In press, JPSP. This is NOT a final draft; numerical results will be updated prior to publication This draft should not be quoted without permission. In addition to update of numerical results, minor revisions of text are likely

Respondents at an Internet site completed over 600,000 tasks between October 1998 and April 2000 measuring attitudes toward and stereotypes of social groups. Their responses demonstrated, on average, implicit preference for White over Black and young over old and stereotypic associations linking male terms with science and career and female terms with liberal arts and family. The main purpose was to provide a demonstration site at which respondents could experience their implicit attitudes and stereotypes toward social groups. Nevertheless, the data collected are rich in information regarding the operation of attitudes and stereotypes, most notably the strength of implicit attitudes, the association and dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes, and the effects of group membership on attitudes and stereotypes. Among the most fundamental groups to which humans belong are their gender, race/ ethnicity, age, socioeconomic status, religion, nationality, and political and intellectual orientations. Such groups typically contain large numbers of others, often spread across the world, and direct interpersonal contact with only a small subset of these individuals. Yet such membership, the mere act of belonging, can determine psychological, social, and economic fates in significant ways. Whether one is African or European, female or male, rich or

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Theoretically, low correlations between implicit and explicit measures can be due to (a) motivational biases in explicit selfreports, (b) lack of introspective access to implicitly assessed representations, (c) factors influencing the retrieval of information from memory, (d) method-related characteristics of the two measures, or (e) complete independence of the underlying constructs. The present study addressed these questions from a meta-analytic perspective, investigating the correlation between the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and explicit self-report measures. Based on a sample of 126 studies, the mean effect size was.24, with approximately half of the variability across correlations attributable to moderator variables. Correlations systematically increased as a function of (a) increasing spontaneity of self-reports and (b) increasing conceptual correspondence between measures. These results suggest that implicit and explicit measures are generally related but that higher order inferences and lack of conceptual correspondence can reduce the influence of automatic associations on explicit self-reports.

2 This meta-analytic review of 61 studies (86 independent samples, 6,282 subjects), found that Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures significantly predicted criterion measures, such as judgments, choices, physiological responses, and behaviors (average r =.27). Explicit (i.e., self-report) measures were also effective predictors (average r =.35). IAT measures outperformed self-report measures in the domain of stereotyping and prejudice (average rs of.25 and.13, respectively). Self-report measures outperformed IAT measures in predicting brand-related choices (rs =.71 vs..40) and political preferences (rs =.67 vs..41). The predictive validity of explicit measures, but not IAT measures, weakened in socially sensitive outcome domains and for responses that are difficult to consciously control. When IAT and explicit measures were strongly correlated, both predicted criterion measures more effectively than when implicit-explicit correspondence was low.

This paper introduces a psychological notion of categorization into economics and derives its implications for economic decision making. We show, using a tractable model of social cognition, that a decision maker in (efficiently) assigning past experiences to categories, will sort experiences of interaction with larger (majority) groups more finely than experiences with smaller (minority) groups. We then apply the model to understand simple forms of discrimination and social identity. It is shown that discrimination in hiring can result from such cognitive processes even when there is no malevolent taste to do so and workers' qualifications are fully observable. The model also provides a framework that is equipped to investigate the social psychological concept of identity, where identity is viewed as self-categorization.

Implicit stereotyping and prejudice often appear as a single process in behavior, yet functional neuroanatomy suggests that they arise from fundamentally distinct substrates associated with semantic versus affective memory systems. On the basis of this research, the authors propose that implicit stereotyping reflects cognitive processes and should predict instrumental behaviors such as judgments and impression formation, whereas implicit evaluation reflects affective processes and should predict consummatory behaviors, such as interpersonal preferences and social distance. Study 1 showed the independence of participants ’ levels of implicit stereotyping and evaluation. Studies 2 and 3 showed the unique effects of implicit stereotyping and evaluation on self-reported and behavioral responses to African Americans using double-dissociation designs. Implications for construct validity, theory development, and research design are discussed.

Somebody once asked “Why is it that when people say ‘that’s a good question ’ they never have a good answer?” In response to the query of how we came to do this work, “good question ” was indeed our own response, and as such we cannot promise to have a good answer. In spite of the irony that this exercise poses for us, who insist on a healthy distrust of introspective analysis, in this article we hope to communicate the many pleasures of our collaborative effort, the degree to which we are indebted to our critics, and the recognition that the larger understanding of implicit social cognition involves many others who constitute an integral part of this discovery. A Brief History The origins of the work chosen for this issue lie in

Our understanding of political phenomena, including political attitudes and sophistication, can be enriched by incorporating the theories and tools of cognitive neuroscience— in particular, the cognitive neuroscience of nonconscious habitual cognition (akin to bicycle riding). From this perspective, different types of informational “building blocks” can be construed from which different types of political attitudes may arise. A reflectionreflexion model is presented that describes how these blocks combine to produce a given political attitude as a function of goals, primes, expertise, and inherent conflict in considerations relevant to the attitude. The ways in which neuroimaging methods can be used to test hypotheses of political cognition are reviewed. KEY WORDS: social cognitive neuroscience, automaticity, habit, political sophistication Scholars since Plato and Aristotle have asked themselves many questions about the intriguingly political nature of the human mind. It is unlikely, however, that many have asked themselves whether political thinking is like riding a bicycle. This isn’t altogether surprising, of course, given that casting a vote and pedaling down the road seem like very different behaviors. Beneath this surface of dissimilarity, however, political thinking and bike riding may frequently depend on flexing a common set of mental “muscles ” that support the formation and expression of habits across a variety of domains (Lieberman, 2000). Political thinking and bicycle riding may seem to be very dissimilar behaviors. But in some circumstances, they may both depend on a common set of mental “muscles ” that support the formation and expression of habits across a variety of domains

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