentralized way, and by improving support for fine-grained data sharing. It supports static program analysis of information flow, so that programs can be certified to permit only acceptable information flows, while largely avoiding the overhead of run-time checking. The article introduces the language Jif, an extension to Java that provides static checking of information flow using the decentralized label model.
Robust Declassification
- in Proc. IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 2001
"... Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 122 (23 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Security properties based on information flow, such as noninterference, provide strong guarantees that confidentiality is maintained. However, programs often need to leak some amount of confidential information in order to serve their intended purpose, and thus violate noninterference. Real systems that control information flow often include mechanisms for downgrading or declassifying information; however, declassification can easily result in the unexpected release of confidential information.
Dimensions and Principles of Declassification
, 2005
"... Computing systems often deliberately release (or declassify) sensitive information. A principal security concern for systems permitting information release is whether this release is safe: is it possible that the attacker compromises the information release mechanism and extracts more secret informa ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 90 (13 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Computing systems often deliberately release (or declassify) sensitive information. A principal security concern for systems permitting information release is whether this release is safe: is it possible that the attacker compromises the information release mechanism and extracts more secret information than intended? While the security community has recognised the importance of the problem, the state-of-theart in information release is, unfortunately, a number of approaches with somewhat unconnected semantic goals. We provide a road map of the main directions of current research, by classifying the basic goals according to what information is released, who releases information, where in the system information is released, and when information can be released. With a general declassification framework as a long-term goal, we identify some prudent principles of declassification. These principles shed light on existing definitions and may also serve as useful "sanity checks" for emerging models.
Security Models
- Encyclopedia of Software Engineering
, 1994
"... this article we focus on the primary use of security models, which has been to describe general confidentiality requirements. We then give pointers to security model work in other areas. 2 Models of Confidentiality ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 69 (2 self)
- Add to MetaCart
this article we focus on the primary use of security models, which has been to describe general confidentiality requirements. We then give pointers to security model work in other areas. 2 Models of Confidentiality
Secure Program Partitioning
- ACM Transactions on Computer Systems
, 2002
"... This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constr ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 59 (15 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This paper presents secure program partitioning, a language-based technique for protecting confidential data during computation in distributed systems containing mutually untrusted hosts. Confidentiality and integrity policies can be expressed by annotating programs with security types that constrain information flow; these programs can then be partitioned automatically to run securely on heterogeneously trusted hosts. The resulting communicating subprograms collectively implement the original program, yet the system as a whole satisfies the security requirements of participating principals without requiring a universally trusted host machine. The experience in applying this methodology and the performance of the resulting distributed code suggest that this is a promising way to obtain secure distributed computation.
A General Theory of Security Properties
- In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 1997
"... This paper presents a general theory of possibilistic security properties. We show that we can express a security property as a predicate that is true of every set containing all the traces with the same low level event sequence. Given this security predicate, we show how to construct a partial orde ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 57 (0 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This paper presents a general theory of possibilistic security properties. We show that we can express a security property as a predicate that is true of every set containing all the traces with the same low level event sequence. Given this security predicate, we show how to construct a partial ordering of security properties. We also discuss information flow and present the weakest property such that no information can flow from high level users to low level users. Finally, we present a comparison of our framework and McLean's Selective Interleaving Functions framework [14]. 1. Introduction Each researcher has proposed a new security property has constructed his or her own notation and formalism. With different notations and assumptions about the model of components, comparing the strengths and weaknesses of the various security properties has been difficult. In this paper, we examine what constitutes a security property and how they can be expressed. We then present a framework for ...
Mostly-Static Decentralized Information Flow Control
, 1999
"... The growing use of mobile code in downloaded programs such as applets and servlets has increased interest in robust mechanisms for ensuring privacy and secrecy. Common security mechanisms such as sandboxing and access control are either too restrictive or too weak---they prevent applications from sh ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 51 (3 self)
- Add to MetaCart
The growing use of mobile code in downloaded programs such as applets and servlets has increased interest in robust mechanisms for ensuring privacy and secrecy. Common security mechanisms such as sandboxing and access control are either too restrictive or too weak---they prevent applications from sharing data usefully, or allow private information to leak. For example, security mechanisms in Java prevent many useful applications while still permitting Trojan horse applets to leak private information. This thesis describes the decentralized label model, a new model of information flow control that protects private data while allowing applications to share data. Unlike previous approaches to privacy protection based on information flow, this label model is decentralized: it allows cooperative computation by mutually distrusting principals, without mediation by highly trusted agents. Cooperative computation is possible because individual principals can declassify their own data without infringing on other principals' privacy. The decentralized label model permits programs using it to be checked statically, which is important for the precise detection of information leaks. This thesis also
A Model for Delimited Information Release
- In Proc. International Symp. on Software Security (ISSS’03), volume 3233 of LNCS
, 2004
"... Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. Howe ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 51 (12 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. However, many intuitively secure programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). Noninterference fails to recognize such programs as secure. In this respect, many security type systems enforcing noninterference are impractical.

