Developmental robotics is an emerging field located at the intersection of robotics, cognitive science and developmental sciences. This paper elucidates the main reasons and key motivations behind the convergence of fields with seemingly disparate interests, and shows why developmental robotics might prove to be beneficial for all fields involved. The methodology advocated is synthetic and two-pronged: on the one hand, it employs robots to instantiate models originating from developmental sciences; on the other hand, it aims to develop better robotic systems by exploiting insights gained from studies on ontogenetic development. This paper gives a survey of the relevant research issues and points to some future research directions.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to localize brain areas that were active during the observation of actions made by another individual. Object- and non-object-related actions made with different effectors (mouth, hand and foot) were presented. Observation of both object- and non-object-related actions determined a somatotopically organized activation of premotor cortex. The somatotopic pattern was similar to that of the classical motor cortex homunculus. During the observation of object-related actions, an activation, also somatotopically organized, was additionally found in the posterior parietal lobe. Thus, when individuals observe an action, an internal replica of that action is automatically generated in their premotor cortex. In the case of object-related actions, a further object-related analysis is performed in the parietal lobe, as if the subjects were indeed using those objects. These results bring the previous concept of an action observation/execution matching system (mirror system) into a broader perspective: this system is not restricted to the ventral premotor cortex, but involves several somatotopically organized motor circuits.

The emerging viewpoint of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world. This position actually houses a number of distinct claims, some of which are more controversial than others. This paper distinguishes and evaluates the following six claims: 1) cognition is situated; 2) cognition is time-pressured; 3) we off-load cognitive work onto the environment; 4) the environment is part of the cognitive system; 5) cognition is for action; 6) off-line cognition is body-based. Of these, the first three and the fifth appear to be at least partially true, and their usefulness is best evaluated in terms of the range of their applicability. The fourth claim, I argue, is deeply problematic. The sixth claim has received the least attention in the literature on embodied cognition, but it may in fact be the best documented and most powerful of the six claims.

Children learn a variety of verbs for hand actions starting in their second year of life. The semantic distinctions can be subtle, and they vary across languages, yet they are learned quickly. Howis this possible? This dissertation explores the hypothesis that to explain the acquisition and use of action verbs, motor control must be taken into account. It presents a model of embodied semantics|based on the principles of neural computation in general and on the human motor system in particular|which takes a set of labelled actions and learns both to label novel actions and to obey verbal commands. Akey feature of the model is the executing schema, anactivecontroller mechanism which, by actually driving behavior, allows the model to carry out verbal commands. A hard-wired mechanism links the activity of executing schemas to a set of linguistically important features including hand posture, joint motions, force, aspect and goals. The feature set is relatively small and is xed, helping to make learning tractable. Moreover, the use of traditional feature structures facilitates the use of model merging, a Bayesian probabilistic learning algorithm which rapidly learns plausible word meanings, automatically determines an appropriate number of senses for each verb, and can plausibly be mapped to a connectionist recruitment

This paper presents an implemented computational model of lexical development for the case of action verbs. A simulated agent is trained by an informant giving labels to the agent's actions (here hand motions) and the system learns to both label and carry out similar actions. Computationally, the system employs a novel form of active representation and is explicitly intended to be neurally plausible. The learning methodology is a version of Bayesian model merging (Omohundro, 1992). The verb learning model is placed in the broader context of the L0 project on embodied natural language and its acquisition.

Concepts are the elementary units of reason and linguistic meaning. They are conventional and relatively stable. As such, they must somehow be the result of neural activity in the brain. The questions are: Where? and How? A common philosophical position is that all concepts—even concepts about action and perception—are symbolic and abstract, and therefore must be implemented outside the brain’s sensory-motor system. We will argue against this position using (1) neuroscientific evidence; (2) results from neural computation; and (3) results about the nature of concepts from cognitive linguistics. We will propose that the sensory-motor system has the right kind of structure to characterise both sensory-motor and more abstract concepts. Central to this picture are the neural theory of language and the theory of cogs, according to which, brain structures in the sensory-motor regions are exploited to characterise the so-called “abstract ” concepts that constitute the meanings of grammatical constructions and general inference patterns.

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Within the field of Neuro Robotics we are driven primarily by the desire to understand how humans and animals live and grow and solve every day's problems. To this aim we adopted a "learn by doing" approach by building artificial systems, e.g. robots that not only look like human beings but also represent a model of some brain process. They should, ideally, behave and interact like human beings (being situated). The main emphasis in robotics has been on systems that act as a reaction to an external stimulus (e.g. tracking, reaching), rather than as a result of an internal drive to explore or "understand" the environment. We think it is now appropriate to try to move from acting, in the sense explained above, to "understanding". As a starting point we addressed the problem of learning about the effects and consequences of self-generated actions. How does the robot learn how to pull an object toward itself or to push it away? How does the robot learn that spherical objects roll while a cube only slides if pushed? Interacting with objects is important because it implicitly explores object representation, event understanding, and can provide definition of objecthood that could not be grasped with a mere passive observation of the world. Further, learning to understand what one's own body can do is an essential step toward learning by imitation. In this view two actions are similar not only if their kinematics and dynamics are similar but rather if the effects on the external world are the same. Along this line of research we discuss some recent experiments performed at the AILab at MIT and at the LIRA-Lab at the University of Genova on COG and Babybot respectively. We show how the humanoid robots can learn how to poke and prod objects to obtain a consistently repeatable eff...

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We want to build robots capable of rich social interactions with humans, including natural communication and cooperation. This work explores how imitation as a social learning and teaching process may be applied to building socially intelligent robots, and summarizes our progress toward building a robot capable of learning how to imitate facial expressions from simple imitative games played with a human, using biologically inspired mechanisms. Our approach is heavily influenced by the ways human infants learn to communicate with their caregivers and understand the actions of others in intentional terms. Among the key ideas that we draw from work on the development of human social intelligence, the most crucial is the hypothesis that in human infants, imitative interactions, starting with facial mimicry, are a significant stepping-stone in developing appropriate social behavior, learning to predict other’s actions, and ultimately, understanding the intensions of others. 1