Abstract — As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a new, general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. I.

An ad hoc network is a collection of wireless computers (nodes), communicating among themselves over possibly multihop paths, without the help of any infrastructure such as base stations or access points. Although many previous ad hoc network routing protocols have been based in part on distance vector approaches, they have generally assumed a trusted environment. In this paper, we design and evaluate the Secure Efficient Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol (SEAD), a secure ad hoc network routing protocol based on the design of the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing protocol. In order to support use with nodes of limited CPU processing capability, and to guard against Denial-of-Service attacks in which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess network bandwidth or processing time, we use efficient one-way hash functions and do not use asymmetric cryptographic operations in the protocol. SEAD performs well over the range of scenarios we tested, and is robust against multiple uncoordinated attackers creating incorrect routing state in any other node, even in spite of any active attackers or compromised nodes in the network.

Topology Dissemination Based on Reverse-Path Forwarding (TBRPF) is a proactive, link-state routing protocol designed for mobile ad-hoc networks, which provides hop-by-hop routing along shortest paths to each destination. Each node running TBRPF computes a source tree (providing paths to all reachable nodes) based on partial topology information stored in its topology table, using a modification of Dijkstra's algorithm. To minimize overhead, each node reports only *part* of its source tree to neighbors. TBRPF uses a combination of periodic and differential updates to keep all neighbors informed of the reported part of its source tree. Each node also has the option to report additional topology information (up to the full topology), to provide improved robustness in highly mobile networks. TBRPF performs neighbor discovery using "differential" HELLO messages which report only *changes* in the status of neighbors. This results in HELLO messages that are much smaller than those of other link-state routing protocols such as OSPF.

We show how to use an interactive theorem prover, HOL, together with a model checker, SPIN, to prove key properties of distance vector routing protocols. We do three case studies: correctness of the RIP standard, a sharp realtime bound on RIP stability, and preservation of loop-freedom in AODV, a distance vector protocol for wireless networks. We develop verification techniques suited to routing protocols generally. These case studies show significant benefits from automated support in reduced verification workload and assistance in finding new insights and gaps for standard specifications.

As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack against ad hoc routing protocols that is particularly challenging to defend against. We show how an attacker can use the wormhole attack to cripple a range of ad hoc network routing protocols. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. Most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend them against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication.

Routing of packets in a mobile ad-hoc network with a large number... this paper is a routing protocol that makes use of location information to reduce routing overhead. However, unlike other position-based routing protocols, BLR does not require nodes to periodically broadcast Hello-messages (called beaconing), and thus avoids drawbacks such as extensive use of scarce battery-power, interferences with regular data transmission, and performance degradation. BLR selects a forwarding node in a distributed manner among all its neighboring nodes with having information neither about their positions nor even about their existence. Data packets are broadcasted and the protocol takes care that just one of the receiving nodes forwards the packet. Optimized forwarding is achieved by applying a concept of Dynamic Forwarding Delay (DFD). Consequently, the node which computes the shortest forwarding delay relays the packet first. This forwarding is detected by the other nodes and suppresses them to relay the same packet any further. Analytical results and simulation experiments indicate that BLR provides efficient and robust routing in highly dynamic mobile ad-hoc networks.

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Most proposed routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks are vulnerable to modification, impersonation and fabrication attacks. The proposed secure rout8 Mobile Computing and Communications Review, Volume 6, Number 4 ing protocol, Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks, prevents such attacks through message authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. Simulation results show that ARAN maintains good network performance while offering significant security advantages over existing routing protocols.

Abstract — As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. We also discuss topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some wormhole topologies. Index Terms — Ad hoc networks, computer network security, computer networks, tunneling, wireless LAN, wormhole, packet

Abstract—To effectively support communication in such a dynamic networking environment as the ad hoc networks, the routing framework has to be adaptable to the spatial and temporal changes in the characteristics of the network, such as traffic and mobility patterns. Multiscoping, as is provided through the concept of the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) for example, can serve as a basis for such an adaptive behavior. The Zone Routing framework implements hybrid routing by every network node proactively maintaining routing information about its local neighborhood called the routing zone, while reactively acquiring routes to destinations beyond the routing zone. In this paper, we propose the Independent Zone Routing (IZR) framework, an enhancement of the Zone Routing framework, which allows adaptive and distributed configuration for the optimal size of each node’s routing zone, on the per-node basis. We demonstrate that the performance of IZR is significantly improved by its ability to automatically and dynamically tune the network routing operation, so as to flexibly and robustly support changes in the network characteristics and operational conditions. As a point of reference, through this form of adaptation, we show that the volume of routing control traffic overhead in the network can be reduced by an order of magnitude, under some set of parameter values. Furthermore, the adaptive nature of IZR enhances the scalability of these networks as well. Index Terms—Ad hoc network, adaptive routing, bordercast, hybrid routing, Independent Zone Routing, multiscope routing, proactive routing, reactive routing, routing framework, routing