The rational choice framework assumes that individuals know what is in their self interest and make choices accordingly. Do they? When they go to the supermarket (in a developed country with a market economy) arguably they do act accordingly. In such settings, the individual knows, almost certainly, whether the choice would be beneficial, ex post. Indeed financial markets in the developed market economies (usually) possess the essential characteristics consistent with substantive rationality. However, it is simply not possible to make sense out of the diverse performance of economies and polities both historically and contemporaneously if individuals really knew their self interest and acted accordingly. Instead people act in part upon the basis of myths, dogmas, ideologies and "half-baked " theories. We argue here both that ideas matter, and that the way that ideas are communicated among people is crucial to building useful theories that will enable us to deal with strong uncertainty problems at the individual level.2 For most of the interesting issues in political and economic markets uncertainty, not risk, characterizes choice-making. Under conditions of uncertainty, individuals ' interpretation of their environment will reflect the

Natural selection acts on genetic variation that comes from two principal sources: mutation and recombination. Because of the inherent differences between mutation and recombination, it is often assumed that they are qualitatively different ways to explore the genotype space. In this paper a new way of constructing recombination spaces is introduced and the topological features of the resulting hypergraphs are analyzed. It is shown that types which are neighbors in the point mutation space are also neighbors in the recombination space, i.e. mutation and recombination spaces are homomorphic. This implies that the shapes of the fitness functions explored by mutation and recombination are similar. However, the potential of one- and two-point recombination operators to explore the fitness landscape may differ dramatically from uniform recombination operators or mutation operators because of the limited number of recombinant types they can produce. 1 Introduction The concept of fitness lan...

I use the example of the 2000 US Presidential election to show that political controversies with technical underpinnings are not resolved by technical means. Then, drawing from examples such as climate change, genetically modified foods, and nuclear waste disposal, I explore the idea that scientific inquiry is inherently and unavoidably subject to becoming politicized in environmental controversies. I discuss three reasons for this. First, science supplies contesting parties with their own bodies of relevant, legitimated facts about nature, chosen in part because they help make sense of, and are made sensible by, particular interests and normative frameworks. Second, competing disciplinary approaches to understanding the scientific bases of an environmental controversy may be causally tied to competing value-based political or ethical positions. The necessity of looking at nature through a variety of disciplinary lenses brings with it a variety of normative lenses, as well. Third, it follows from the foregoing that scientific uncertainty, which so often occupies a central place in environmental controversies, can be understood not as a lack of scientific understanding but as the lack of coherence among competing scientific understandings, amplified by the various political, cultural, and institutional contexts within which science is carried out. In light of these observations, I briefly explore the problem of why some types of political controversies become “scientized ” and others do not, and conclude that the value bases of disputes underlying environmental controversies must be fully articulated and adjudicated through political means before science can play an effective role in resolving environmental problems.

While natural selection is often viewed as synonymous with evolution, it is widely felt to be inadequate as a theory of biological evolution; moreover, historically the concept of evolution has not been limited to biology. We propose an integrative framework for characterizing how entities evolve, in which evolution is viewed as a process of context-driven actualization of potential (CAP). Processes of change differ according to the degree of nondeterminism, and the degree to which they are sensitive to, internalize, and depend upon a particular environment or context. The approach enables us to embed phenomena across multiple disciplines into a broader conceptual framework. It suggests that the dynamical evolution of a quantum entity as described by the Schrödinger equation is not fundamentally different from change provoked by a measurement often referred to as collapse but a limiting case, with only one way to collapse. The biological transition to coded replication is seen as a means of preserving structure in the face of context, and sexual replication as a means of increasing potentiality thus enhancing diversity through interaction with context. The integrative framework sheds light on biological concepts like selection and fitness, reveals how exceptional Darwinian evolution is as a means of ‘change of state’, and clarifies in what sense culture (and the creative process underlying it) is and is not Darwinian.

An important research tradition in the cognitive psychology of reasoning--called the heuristics and biases approach--has firmly established that people’s responses often deviate from the performance considered normative on many reasoning tasks. For example, people assess probabilities incorrectly, they display confirmation bias, they test hypotheses inefficiently, they violate the axioms of utility theory, they do not properly calibrate degrees of belief, they overproject their own opinions onto others, they display illogical framing effects, they uneconomically honor sunk costs, they allow prior knowledge to become implicated in deductive reasoning, and they display numerous other information processing biases (for summaries of the large literature, see

Abstract. We give a overview of stochastic models of evolution that have found applications in genetics, ecology and linguistics for an audience of nonspecialists, especially statistical physicists. In particular, we focus mostly on neutral models in which no intrinsic advantage is ascribed to a particular type of the variable unit, for example a gene, appearing in the theory. In many cases these models are exactly solvable and furthermore go some way to describing observed features of genetic, ecological and linguistic systems. Stochastic Models of Evolution in Genetics, Ecology and Linguistics 2 1.

