To describe phenomena that occur at different time scales, computational models of the brain must necessarily incorporate different levels of abstraction. We argue that at time scales of approximately one-third of a second, orienting movements of the body play a crucial role in cognition and form a useful computational level, termed the embodiment level . At this level, the constraints of the body determine the nature of cognitive operations, since the natural sequentiality of body movements can be matched to the natural computational economies of sequential decision systems. The way this is done is through a system of implicit reference termed deictic, whereby pointing movements are used to bind objects in the world to cognitive programs. We show how deictic bindings enable the solution of natural tasks and argue that one of the central features of cognition, working memory, can be related to moment-by-moment dispositions of body features such as eye movements and hand movements. Keyw...

The frontal cortex and basal ganglia interact via a relatively well-understood and elaborate system of interconnections. In the context of motor function, these interconnections can be understood as disinhibiting or "releasing the brakes" on frontal motor action plans --- the basal ganglia detect appropriate contexts for performing motor actions, and enable the frontal cortex to execute such actions at the appropriate time. We build on this idea in the domain of working memory through the use of computational neural network models of this circuit. In our model, the frontal cortex exhibits robust active maintenance, while the basal ganglia contribute a selective, dynamic gating function that enables frontal memory representations to be rapidly updated in a task-relevant manner. We apply the model to a novel version of the continuous performance task (CPT) that requires subroutine-like selective working memory updating, and compare and contrast our model with other existing models and th...

Modern economic theory ignores the influence of emotions on decision-making. Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory processes, including those that express themselves in emotions and feelings. This influence can occur at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur consciously, and some of which occur non-consciously. Here we review studies that confirm various predictions from the hypothesis, and propose a neural model for economic decision, in which emotions are a major factor in the interaction between environmental conditions and human decision processes, with these emotional systems providing valuable implicit or explicit knowledge for making fast and advantageous decisions. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

The authors present a theory of how relational inference and generalization can be accomplished within a cognitive architecture that is psychologically and neurally realistic. Their proposal is a form of symbolic connectionism: a connectionist system based on distributed representations of concept meanings, using temporal synchrony to bind fillers and roles into relational structures. The authors present a specific instantiation of their theory in the form of a computer simulation model, Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA). By using a kind of self-supervised learning, LISA can make specific inferences and form new relational generalizations and can hence acquire new schemas by induction from examples. The authors demonstrate the sufficiency of the model by using it to simulate a body of empirical phenomena concerning analogical inference and relational generalization. A fundamental aspect of human intelligence is the ability to form and manipulate relational representations. Examples of relational thinking include the ability to appreciate analogies between seemingly different objects or events (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), the ability to apply abstract rules in novel situations (e.g., Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992), the ability to understand and learn language (e.g., Kim, Pinker, Prince, & Prasada, 1991), and even the ability to appreciate perceptual similarities

Human cognitive control is uniquely flexible, and has been shown to depend on prefrontal cortex (PFC). But exactly how the biological mechanisms of the PFC support flexible cognitive control remains a profound mystery. Existing theoretical models have posited powerful task-specific PFC representations, but not how these develop. We show how this can occur when a set of PFC-specific neural mechanisms interact with breadth of experience to self-organize abstract, rulelike PFC representations that support flexible generalization in novel tasks. The same model is shown to apply to benchmark PFC tasks (Stroop and Wisconsin card sorting), accurately simulating the behavior of neurologically intact and frontally-damaged people. A fundamental human cognitive faculty is the capacity for cognitive control: The ability to behave in accord with rules, goals, or intentions, even when this runs counter to reflexive or otherwise highly compelling competing responses (e.g., the ability to keep typing rather than scratch a mosquito bite). A hallmark of cognitive control in humans is its remarkable flexibility — we can perform novel tasks with very little additional experience (e.g., playing a novel card game for the

Dopamine-mediated stabilization of delay-period activity in a network model of prefrontal cortex. J. Neurophysiol. 83: 1733–1750, 2000. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is critically involved in working memory, which underlies memory-guided, goal-directed behavior. During working-memory tasks, PFC neurons exhibit sustained elevated activity, which may reflect the active holding of goal-related information or the preparation of forthcoming actions. Dopamine via the D1 receptor strongly modulates both this sustained (delay-period) activity and behavioral performance in working-memory tasks. However, the function of dopamine during delay-period activity and the underlying neural mechanisms are only poorly understood. Recently we proposed that dopamine might stabilize active neural representations in PFC circuits during tasks involving working memory and render them robust against interfering stimuli and noise. To further test this idea and to examine the dopamine-modulated ionic currents

Neuroimaging studies have suggested the involvement of ventrolateral, dorsolateral, and frontopolar prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions in both working (WM) and long-term memory (LTM). The current study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to directly compare whether these PFC regions show selective activation associated with one memory domain. In a within-subjects design, subjects performed the n-back WM task (two-back condition) as well as LTM encoding (intentional memorization) and retrieval (yes–no recognition) tasks. Additionally, each task was performed with two different types of stimulus materials (familiar words, unfamiliar faces) in order to determine the influence of material-type vs task-type. A bilateral region of dorsolateral PFC (DL-PFC; BA 46/9)

: In this work we discuss Hebb's old ideas about cell assemblies in the light of recent results concerning temporal structure and correlations in neural signals. We want to give a conceptual, necessarily only rough picture, how ideas about `binding by synchronisation', `synfire chains', `local and global assemblies', `short and long term memory' and `behaviour' might be integrated into a coherent model of brain functioning based on neuronal assemblies. Keywords: cell assemblies, synchronization, gamma-oscillations, synfire chains, memory, behaviour 1 ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIVE MEMORIES 1.1 Cell Assemblies Cell assemblies have been introduced by Donald Hebb with the intention of providing a functional and at the same time structural model for cortical processes and neuronal representations of external events (Hebb, 1949). According to Hebb's ideas, stimuli, objects, things, but also more abstract entities like concepts, contextual relations, ideas, and so on are thought of being repre...

Despite a century of research, the mechanisms underlying short-term or working memory for serial order remain uncertain. Recent theoretical models have converged on a particular account, based on transient associations between independent item and context representations. In the present article, the authors present an alternative model, according to which sequence information is encoded through sustained patterns of activation within a recurrent neural network architecture. As demonstrated through a series of computer simulations, the model provides a parsimonious account for numerous benchmark characteristics of immediate serial recall, including data that have been considered to preclude the application of recurrent neural networks in this domain. Unlike most competing accounts, the model deals naturally with findings concerning the role of background knowledge in serial recall and makes contact with relevant neuroscientific data. Furthermore, the model gives rise to numerous testable predictions that differentiate it from competing theories. Taken together, the results presented indicate that recurrent neural networks may offer a useful framework for understanding short-term memory for serial order.

This paper addresses the issue of the functional correlates of motor imagery, using mental chronometry, monitoring the autonomic responses and measuring cerebral blood flow in humans. The timing of mentally simulated actions closely mimic actual movement times. Autonomic responses during motor imagery parallel the autonomic responses to actual exercise. Cerebral blood flow increases are observed in the motor cortices involved in the programming of actual movement (i.e. premotor cortex, anterior cingulate, inferior parietal lobule and cerebellum). These three sources of data provide converging support for the hypothesis that imagined and executed actions share, to some extent, the same central structures.