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Making Reliable Distributed Systems in the Presence of Software Errors
, 2003
"... product, having over a million lines of Erlang code. This product (the AXD301) is thought to be one of the most reliable products ever made by Ericsson. ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 42 (0 self)
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product, having over a million lines of Erlang code. This product (the AXD301) is thought to be one of the most reliable products ever made by Ericsson.
Improving Availability with Recursive Micro-Reboots: A Soft-State System Case Study
, 2003
"... Even after decades of software engineering research, complex computer systems still fail. This paper makes the case for increasing research emphasis on dependability and, specifically, on improving availability by reducing time-to-recover. All software fails at some point, so systems must be able to ..."
Abstract
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Cited by 35 (4 self)
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Even after decades of software engineering research, complex computer systems still fail. This paper makes the case for increasing research emphasis on dependability and, specifically, on improving availability by reducing time-to-recover. All software fails at some point, so systems must be able to recover from failures. Recovery itself can fail too, so systems must know how to intelligently retry their recovery. We present here a recursive approach, in which a minimal subset of components is recovered first
Retaining Sandbox Containment Despite Bugs in Privileged Memory-Safe Code
"... Flaws in the standard libraries of secure sandboxes represent a major security threat to billions of devices worldwide. The standard libraries are hard to secure because they frequently need to perform low-level operations that are forbidden in untrusted application code. Existing designs have a sin ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Flaws in the standard libraries of secure sandboxes represent a major security threat to billions of devices worldwide. The standard libraries are hard to secure because they frequently need to perform low-level operations that are forbidden in untrusted application code. Existing designs have a single, large trusted computing base that contains security checks at the boundaries between trusted and untrusted code. Unfortunately, flaws in the standard library often allow an attacker to escape the security protections of the sandbox. In this work, we construct a Python-based sandbox that has a small, security-isolated kernel. Using a mechanism called a security layer, we migrate privileged functionality into memory-safe code on top of the sandbox kernel while retaining isolation. For example, significant portions of module import, file I/O, serialization, and network communication routines can be provided in security layers. By moving these routines out of the kernel, we prevent attackers from leveraging bugs in these routines to evade sandbox containment. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by studying past bugs in Java’s standard libraries and show that most of these bugs would likely be contained in our sandbox.
Virtualization of Service Gateways in
- University, Västeras, Sweden
, 2006
"... Today we see more and more services being brought to connected homes, such as entertainment or home automation. These services are published and operated by a variety of service providers. Currently, each provider sells his own box, providing both connectivity and a closed service environment. T ..."
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Today we see more and more services being brought to connected homes, such as entertainment or home automation. These services are published and operated by a variety of service providers. Currently, each provider sells his own box, providing both connectivity and a closed service environment. The open service paradigm aims at mixing all services within the same box, thus opening the service delivery chain for home users.
Printed by Universitetsservice US-AB 2003iii
, 2003
"... Making reliable distributed systems in the presence of sodware errors ..."

