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95
A bargaining model of Collective Choice
 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
, 1999
"... We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equil ..."
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Cited by 63 (3 self)
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We analyze sequential bargaining in general political and economic environments, where proposers are recognized according to a random recognition rule and a proposal is implemented if it passes under an arbitrary voting rule. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium proposals in structural and preference parameters, and core equivalence
A ThreePlayer Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Game
 Journal of Economic Theory
, 2004
"... for comments. All errors are mine. ..."
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Winner determination in sequential majority voting
 In Proceedings of the ECAI2006 Multidisciplinary Workshop on Advances in Preference Handling
, 2007
"... Preferences can be aggregated using a voting rule. Each agent gives their preference orderings over a set of candidates, and a voting rule is used to compute the winner. We consider voting rules which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between two candidates, where the result of each is comp ..."
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Cited by 39 (13 self)
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Preferences can be aggregated using a voting rule. Each agent gives their preference orderings over a set of candidates, and a voting rule is used to compute the winner. We consider voting rules which perform a sequence of pairwise comparisons between two candidates, where the result of each is computed by a majority vote. The winner thus depends on the chosen sequence of comparisons, which can be represented by a binary tree. There are candidates that will win in some trees (called possible winners) or in all trees (called Condorcet winners). While it is easy to find the possible and Condorcet winners, we prove that it is difficult if we insist that the tree is balanced. This restriction is therefore enough to make voting difficult for the chair to manipulate. We also consider the situation where we lack complete informations about preferences, and determine the computational complexity of computing possible and Condorcet winners in this extended case. 1
Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies
 Public Choice
, 1984
"... Consider a group of people confronted with a dichotomous choice (for example, a yes or no decision). Assume that we can characterize each person by a probability, pi, of making the 'better ' of the two choices open to the group, such that we define 'better ' in terms of some line ..."
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Cited by 21 (1 self)
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Consider a group of people confronted with a dichotomous choice (for example, a yes or no decision). Assume that we can characterize each person by a probability, pi, of making the 'better ' of the two choices open to the group, such that we define 'better ' in terms of some linear ordering of the alternatives. If individual choices are independent, and if the a priori likelihood that either of the two choices is correct is one half, we show that the group decision procedure that maximizes the likelihood that the group will make the better of the two choices open to it is a weighted voting rule that assigns weights, wi, such that Pi wi ~ log 1ffi " We then examine the implications for optimal group choice of interdependencies among individual choices.
A Model of Farsighted Voting
, 2008
"... I present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation. In such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today, but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace ..."
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Cited by 20 (0 self)
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I present a new method of interpreting voter preferences in settings where policy remains in effect until replaced by new legislation. In such settings voters consider not only the utility they receive from a given policy today, but also the utility they will receive from policies likely to replace that policy in the future. The model can be used to both characterize longterm preferences and distributions over policy outcomes in situations where policy is ongoing and voters are farsighted.
Computing the minimal covering set
 In Proceedings of the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
, 2007
"... We present the first polynomialtime algorithm for computing the minimal covering set of a (weak) tournament. The algorithm draws upon a linear programming formulation of a subset of the minimal covering set known as the essential set. On the other hand, we show that no efficient algorithm exists fo ..."
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Cited by 17 (13 self)
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We present the first polynomialtime algorithm for computing the minimal covering set of a (weak) tournament. The algorithm draws upon a linear programming formulation of a subset of the minimal covering set known as the essential set. On the other hand, we show that no efficient algorithm exists for two variants of the minimal covering set, the minimal upward covering set and the minimal downward covering set, unless P equals NP. Finally, we observe a strong relationship between von NeumannMorgenstern stable sets and upward covering on the one hand, and the Banks set and downward covering on the other.
Minimal Stable Sets in Tournaments
, 2009
"... We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, which encompasses the top cycle, the uncove ..."
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Cited by 14 (10 self)
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We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions, which encompasses the top cycle, the uncovered set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, the tournament equilibrium set, the Copeland set, and the bipartisan set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured to refine both the minimal covering set and the Banks set. 1
Uncovering some subtleties of the uncovered set: Social choice theory and distributive politics,” Social Choice and Welfare
, 1998
"... Abstract. Although the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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Abstract. Although the uncovered set has occupied a prominent role in social choice theory, its exact shape has never been determined in a general setting. This paper calculates the uncovered set when actors have pork barrel, or purely distributive, preferences, and shows that in this setting nearly the entire Pareto set is uncovered. The result casts doubt on the usefulness of the uncovered set as a general solution concept and suggests that to predict the distribution of political benefits one must explicitly model the institutions that structure collective choice. 1.
Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections
, 1998
"... We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of twoplayer, symmetric, zerosum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and, as a special case, we obtain a lon ..."
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Cited by 10 (2 self)
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We prove that the support of mixed strategy equilibria of twoplayer, symmetric, zerosum games lies in the uncovered set, a concept originating in the theory of tournaments and the spatial theory of politics. We allow for uncountably infinite strategy spaces, and, as a special case, we obtain a longstanding claim to the same eect, due to McKelvey (1986), in the political science literature. Further, we prove the nonemptiness of the uncovered set under quite general assumptions, and we establish, under various assumptions, the measurability and coanalyticity of this set. In the concluding section, we indicate how the inclusion result may be extended to multiplayer, nonzerosum games.
2004, ‘Mixed strategy equilibrium and deep covering in multidimensional electoral competition
"... We prove existence of mixed strategy electoral equilibrium in the multidimensional Downsian model of elections. We do so by modelling voters explicitly as players, enabling us to resolve discontinuities in the game between the candidates, which have proved a barrier to existence. We then give a pa ..."
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Cited by 10 (4 self)
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We prove existence of mixed strategy electoral equilibrium in the multidimensional Downsian model of elections. We do so by modelling voters explicitly as players, enabling us to resolve discontinuities in the game between the candidates, which have proved a barrier to existence. We then give a partial characterization: the supports of equilibrium mixed strategies must lie in the deep uncovered set, a “centrally located ” solution derived from the formal political science literature and the literature on tournaments.