Many theories have been proposed to explain difficulty with center embedded constructions, most attributing the problem to some kind of limited capacity short-term memory. However, these theories have developed for the most part independently of more traditional memory research, which has focused on uncovering general principles such as chunking and interference. This article attempts to gain some unification with this research by suggesting that an interesting range of core sentence processing phenomena can be explained as interference effects in a sharply limited syntactic working memory. These include difficult and acceptable embeddings, as well as certain limitations on ambiguity resolution, length effects in garden path structures, and the requirement for locality in syntactic structure. The theory takes the form of an architecture for parsing which can index no more than two constituents under the same syntactic relation. A limitation of two or three items shows up in a variety o...

ing away from irrelevant details is a theoretical virtue, but the kinds of abstractions that module geography makes can lead to incorrect inferences from data. That such a possibility exists is clearly demonstrated by the working memory research of Just & Carpenter (1992). Briefly, Just and Carpenter have argued that some garden path effects that were previously interpreted in terms of a syntactically encapsulated module can instead be explained by individual differences in working memory capacity. Such an explanation is not considered in a theoretical framework that systematically ignores the role of memory structures in parsing. This point should be taken regardless of whether one is convinced by the current body of empirical support for this particular model---the fact remains that such an explanation could in principle account for the data, and these alternative explanations are only discovered by developing functionally complete architectures. The next few sections describes what ...

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Previous research has identified the prefrontal cortex (PFC) as a brain region that is critical for cognitive control. Currently, theorists remain divided about whether to view the PFC as primarily a coordinative, mnemonic, or inhibitory structure. A theory is presented that attempts to resolve some of the apparent conflicts between the predominant views on PFC control functions. In this theory, PFC is proposed to actively maintain representations of context information. These maintained representations provide a mechanism of control by serving as a top-down bias on the local competitive interactions that occur during processing. As such, it is suggested that PFC performs both mnemonic and inhibitory functions in the service of control, and that each is preferentially observable under different task situations. A series of behavioral, computational, and neuroimaging studies are presented that demonstrates how this theory can account for a wide range of data associated with performance ...

The role of verbal and visuospatial working memory in rule-based and information-integration category learning was examined. Previously, Maddox, Ashby, Ing, and Pickering (2004) found that a sequentially presented verbal working memory task did not affect information-integration learning, but disrupted rule-based learning when the rule was on the spatial frequency of a Gabor stimulus. This pattern was replicated in Experiment 1, in which the same category structures were used, but in which the verbal working memory task was replaced with a visuospatial analog. Experiment 2A examined rule-based learning on an oblique orientation and also found both verbal and visuospatial working memory tasks disrupting learning. Experiment 2B examined rule-based learning on a cardinal orientation and found a minimal effect of the verbal working memory task, but a large effect of the visuospatial working memory task. The conceptual significance of cardinal orientations and the role of visuospatial and verbal working memory in category learning are discussed. Perceptual categorization is a systematic differentiation among classes (or categories) of objects based on their perceptual features. A large body of evidence suggests that humans have available several category learning systems (see Ashby & Maddox, 2005, or Keri, 2003, for a review). The classical approach to categorization (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956), and most multiplesystems approaches, postulate one categorization system based on an extraction of a categorization rule via hypothesis testing during an explicit reasoning process

Several authors have hypothesized that visuo-spatial working memory is functionally analogous to verbal working memory. Irrelevant background speech impairs verbal short-term memory. We investigated whether irrelevant visual information has an analogous effect on visual short-term memory, using a dynamic visual noise (DVN) technique known to disrupt visual imagery (Quinn & McConnell, 1996b). Experiment 1 replicated the effect of DVN on pegword imagery. Experiments 2 and 3 showed no effect of DVN on recall of static matrix patterns, despite a significant effect of a concurrent spatial tapping task. Experiment 4 showed no effect of DVN on encoding or maintenance of arrays of matrix patterns, despite testing memory by a recognition procedure to encourage visual rather than spatial processing. Serial position curves showed a oneitem recency effect typical of visual short-term memory. Experiment 5 showed no effect of DVN on short-term recognition of Chinese characters, despite effects of visual similarity and a concurrent colour memory task that confirmed visual processing of the characters. We conclude that irrelevant visual noise does not impair visual short-term memory. Visual working memory may not be functionally analogous to verbal working memory, and different cognitive processes may underlie visual short-term memory and visual imagery.

