Einstein’s philosophy of physics (as clarified by Fine and Howard) was predicated on his Trennungsprinzip, a combination of separability and locality, without which he believed “physical thought ” and “physical laws ” to be impossible. Bohr’s philosophy (as elucidated by Hooker, Scheibe, Folse, Howard, and others), on the other hand, was grounded in a seemingly different doctrine about the possibility of objective knowledge, namely the necessity of classical concepts. In fact, it follows from Raggio’s Theorem in algebraic quantum theory that within a suitable class of physical theories Einstein’s doctrine is mathematically equivalent to Bohr’s, so that quantum mechanics accommodates Einstein’s Trennungsprinzip if and only if it is interpreted à la Bohr through classical physics. Unfortunately, the protagonists themselves failed to discuss their differences in a constructive way, since in its early phase their debate was blurred by an undue emphasis on the uncertainty relations, whereas in its second stage it was dominated by Einstein’s flawed attempts to establish the “incompleteness ” of quantum mechanics. These two aspects of their debate may still be understood and appreciated, however, as reflecting a much deeper and insurmountable disagreement between Bohr and Einstein on the knowability of Nature. Using the theological controversy on the knowability of God as a analogy, Einstein was a Spinozist, whereas Bohr could be said to be on the side of Maimonides. Thus Einstein’s off-the-cuff characterization of Bohr as a ‘Talmudic philosopher ’ was spot-on.

A framework for the mind-matter problem in a holistic universe which has no parts is outlined. The conceptual structure of modern quantum theory suggests to use complementary Boolean descriptions as elements for a more comprehensive non-Boolean description of a world without an apriorigiven mind-matter distinction. Such a description in terms of a locally Boolean but globally non-Boolean structure makes allowance for the fact that Boolean descriptions play a privileged role in science. If we accept the insight that there are no ultimate building blocks, the existence of holistic correlations between contextually chosen parts is a natural consequence. The main problem of a genuinely non-Boolean description is to find an appropriate partition of the universe of discourse. If we adopt the idea that all fundamental laws of physics are invariant under time translations, then we can consider a partition of the world into a tenseless and a tensed domain. In the sense of a regulative principle, the material domain is defined as the tenseless domain with its homogeneous time. The tensed domain contains the mental domain with a tensed time characterized by a privileged position, the Now. Since this partition refers to two complementary descriptions which are not given apriori,wehavetoexpectcorrelations between these two domains. In physics it corresponds to Newton’s separation of universal laws of nature and contingent initial conditions. Both descriptions have a non-Boolean structure and can be encompassed into a single non-Boolean description. Tensed and tenseless time can be synchronized by holistic correlations. 1.

We first examine Howard's analysis of the Bell factorizability condition in terms of 'separability' and 'locality' and then consider his claims that the violations of Bell's inequality by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics should be interpreted in terms of 'non-separability' rather than 'non-locality' and that 'non-separability' implies the failure of space-time as a principle of individuation for quantum-mechanical systems. And I find his arguments for both claims to be lacking.

In this internship report, we present Carlo Rovelli’s relational interpretation of quantum mechanics, focusing on its historical and conceptual roots. A critical analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument is then put forward, which suggests that the phenomenon of ‘quantum non-locality ’ is an artifact of the orthodox interpretation, and not a physical effect. A speculative discussion of the potential import of the relational view for quantum-logic is finally proposed.

In the present paper, I shall argue that disjunctively construed naïve realism about the nature of perceptual experiences succumbs to the empirically inspired causal argument. The causal argument highlights as a first step that local action necessitates the presence of a type-identical common kind of mental state shared by all perceptual experiences. In a second step, it sets out that the property of being a veridical perception cannot be a mental property. It results that the mental nature of perceptions must be exhausted by the occurrence of inner sensory experiences that narrowly supervene on the perceiver. That is, empirical objects fail directly to determine the perceptual consciousness of the perceiver. The upshot is that not only naïve realism, but also certain further forms of direct realism have to be abandoned.

Abstract. In this Einstein Year of Physics it seems appropriate to look at an important aspect of Einstein’s work that is often down-played: his contribution to the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Contrary to physics ‘folklore’, Bohr had no defence against Einstein’s 1935 attack (the EPR paper) on the claimed completeness of orthodox quantum mechanics. I suggest that Einstein’s argument, as stated most clearly in 1946, could justly be called Einstein’s reality–locality– completeness theorem, since it proves that one of these three must be false. Einstein’s instinct was that completeness of orthodox quantum mechanics was the falsehood, but he failed in his quest to find a more complete theory that respected reality and locality. Einstein’s theorem, and possibly Einstein’s failure, inspired John Bell in 1964 to prove his reality–locality theorem. This strengthened Einstein’s theorem (but showed the futility of his quest) by demonstrating that either reality or locality is a falsehood. This revealed the full nonlocality of the quantum world for the first time.

We study the EPR-type correlations from the perspective of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that these correlations do not entail any form of “non-locality”, when viewed in the context of this interpretation. The abandonment of strict Einstein realism implied by the relational stance permits to reconcile quantum mechanics, completeness, (operationally defined) separability, and locality. DOI: 10.1007/s10701-007-9105-0 1