The nature of cognition is being re-considered. Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, the new approach foregrounds the fact that cognition is, rather, a situated activity, and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore be considered first and foremost as acting beings. The essay reviews recent work in Embodied Cognition, provides a concise guide to its principles, attitudes and goals, and identifies the physical grounding project as its central research focus.

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: 1) cognition is situated; 2) cognition is time-pressured; 3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; 4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; 5) cognition is for action; 6) off-line cognition is body-based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

Much indirect evidence supports the hypothesis that transformations of mental images are

Paradigms drawn from cognitive psychology have provided new insight into covert stages of action. These states include not only intending actions that will eventually be executed, but also imagining actions, recognizing tools, learning by observation, or even understanding the behavior of other people. Studies using techniques for mapping brain activity, probing cortical excitability, or measuring the activity of peripheral effectors in normal human subjects and in patients all provide evidence of a subliminal activation of the motor system during these cognitive states. The hypothesis that the motor system is part of a simulation network that is activated under a variety of conditions in relation to action, either self-intended or observed from other individuals, will be developed. The function of this process of simulation would be not only to shape the motor system in anticipation to execution, but also to provide the self with information on the feasibility and the meaning of potential actions. © 2001 Academic Press

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This thesis presents a perceptual system for a humanoid robot that integrates abilities such as object localization and recognition with the deeper developmental machinery required to forge those competences out of raw physical experiences. It shows that a robotic platform can build up and maintain a system for object localization, segmentation, and recognition, starting from very little. What the robot starts with is a direct solution to achieving figure/ground separation: it simply `pokes around' in a region of visual ambiguity and watches what happens. If the arm passes through an area, that area is recognized as free space. If the arm collides with an object, causing it to move, the robot can use that motion to segment the object from the background. Once the robot can acquire reliable segmented views of objects, it learns from them, and from then on recognizes and segments those objects without further contact. Both low-level and high-level visual features can also be learned in this way, and examples are presented for both: orientation detection and affordance recognition, respectively.

... This paper develops active strategies for a robot to acquire visual experience through simple experimental manipulation. The experiments are oriented towards determining what parts of the environment are physically coherent -- that is, which parts will move together, and which are more or less independent. We argue that following causal chains of events out from the robot's body into the environment allows for a very natural developmental progression of visual competence, and relate this idea to results in neuroscience.

This paper describes the results of an implemented computational model that cashes out the belief that metaphor interpretation is grounded in embodied primitives. The speci c task addressed is the interpretation of simple causal narratives in the domains of Politics and Economics. The stories are taken from newspaper articles in these domains. When presented with a preparsed version of these narratives as input, the system described is able to generate commonsense inferences consistent with the input.

& Observing actions made by others activates the cortical circuits responsible for the planning and execution of those same actions. This observation–execution matching system (mirror-neuron system) is thought to play an important role in the understanding of actions made by others. In an fMRI experiment, we tested whether this system also becomes active during the processing of action-related sentences. Participants listened to sentences describing actions performed with the mouth, the hand, or the leg. Abstract sentences of comparable syntactic structure were used as control stimuli. The results showed that listening to action-related sentences activates a left fronto-parieto-temporal network that includes the pars opercularis of the inferior frontal gyrus (Broca’s area), those sectors of the premotor cortex where the actions described are motorically coded, as well as the inferior parietal lobule, the intraparietal sulcus, and the posterior middle temporal gyrus. These data provide the first direct evidence that listening to sentences that describe actions engages the visuomotor circuits which subserve action execution and observation. &

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