The trade-off between exploration and exploitation is common to a wide variety of problems involving search in space and mind. The prevalence of this trade-off and its neurological underpinnings led us to propose domain-general cognitive search processes (Hills, Todd, & Goldstone, 2008). We propose further that these are consistent with the idea of a central executive search process that combines goal-handling across subgoal hierarchies. In the present study, we investigate 3 aspects of this proposal. First, the existence of a unitary central executive search process should allow priming from 1 search task to another and at multiple hierarchical levels. We confirm this by showing cross-domain priming from a spatial search task to 2 different cognitive levels within a lexical search task. Second, given the neural basis of the proposed generalized cognitive search process and the evidence that the central executive is primarily engaged during complex tasks, we hypothesize that priming should require search in the sense of a self-regulated making and testing of sequential predictions about the world. This was confirmed by showing that when participants were allowed to collect spatial resources without searching for them, no priming occurred. Finally, we provide a mechanism for the underlying search process and investigate 3 alternative hypotheses for subgoal hierarchies using the central executive as a search process model (CESP). CESP envisions the central executive as having both emergent and unitary processes, with one of its roles being a generalized cognitive search process that navigates goal hierarchies by mediating persistence on and switching between subgoals.

There is a large range of models of working memory, each with different scopes and emphases. Current interest focuses strongly on the interaction of working memory with long-term memory, as it has become clear that models of working memory alone are incapable of capturing some of our complex cognitive abilities. Most models have contrasting views on how this interaction is implemented. In this thesis, three classes of models are defined, each proposing a different type of interaction. The first model proposes that working memory acts as a gateway for perceptual input on its way to long-term memory. In the unitary model, working memory is seen as comprising the activated portion of long-term memory. The workspace model views working memory as a workspace that is separate from, and deals with the activated contents of long-term memory. The main aim of this thesis was to address the differences between these three models experimentally. Experiments 1 – 7 employed a dual-task paradigm to investigate the effects of irrelevant visual input on visuo-spatial working memory tasks. Two main findings emerged: (1) maintenance of images in working memory was largely insensitive to the effects of concurrent perceptual input; (2) mental imagery was susceptible to interference from irrelevant visual input. This interference effect was selective, as demonstrated by a lack of disruption of imagery by other secondary tasks. Experiment 8 further tested the three models by investigating implicit processing of visual information by neglect patients. It was found that implicit processing is mediated by the activation of long-term memory, in the absence of a conscious representation in working memory. These results together converge to support the workspace model, and suggest a view in which perceptual input activates the contents of long-term memory, prior to these activated representations being made available in a functionally separate working memory system for further processing. The gateway model and unitary model are unable to accommodate all findings. The implications of these results for existing theories about working memory are discussed.

Abstract: The ability to integrate different types of information (e.g., object identity and spatial orientation) and maintain or manipulate them concurrently in working memory (WM) facilitates the flow of ongoing tasks and is essential for normal human cognition. Research shows that object and spatial information is maintained and manipulated in WM via separate pathways in the brain (object/ventral versus spatial/dorsal). How does the human brain coordinate the activity of different specialized systems to conjoin different types of information? Here we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate conjunction- versus single-task manipulation of object (compute average color blend) and spatial (compute intermediate angle) information in WM. Object WM was associated with ventral (inferior frontal gyrus, occipital cortex), and spatial WM with dorsal (parietal cortex, superior frontal, and temporal sulci) regions. Conjoined object/spatial WM resulted in intermediate activity in these specialized areas, but greater activity in different prefrontal and parietal areas. Unique to our study, we found lower temporo-occipital activity and greater deactivation in temporal and medial prefrontal cortices for conjunction- versus single-tasks. Using structural equation modeling, we derived a conjunctiontask connectivity model that comprises a frontoparietal network with a bidirectional DLPFC-VLPFC connection, and a direct parietal-extrastriate pathway. We suggest that these activation/deactivation patterns reflect efficient resource allocation throughout the brain and propose a new extended version of the biased

# The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract Prominent roles for general attention resources are posited in many models of working memory, but the manner in which these can be allocated differs between models or is not sufficiently specified. We varied the payoffs for correct responses in two temporally-overlapping recognition tasks, a visual array comparison task and a tone sequence comparison task. In the critical conditions, an increase in reward for one task corresponded to a decrease in reward for the concurrent task, but memory load remained constant. Our results show patterns of interference consistent with a trade-off between the tasks, suggesting that a shared resource can be flexibly divided, rather than only fully allotted to either of the tasks. Our findings support a role for a domain-general resource in models of working memory, and furthermore suggest that this resource is flexibly divisible.