We review extensive evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and prices. Systematic mispricing probably causes substantial resource misallocation. We argue that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity about the strategic incentives of informed market participants. However, individuals as political participants remain subject to the biases and self-interest they exhibit in private settings. Indeed, correcting contemporaneous market pricing errors is probably not government’s relative advantage. Government and private planners should establish rules ex ante to improve choices and efficiency, including disclosure, reporting, advertising, and default-option-setting regulations. Especially

This paper explains why seemingly irrational overconfident behavior can persist. Information aggregation is poor in groups in which most individuals herd. By ignoring the herd, the actions of overconfident individuals (“entrepreneurs”) convey their private information. However, entrepreneurs make mistakes and thus die more frequently. The socially optimal proportion of entrepreneurs trades off the positive information externality against high attrition rates of entrepreneurs, and depends on the size of the group, on the degree of overconfidence, and on the accuracy of individuals ’ private information. The stationary distribution trades off the fitness of the group against the fitness of overconfident individuals. Starting any company is really hard to do, so you can’t be so smart that it occurs to you that it can’t be done.

The 30th anniversary of The Journal of Portfolio Management is a milestone in the rich intellectual history of modern finance, firmly establishing the relevance of quantitative models and scientific inquiry in the practice of financial management. One of the most enduring ideas from this intellectual history is the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH), a deceptively simple notion that has become a lightning rod for its disciples and the proponents of behavioral economics and finance. In its purest form, the EMH obviates active portfolio management, calling into question the very motivation for portfolio research. It is only fitting that we revisit this groundbreaking idea after three very successful decades of this Journal. In this article, I review the current state of the controversy surrounding the EMH and propose a new perspective that reconciles the two opposing schools of thought. The proposed reconciliation, which I call the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (AMH), is based on an evolutionary approach to economic interactions, as well as some recent research in the cognitive neurosciences that has been transforming and revitalizing the intersection of psychology and economics. Although some of these ideas have not yet been fully articulated within a rigorous quantitative framework, long time students of the EMH and seasoned practitioners will no doubt recognize immediately the possibilities generated by this new perspective. Only time will tell whether its potential will be fulfilled. I begin with a brief review of the classic version of the EMH, and then summarize the most significant criticisms leveled against it by psychologists and behavioral economists. I argue that the sources of this controversy can

Abstract not found

The battle between proponents of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and champions of behavioral finance has never been more pitched, and little consensus exists as to which side is winning or the implications for investment management and consulting. In this article, I review the case for and against the Efficient Markets Hypothesis and describe a new framework—the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis—in which the traditional models of modern financial economics can coexist alongside behavioral models in an intellectually consistent manner. Based on evolutionary principles, the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis implies that the degree of market efficiency is related to environmental factors characterizing market ecology such as the number of competitors in the market, the magnitude of profit opportunities available, and the adaptability of the market participants. Many of the examples that behavioralists cite as violations of rationality that are inconsistent with market efficiency—loss aversion, overconfidence, overreaction, mental accounting, and other behavioral biases—are, in fact, consistent with an evolutionary model of individuals adapting to a changing environment via simple heuristics. Despite the qualitative nature of this new paradigm, I show that the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis yields a number of surprisingly concrete applications for both investment managers and consultants.

We experimentally test overconfidence in investment decisions by offering participants the possibility to substitute their own for alternative investment choices.

The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) maintains that market prices fully reflect all available information. Developed independently by Paul A. Samuelson and Eugene F. Fama in the 1960s, this idea has been applied extensively to theoretical models and empirical studies of financial securities prices, generating considerable controversy as well as fundamental insights into the price-discovery process. The most enduring critique comes from psychologists and behavioural economists who argue that the EMH is based on counterfactual assumptions regarding human behaviour, that is, rationality. Recent advances in evolutionary psychology and the cognitive neurosciences may be able to reconcile the EMH with behavioural anomalies.

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Using financial incentives, we study how portfolio choice (how much to invest in a risky asset) depends on three well-known behavioral phenomena: ambiguity aversion, the illusion of control, and myopic loss aversion. We find evidence that these phenomena are present and test how the level of investment is affected by these motivations; at the same time, we investigate whether participants are willing to explicitly pay a small sum of money to indulge preferences for less ambiguity, more control, or more frequent feedback/opportunities to choose the investment level. First, the observed preference for ‘‘control’ ’ did not affect investment behavior and in fact disappeared when participants were asked to actually pay to gain more control. Second, while people were indeed willing to pay for less ambiguity, the level of ambiguity did not influence investment levels. Finally, participants were willing to pay to have more frequent feedback opportunities to change their portfolio, even though prior research has shown that people invest less in risky assets (and earn less) in this case. (JEL B49, C91, D81, G11, G19) I.

This paper focuses on egocentric biases in financial decisions. Subjects first design a portfolio, whereby each combination of assets yields the same expected return and variance of returns. They are then confronted with two alternative portfolios; the average portfolio and the portfolio of one's selected expert. Illusion of expertise prevails if one prefers nevertheless the own portfolio. Using the random price mechanism reveals that most subjects prefer their own portfolio to the average or the expert's portfolio. Illusion of expertise is shown to be stable individually, over alternatives, and for both elicitation methods, willingness to pay and to accept.