We exploit di®erences in early colonial experience to estimate the e®ect of institutions on economic performance. Our argument is that Europeans adopted very di®erent colonization policies in di®erent colonies, with di®erent associated institutions. The choice of colonization strategy was, at least in part, determined by the feasibility of whether Europeans could settle in the colony. In places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, they could not settle and they were more likely to set up worse (extractive) institutions. These early institutions persisted to the present. We document these hypotheses in the data. Exploiting di®erences in mortality rates faced by soldiers, bishops and sailors in the colonies during the 18th and 19th centuries as an instrument for current institutions, we estimate large e®ects of institutions on income per capita. Our estimates imply that a change from the worst (Zaire) to the best (US or New Zealand) institutions in our sample would be associated with a ¯ve fold increase in income per capita.

This paper evaluates (1) whether the exogenous component of financial intermediary development influences economic growth and (2) whether cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems (e.g., creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting standards) explain differences in the level of financial development. Using both traditional cross-section, instrumental variable procedures and recent dynamic panel techniques, we find that the exogenous components of financial intermediary development is positively associated with economic growth. Also, the data show that cross-country differences in legal and accounting systems help account for differences in financial development. Together, these findings suggest that legal and accounting reforms that strengthen creditor rights, contract enforcement, and accounting practices can boost financial development and accelerate economic growth.

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Acknowledgements: We would like to thank Anke Höffler for research assistance in section 2 and Chris Adam, Janine Aron, Kees Burger, Bill Kinsey, Remco Oostendorp, Ritva Reinikka, Francis Teal, Steve Younger and three referees for comments. Abstract: Africa has had slow growth and a massive exodus of capital. In many respects it has been the most capital-hostile region. We review and interpret the aggregate-level and microeconomic literatures to identify the key explanations for this performance. There is a reasonable correspondence of the two sets of evidence, pointing to four factors as being important. These are a lack of openness to international trade; a high-risk environment; a low level of social capital; and poor infrastructure. These problems are to a substantial extent attributable to government behaviour and the paper includes a review of the political economy literature which addresses that behaviour

This paper analyzes which of various plausible determinants are significantly related to an index of "perceived corruption" compiled from business risk surveys for the mid-1990s. Using 2SLS to reduce problems of endogeneity and a variation of Leamer's "extreme bounds analysis" to test for robustness, it finds three factors robustly significant. Countries that were more economically developed and those which are former British colonies were rated "less corrupt". Those which have a federal structure were "more corrupt". Daniel Treisman Assistant Professor Department of Political Science University of California, Los Angeles 4289 Bunche Hall LA CA 90095-1472 Treisman@polisci.ucla.edu First Draft September 1997 Revised April 1998 ####

For over a century, economists and policy makers have debated the relative merits of bank-based versus market-based financial systems. Recently, however, proponents of the legal-based view of financial development have argued that the century long debate concerning bank-based versus market-based financial systems is analytically vacuous. According to this view, the critical issue is establishing a legal environment in which both banks and markets can operate effectively. This paper represents the first broad, cross-country examination of which view of financial structure and economic growth is most consistent with the data.

Pablo Zoido-Lobaton and Greg Dorchak for efficient research and editorial assistance. We thank particularly Mark Shankerman and Jakob Svensson for very useful suggestions to improve the model. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive In an environment in which bureaucratic burden and delay are exogenous, an individual firm may find bribes helpful to reduce the effective red tape it faces. The “efficient grease ” hypothesis asserts therefore that corruption can improve economic efficiency and that fighting bribery would be counter-productive. This need not be the case. In a general equilibrium in which regulatory burden and delay can be endogenously chosen by rentseeking bureaucrats, the effective (not just nominal) red tape and bribery may be positively correlated across firms. Using data from three worldwide firm-level surveys, we examine the relationship between bribe payment, management time wasted with bureaucrats, and cost of capital. Contrary to the “efficient grease ” theory, we find that firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, cost of capital

This paper attempts to explain international and inter-personal differences in subjective well-being over the final fifth of the twentieth century. The empirical work makes use of data from three waves of the World Values survey covering about fifty different countries. The analysis proceeds in stages. First there is a brief review of some reasons for giving a key role to subjective measures of well-being. This is followed by a survey of earlier empirical studies, a description of the main variables used, a report of results and tests, and discussion of the links among social capital, education, income and well-being. The main innovation of the paper, relative to earlier studies of subjective well-being, lies in its use of large international samples of data combining individual and societal level variables, thus permitting the simultaneous identification of individual-level and societal-level determinants of well-being. This is particularly useful in identifying the direct and indirect linkages between social capital and well-being.

The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists. In this paper, we make a first attempt at examining this issue empirically, by looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices. Our estimates suggest a strong negative relationship between fiscal decentralization in government expenditure and corruption. Moreover, we find that legal origin performs extremely well as an instrument for decentralization. When instrumenting in this way, the estimated relationship between decentralization and corruption is even stronger. We thank Shantayanan Devarajan for useful conversations and seminar participants at the IX Conference of the Italian Society of Public Economics and the World Bank for valuable comments. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect those of the World

We investigate whether civil wars have economic causes. The model is based on utility theory, rebels will conduct a civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion. Using probit and tobit models the propositions are tested empirically. Four variables, initial income, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, the amount of natural resources and initial population size are significant and strong determinants of the duration and the probability of civil wars. One important finding is that the relationship between civil wars and ethnic diversity is non-monotonic; highly fractionalised societies have no greater risk of experiencing a civil war than homogenous ones.

Abstract not found