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Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 1998
"... This paper therefore builds on [3], in which a model of consistent aspirationsbased learning was introduced ..."
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Cited by 59 (3 self)
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This paper therefore builds on [3], in which a model of consistent aspirationsbased learning was introduced
Understanding Reciprocity
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
, 2003
"... This paper surveys the evolutionary game theoretic literature on reciprocity in human interactions, dealing both with longterm relationships and with sporadic interactions. Four basic themes, repetition, commitment, assortation, and parochialism, appear repeatedly throughout the literature. Repet ..."
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Cited by 36 (2 self)
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This paper surveys the evolutionary game theoretic literature on reciprocity in human interactions, dealing both with longterm relationships and with sporadic interactions. Four basic themes, repetition, commitment, assortation, and parochialism, appear repeatedly throughout the literature. Repetition can give rise to the evolution of behavior that exhibits reciprocitylike features but a vast array of other behaviors are also stable. In sporadic interactions, reciprocity can be stable if the propensity to punish selfish actions can induce opportunists to cooperate, if reciprocators themselves behave opportunistically when they expect others to do so, or if matching is sufficiently assortative.
Learning Strategies
 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
, 2003
"... Adaptive learning models that have been tested against experimental data typically share two features: (i) initial attractions (or beliefs) are given exogenously, and (ii) learning is based on the performance of stagegame actions rather than repeated game strategies. We develop a model of learni ..."
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Cited by 12 (3 self)
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Adaptive learning models that have been tested against experimental data typically share two features: (i) initial attractions (or beliefs) are given exogenously, and (ii) learning is based on the performance of stagegame actions rather than repeated game strategies. We develop a model of learning which endogenizes initial attractions and allows for the learning of repeated game strategies. Learning occurs in two phases.
Chinese Academy of Sciences and
, 1994
"... Fellowship for Scholarly Development of CSCC (J. Z. W) for financial support. Noise, in the form of random errors in implementing a choice, is a common problem in real world interactions. Recent research has identified three approaches to coping with noise: adding generosity to a reciprocating strat ..."
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Cited by 2 (1 self)
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Fellowship for Scholarly Development of CSCC (J. Z. W) for financial support. Noise, in the form of random errors in implementing a choice, is a common problem in real world interactions. Recent research has identified three approaches to coping with noise: adding generosity to a reciprocating strategy; adding contrition to a reciprocating strategy; and using an entirely different strategy, Pavlov, based on the idea of switching choice whenever the previous payoff was low. Tournament studies, ecological simulation, and theoretical analysis demonstrate: (1) A generous version of Tit for Tat is a highly effective strategy when the players it meets have not adapted to noise. (2) If the other players have adapted to noise, a contrite version of Tit for Tat is even more effective at quickly restoring mutual cooperation without the risk of exploitation. (3) Pavlov is not robust. An important feature of interactions in the real world is that choices can not be implemented without error. Since the other player does not necessarily know whether a given action is an error or a deliberate choice, a single error can lead to significant complications. For example, on September 1,1983 a South Korean airliner mistakenly
FIG. I. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
, 1990
"... We consider a game in which “metaplayers ” choose finite automata to play a repeated stage game. Metaplayers ’ utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limitofthemeans) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states in their automaton. We examine the out ..."
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We consider a game in which “metaplayers ” choose finite automata to play a repeated stage game. Metaplayers ’ utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limitofthemeans) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states in their automaton. We examine the outcomes in this game which satisfy a version of evolutionary stability that has been modified to permit existence. We find that such automata must be efficient, in that they must maximize the sum of the (limitofthemeans) payoffs from the repeated game. Journal of Economic
Rationality and Society, 13: 532 (2001)
"... We analyze the role of social structure in maintaining cooperation within a population of adaptive agents for whom cooperative behavior may be costly in the short run. We use the example of a collection of agents playing pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma. We call sustained cooperative behavior in suc ..."
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We analyze the role of social structure in maintaining cooperation within a population of adaptive agents for whom cooperative behavior may be costly in the short run. We use the example of a collection of agents playing pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma. We call sustained cooperative behavior in such circumstances a 'cooperative regime'. We show that social structure, by channeling which agents interact with which others, can sustain cooperative regimes against forces that frequently dissolve them. We show in detail the process through which structured interaction in a population creates a "shadow of the adaptive future" allowing even a small set of cooperative strategies to grow into a cooperative regime, a coherent, selfsustaining entity that is something more than the sum of the pairwise interactions among its members.
Equal Pay for all Prisoners / The Logic of Contrition
, 1997
"... This report deals with two questions concerning the emergence of cooperative strategies in repeated games. The first part is concerned with the Perfect Folk Theorem and presents a vast class of equilibrium solutions based on Markovian strategies. Simple strategies, called equalizers, are introduced ..."
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This report deals with two questions concerning the emergence of cooperative strategies in repeated games. The first part is concerned with the Perfect Folk Theorem and presents a vast class of equilibrium solutions based on Markovian strategies. Simple strategies, called equalizers, are introduced and discussed: if players adopt such strategies, the same payo# results for every opponent. The second part analyzes strategies implemented by finite automata. Such strategies are relevant in an evolutionary context; an important instance is called Contrite Tit For Tat. In populations of players adopting such strategies, Contrite Tit For Tat survives very wellat least as long as errors are restricted to mistakes in implementation ('the trembling hand'). However, this cooperative strategy cannot persist if mistakes in perception are included as well. iv About the Authors Maarten Boerlijst Department of Zoology University of Oxford South Parks Road Oxford OX1 3PS, UK Martin Nowak Depa...
Evolution of AllorNone Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas
, 2014
"... Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated ..."
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Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call AllOrNone (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well