Contents I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT NETWORK Towards a New Relationship between the Developing and Developed Countries II. EPISTOMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS Knowledge Infrastructure and the GDN Types of Development Knowledge General versus Local Knowledge Codified versus Tacit Knowledge Summary of Knowledge Dimensions III. Active Social Learning Negative Effects of Passive Learning IV. Social Learning, Consensus-Building, and Other Democratic Processes Learning How to Learn Beyond Technocratic Development Models Consensus-Building and Democracy Concluding Remarks Bibliography "Every alleged example of local implementation of central policy, if it results in significant social transformation, is in fact a process of local social discovery." [Donald Schn] It is a great pleasure for me to be here to help inaugurate the Global Development Network. In my remarks this evening, I want t

Open source software development has organizational characteristics that are out of the ordinary (e.g., no hierarchy, selforganization, self-regulation, and no ownership structure). The study suggests that this organization of work can be explained by combining the recently developed organizational theory of professions with the classic one of clubs. Still, the explanans falls within the broad rubric of the knowledge approach. The claim is in fact that this organization is at least as good as a firm in sharing rich types of information in real time because (a) constituents have symmetry of absorptive capacity, and (b) software itself is a capital structure embodying knowledge. Indeed, in this regard the study goes so far as to suggest that the distinction between input (knowledge) and output (software) is somewhat amorphous because knowledge and software are not only the common (spontaneous) standards, but also the norrivalrous network products being shared.

Contents Theme 2: Seeing Through the Doers' Eyes Theme 3: Helper Cannot Impose Change on Doers Theme 4: Help as Benevolence is Ineffective Theme 1 Applied: Starting from Present Institutions Theme 2 Applied: Seeing the World Through the Eyes of the Client Theme 3 Applied: Transformation Cannot be Externally Imposed Theme 4 Applied: Addams-Dewey-Lasch's Critique of Benevolence Ownership Problems Self-Efficacy Problems Cognitive Dependency Problems Codified versus Tacit Knowledge Roadblock to Learning #1: Branded Knowledge as Dogma Roadblock to Learning #2: Funded Assumptions as Dogma Roadblock to Learning #3: "Social Science" as Dogma Roadblock to Learning #4: The Rage to Conclude The Open Learning Model Competition and Devil's Advocacy in the Open Learning Model Non-dogmatism and Socratic Ignorance in Organizations Bibliography

ytterligare underlag till strategiska ställningstaganden i kommitténs arbete. På samma sätt som övriga råd och kommittéer vid Vetenskapsrådet har kommittén även i uppgift att behandla forskningspolitiska frågor och arbeta med forskningsinformation. Kommittén fördelar medel till forsknings projekt och forskarskolor. Utöver detta stöder kommittén även forskarnätverk, arrangerar konferenser och delar ut resebidrag för att stimulera internationellt utbyte mellan forskare. I denna översikt presenteras nordisk didaktisk forskning på bildområdet. Bildämnets didaktik kan studeras med utgångspunkt i bildkunskap eller pedagogisk kunskap, ämnet kan beskrivas i termer av visuell kommunikation eller visuell kultur. Professor Lars Lindström, Stockholm universitet, som är redaktör för översikten, inleder med flera artiklar som förklarar begrepp och ger historisk bakgrund. I en av dessa redovisas en studie av bilddidaktisk forskning och kursplaner i bild i Sverige fram till och med 1994. Därefter följer översikter från de fem nordiska länderna kring temata i forskningen

Beliefs and values are hard to alter; yet they strongly influence employees ’ attitudes towards strategic changes. Using a longitudinal case study in the oil industry, we show how to distinguish between ideological beliefs (justified by ethical values) and mundane beliefs (substantiated by knowledge structures). We explain that the willingness of workers to participate in change was promoted by a dynamic interaction between these interdependent belief sets. More critically, we show that acceptance of change did not require a change in values, but rather a change in the way that values were applied. We develop propositions that move theory forward and point to future directions for research.

During the twentieth century there was a strong desire to develop an Information Science from librarianship, bibliography, and documentation and in 1968 the American Documentation Institute changed its name to American Society for Information Science. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, departments of (library and) information science had turned instead towards the social sciences. These programs address a variety of important topics, but they have been less successful in providing a coherent explanation of the nature and scope of the field. Progress can be made towards a coherent, unified view of the roles of archives, libraries, museums, online information services, and related organizations if they are treated as information-providing services. But such an approach seems significantly incomplete on ordinary understandings of the providing of information. Instead of asking what Information Science is or what we might wish it to become, we ask instead what kind of field it can be given our assumptions about it. We approach the question by examining some key words: science, information, knowledge and interdisciplinary. We conclude that if information science is concerned with what people know, then it is a form of cultural engagement and, at most, a science of the artificial.

This paper lies at the edge of the topic of the workshop. We can write down a Π1 1 axiom whose models are precisely the ∈-structures 〈Rα, ∈ ∩R2 α〉 where α> 0 and Rα is the collection of all (pure) sets of rank < α. From this, one can consider the introduction of new axioms concerning the size of α. The question of the grounds for doing so is perhaps the central question of the workshop. But I want to discuss another question which, as I said, arises at the periphery: How do we know that there are structures 〈Rα, ∈ ∩R2 α〉? How do we know that there exist such things as sets and how do we know that, given such things, the axioms we write down are true of them? These seem very primitive questions, but the skepticism implicit in them has deep (and ancient) roots. In particular, they are questions about ideal objects in general, and not just about the actual infinite. I want to explain why I think the questions (as intended) are empty and the skepticism unfounded. 1 I will be expanding the argument of the first part of my paper “Proof and truth: the Platonism of mathematics”[1986a]. 2 The argument in question