The quantum formalism is a "measurement" formalism--a phenomenological formalism describing certain macroscopic regularities. We argue that it can be regarded, and best be understood, as arising from Bohmian mechanics, which is what emerges from Schr6dinger's equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that "particles " means particles. While distinctly non-Newtonian, Bohmian mechanics is a fully deterministic theory of particles in motion, a motion choreographed by the wave function. We find that a Bohmian universe, though deterministic, evolves in such a manner that an appearance of randomness emerges, precisely as described by the quantum formalism and given, for example, by "p = IV [ 2.,, A crucial ingredient in our analysis of the origin of this randomness is the notion of the effective wave function of a subsystem, a notion of interest in its own right and of relevance to any discussion of quantum theory. When the quantum formalism is regarded as arising in this way, the paradoxes and perplexities so often associated with (nonrelativistic) quantum theory simply evaporate.

The probabilistic predictions of quantum theory are conventionally obtained from a special probabilistic axiom. But that is unnecessary because all the practical consequences of such predictions follow from the remaining non-probabilistic axioms of quantum theory, together with the non-probabilistic part of classical decision theory.

The quantum analogues of classical variable-length codes are indeterminatelength quantum codes, in which codewords may exist in superpositions of different lengths. This paper explores some of their properties. The length observable for such codes is governed by a quantum version of the Kraft-McMillan inequality. Indeterminate-length quantum codes also provide an alternate approach to quantum data compression.

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The manner in which states of some quantum systems become effectively classical is of great significance for the foundations of quantum physics, as well as for problems of practical interest such as quantum engineering. In the past two decades it has become increasingly clear that many (perhaps all) of the symptoms of classicality can be induced in quantum systems by their environments. Thus decoherence is caused by the interaction in which the environment in effect monitors certain observables of the system, destroying coherence between the pointer states corresponding to their eigenvalues. This leads to environment-induced superselection or einselection, a quantum process associated with selective loss of information. Einselected pointer states are stable. They can retain correlations with the rest of the universe in spite of the environment. Einselection enforces classicality by imposing an effective ban on the vast majority of the Hilbert space, eliminating especially the flagrantly nonlocal ‘‘Schrödinger-cat states.’ ’ The classical structure of phase space emerges from the quantum Hilbert space in the appropriate macroscopic limit. Combination of einselection with dynamics leads to the idealizations of a point and of a classical trajectory. In measurements, einselection replaces quantum entanglement between the apparatus and the measured system with the classical correlation. Only the preferred pointer observable of the apparatus can store information

The problem of setting up quantum theory as a universal physical theory is investigated. It is shown that the existing formalism, in either the conventional or the Everett interpretation, must be supplemented by an additional structure, the "interpretation basis." This is a preferred ordered orthonormal basis in the space of states. Quantum measurement theory is developed as a tool for determining the interpretation basis. The augmented quantum theory is discussed.

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An extended analysis is given of the program, originally suggested by Deutsch, of solving the probability problem in the Everett interpretation by means of decision theory. Deutsch’s own proof is discussed, and alternatives are presented which are based upon different decision theories and upon Gleason’s Theorem. It is argued that decision theory gives Everettians most or all of what they need from ‘probability’. Contact is made with Lewis’s Principal Principle linking subjective credence with objective chance: an Everettian Principal Principle is formulated, and shown to be at least as defensible as the usual Principle. Some consequences of (Everettian) quantum mechanics for decision theory itself are also discussed.

This is a discussion of how we can understand the world-view given to us by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular the rôle played by the concept of ‘world’. The view presented is that we are entitled to use ‘many-worlds ’ terminology even if the theory does not specify the worlds in the formalism; this is defended by means of an extensive analogy with the concept of an ‘instant ’ or moment of time in relativity, with the lack of a preferred foliation of spacetime being compared with the lack of a preferred basis in quantum theory. Implications for identity of worlds over time, and for relativistic quantum mechanics, are discussed.

Difficulties over probability have often been considered fatal to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I argue that the Everettian can have everything she needs from ‘probability ’ without recourse to indeterminism, ignorance, primitive identity over time or subjective uncertainty: all she needs is a particular rationality principle. The decision-theoretic approach recently developed by Deutsch and Wallace claims to provide just such a principle. But, according to Wallace, decision theory is itself applicable only if the correct attitude to a future Everettian measurement outcome is subjective uncertainty. I argue that subjective uncertainty is not to be had, but I offer an alternative interpretation that enables the Everettian to live without uncertainty: we can justify Everettian decision theory on the basis that an Everettian should care about all her future branches. The probabilities appearing in the decision-theoretic representation theorem can then be interpreted as the degrees to which the rational agent cares about each future branch. This reinterpretation, however, reduces the intuitive plausibility of one of the Deutsch-Wallace axioms (Measurement Neutrality).