Stochastic Diffusion Search (sds) was introduced by Bishop (1989a) as an algorithm to solve pattern matching problems. It relies on many concurrent partial evaluations of candidate solutions by a population of agents and communication between those agents to locate the optimal match to a target pattern in a search space. In subsequent research, several variations on the original algorithmic formulation were proposed. It also became evident that its main principles – partial evaluation and communication between agents – can be employed to problems outside the pattern matching domain. The primary aim of this dissertation is to develop these expansive views further: sds is proposed as a metaheuristic, a generic heuristic procedure for solving problems through search. Furthermore, it is proposed as a challenge to the dominant metaphor in computer science: sequential computation. The thesis proceeds in a structured way by first considering all questions that can be asked about a heuristic procedure like sds: questions of a foundational nature, questions pertaining to mathematical analysis, questions about application domains and questions about physical implementation. It is to the foundational issues that most attention is devoted. Analogies with selective processes in natural and social systems are investigated, as well as analogies with other metaheuristic techniques from artificial intelligence. An attempt is made to categorise potential variants, and to establish what kind of problems sds would be the optimal problem-solving method for. The work aims to provide an expanded but structured understanding of sds, to give guidelines for future work, and to establish how progress in other scientific disciplines can be of use in the study of sds, and vice versa. Preface All sciences characterise the essential nature of the systems they study. These characterisations are invariably qualitative in nature, for they set the terms with which more detailed knowledge can be developed. A. Newell and H. Simon (Newell and Simon, 1976) Cybernetics is the science of defensible metaphors.

Does evolutionary theory have implications about the existence of supernatural entities? This question concerns the logical relationships that hold between the theory of evolution and different bits of metaphysics. There is a distinct question that I also want to address; it is epistemological in character. Does the evidence we have for evolutionary theory also provide evidence concerning the existence of supernatural entities? An affirmative answer to the logical question would entail an affirmative answer to the epistemological question if the principle in confirmation theory that Hempel (1965, p. 31) called the special consequence condition were true: The special consequence condition: If an observation report confirms a hypothesis H, then it also confirms every consequence of H. According to this principle, if evolutionary theory has metaphysical implications, then whatever confirms evolutionary theory also must confirm those metaphysical implications. But the special consequence is false. Here‟s a simple example that illustrates why. You are playing poker and would dearly like to know whether the card you are about to be dealt will be the Jack of Hearts. The dealer is a bit careless and so you catch a glimpse of the card on top of the deck before it is dealt to you. You see that it is red. The fact that it is red confirms the hypothesis that the card is the Jack of Hearts, and the hypothesis that it is the Jack of Hearts entails that the card will be a Jack. However, the fact that the card is red does not confirm the hypothesis that the card will be a Jack. 2 Bayesians gloss these facts by understanding confirmation in terms of probability raising: The Bayesian theory of confirmation: O confirms H if and only if Pr(H│O)> Pr(H). The general reason why Bayesianism is incompatible with the special consequence

Introduction. The view that scientific explanation is achieved via unification was formally introduced by Michael Friedman (1974) and modified and extended by Philip Kitcher (1976, 1981, 1989, 1993). The essence of the unification view is that science increases our understanding of the world by extending our unified picture of it (Friedman 1974, 15). Kitcher's view is that we extend unification and, so, increase scientific understanding, by reducing the number of types of facts, brute facts, that scientists must accept in articulating their world view (1976, 212; 1981, 529; 1989, 432). The reduction of brute facts is achieved by deriving a maximum number of statements about scientific phenomena from a minimum number of schematic arguments, or argument patterns which bring together under one or a few schemata statements about a class of phenomena (Kitcher 1981, 512; 1989, 432). Among the unificatory schemata Kitcher has provided, he has shown that a certain economy of them unifies, and

The evolutionary scenario as a model for linguistic change has become more prominent in recent years (Croft 2000, Haspelmath 1999, Kirby 1999). The principled idea behind the evolutionary scenario is quite straightforward: change operates on the basis of variation between available linguistic options