To describe phenomena that occur at different time scales, computational models of the brain must necessarily incorporate different levels of abstraction. We argue that at time scales of approximately one-third of a second, orienting movements of the body play a crucial role in cognition and form a useful computational level, termed the embodiment level . At this level, the constraints of the body determine the nature of cognitive operations, since the natural sequentiality of body movements can be matched to the natural computational economies of sequential decision systems. The way this is done is through a system of implicit reference termed deictic, whereby pointing movements are used to bind objects in the world to cognitive programs. We show how deictic bindings enable the solution of natural tasks and argue that one of the central features of cognition, working memory, can be related to moment-by-moment dispositions of body features such as eye movements and hand movements. Keyw...

The frontal cortex and basal ganglia interact via a relatively well-understood and elaborate system of interconnections. In the context of motor function, these interconnections can be understood as disinhibiting or "releasing the brakes" on frontal motor action plans --- the basal ganglia detect appropriate contexts for performing motor actions, and enable the frontal cortex to execute such actions at the appropriate time. We build on this idea in the domain of working memory through the use of computational neural network models of this circuit. In our model, the frontal cortex exhibits robust active maintenance, while the basal ganglia contribute a selective, dynamic gating function that enables frontal memory representations to be rapidly updated in a task-relevant manner. We apply the model to a novel version of the continuous performance task (CPT) that requires subroutine-like selective working memory updating, and compare and contrast our model with other existing models and th...

Modern economic theory ignores the influence of emotions on decision-making. Emerging neuroscience evidence suggests that sound and rational decision making, in fact, depends on prior accurate emotional processing. The somatic marker hypothesis provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and its influence by emotion. The key idea of this hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory processes, including those that express themselves in emotions and feelings. This influence can occur at multiple levels of operation, some of which occur consciously, and some of which occur non-consciously. Here we review studies that confirm various predictions from the hypothesis, and propose a neural model for economic decision, in which emotions are a major factor in the interaction between environmental conditions and human decision processes, with these emotional systems providing valuable implicit or explicit knowledge for making fast and advantageous decisions. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

& The majority of the research related to visual recognition has so far focused on bottom-up analysis, where the input is processed in a cascade of cortical regions that analyze increasingly complex information. Gradually more studies emphasize the role of top-down facilitation in cortical analysis, but it remains something of a mystery how such processing would be initiated. After all, top-down facilitation implies that high-level information is activated earlier than some relevant lower-level information. Building on previous studies, I propose a specific mechanism for the activation of top-down facilitation during visual object recognition. The gist of this hypothesis is that a partially analyzed version of the input image (i.e., a blurred image) is projected rapidly from early visual areas directly to the prefrontal cortex (PFC). This coarse representation activates in the PFC expectations about the most likely interpretations of the input image, which are then back-projected as an ‘‘initial guess’ ’ to the temporal cortex to be integrated with the bottom-up analysis. The top-down process facilitates recognition by substantially limiting the number of object representations that need to be considered. Furthermore, such a rapid mechanism may provide critical information when a quick response is necessary. &

The authors present a theory of how relational inference and generalization can be accomplished within a cognitive architecture that is psychologically and neurally realistic. Their proposal is a form of symbolic connectionism: a connectionist system based on distributed representations of concept meanings, using temporal synchrony to bind fillers and roles into relational structures. The authors present a specific instantiation of their theory in the form of a computer simulation model, Learning and Inference with Schemas and Analogies (LISA). By using a kind of self-supervised learning, LISA can make specific inferences and form new relational generalizations and can hence acquire new schemas by induction from examples. The authors demonstrate the sufficiency of the model by using it to simulate a body of empirical phenomena concerning analogical inference and relational generalization. A fundamental aspect of human intelligence is the ability to form and manipulate relational representations. Examples of relational thinking include the ability to appreciate analogies between seemingly different objects or events (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995), the ability to apply abstract rules in novel situations (e.g., Smith, Langston, & Nisbett, 1992), the ability to understand and learn language (e.g., Kim, Pinker, Prince, & Prasada, 1991), and even the ability to appreciate perceptual similarities

Dopamine-mediated stabilization of delay-period activity in a network model of prefrontal cortex. J. Neurophysiol. 83: 1733–1750, 2000. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is critically involved in working memory, which underlies memory-guided, goal-directed behavior. During working-memory tasks, PFC neurons exhibit sustained elevated activity, which may reflect the active holding of goal-related information or the preparation of forthcoming actions. Dopamine via the D1 receptor strongly modulates both this sustained (delay-period) activity and behavioral performance in working-memory tasks. However, the function of dopamine during delay-period activity and the underlying neural mechanisms are only poorly understood. Recently we proposed that dopamine might stabilize active neural representations in PFC circuits during tasks involving working memory and render them robust against interfering stimuli and noise. To further test this idea and to examine the dopamine-modulated ionic currents

The authors explore the division of labor between the basal ganglia–dopamine (BG-DA) system and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in decision making. They show that a primitive neural network model of the BG-DA system slowly learns to make decisions on the basis of the relative probability of rewards but is not as sensitive to (a) recency or (b) the value of specific rewards. An augmented model that explores BG-OFC interactions is more successful at estimating the true expected value of decisions and is faster at switching behavior when reinforcement contingencies change. In the augmented model, OFC areas exert top-down control on the BG and premotor areas by representing reinforcement magnitudes in working memory. The model successfully captures patterns of behavior resulting from OFC damage in decision making, reversal learning, and devaluation paradigms and makes additional predictions for the underlying source of these deficits.

Human cognitive control is uniquely flexible, and has been shown to depend on prefrontal cortex (PFC). But exactly how the biological mechanisms of the PFC support flexible cognitive control remains a profound mystery. Existing theoretical models have posited powerful task-specific PFC representations, but not how these develop. We show how this can occur when a set of PFC-specific neural mechanisms interact with breadth of experience to self-organize abstract, rulelike PFC representations that support flexible generalization in novel tasks. The same model is shown to apply to benchmark PFC tasks (Stroop and Wisconsin card sorting), accurately simulating the behavior of neurologically intact and frontally-damaged people. A fundamental human cognitive faculty is the capacity for cognitive control: The ability to behave in accord with rules, goals, or intentions, even when this runs counter to reflexive or otherwise highly compelling competing responses (e.g., the ability to keep typing rather than scratch a mosquito bite). A hallmark of cognitive control in humans is its remarkable flexibility — we can perform novel tasks with very little additional experience (e.g., playing a novel card game for the

The physiology of the cerebral cortex is organized in hierarchical manner. At the bottom of the cortical organization, sensory and motor areas support specific sen-sory and motor functions. Progressively higher areas—of later phylogenetic and ontogenetic development—support functions that are progressively more integrative. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) constitutes the highest level of the cortical hierarchy dedicated to the representation and execution of actions. The PFC can be subdivided in three major regions: orbital, medial, and lateral. The orbital and medial regions are involved in emotional behavior. The lateral region, which is maximally developed in the human, pro-vides the cognitive support to the temporal organization of behavior, speech, and reasoning. This function of

This paper addresses the issue of the functional correlates of motor imagery, using mental chronometry, monitoring the autonomic responses and measuring cerebral blood flow in humans. The timing of mentally simulated actions closely mimic actual movement times. Autonomic responses during motor imagery parallel the autonomic responses to actual exercise. Cerebral blood flow increases are observed in the motor cortices involved in the programming of actual movement (i.e. premotor cortex, anterior cingulate, inferior parietal lobule and cerebellum). These three sources of data provide converging support for the hypothesis that imagined and executed actions share, to some extent, the same central structures.