Results 1  10
of
25
Metatheory and Reflection in Theorem Proving: A Survey and Critique
, 1995
"... One way to ensure correctness of the inference performed by computer theorem provers is to force all proofs to be done step by step in a simple, more or less traditional, deductive system. Using techniques pioneered in Edinburgh LCF, this can be made palatable. However, some believe such an appro ..."
Abstract

Cited by 59 (2 self)
 Add to MetaCart
One way to ensure correctness of the inference performed by computer theorem provers is to force all proofs to be done step by step in a simple, more or less traditional, deductive system. Using techniques pioneered in Edinburgh LCF, this can be made palatable. However, some believe such an approach will never be efficient enough for large, complex proofs. One alternative, commonly called reflection, is to analyze proofs using a second layer of logic, a metalogic, and so justify abbreviating or simplifying proofs, making the kinds of shortcuts humans often do or appealing to specialized decision algorithms. In this paper we contrast the fullyexpansive LCF approach with the use of reflection. We put forward arguments to suggest that the inadequacy of the LCF approach has not been adequately demonstrated, and neither has the practical utility of reflection (notwithstanding its undoubted intellectual interest). The LCF system with which we are most concerned is the HOL proof ...
Reflection in logic, functional and objectoriented programming: a short comparative study
 Proc. of the IJCAI’95 Workshop on Reflection and Metalevel Architectures andtheir Applications in AI,1995
"... Département d’informatique et de recherche opérationnelle ..."
Abstract

Cited by 41 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Département d’informatique et de recherche opérationnelle
On the NoCounterexample Interpretation
 J. SYMBOLIC LOGIC
, 1997
"... In [15],[16] Kreisel introduced the nocounterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated "substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of firstorder Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive f ..."
Abstract

Cited by 20 (10 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
In [15],[16] Kreisel introduced the nocounterexample interpretation (n.c.i.) of Peano arithmetic. In particular he proved, using a complicated "substitution method (due to W. Ackermann), that for every theorem A (A prenex) of firstorder Peano arithmetic PA one can find ordinal recursive functionals \Phi A of order type ! " 0 which realize the Herbrand normal form A of A. Subsequently more
Higher Order Logic
 In Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming
, 1994
"... Contents 1 Introduction : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 2 2 The expressive power of second order Logic : : : : : : : : : : : 3 2.1 The language of second order logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3 2.2 Expressing size : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 4 2.3 Definin ..."
Abstract

Cited by 19 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Contents 1 Introduction : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 2 2 The expressive power of second order Logic : : : : : : : : : : : 3 2.1 The language of second order logic : : : : : : : : : : : : : 3 2.2 Expressing size : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 4 2.3 Defining data types : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 6 2.4 Describing processes : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 8 2.5 Expressing convergence using second order validity : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 9 2.6 Truth definitions: the analytical hierarchy : : : : : : : : 10 2.7 Inductive definitions : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : 13 3 Canonical semantics of higher order logic : : : : : : : : : : : : 15 3.1 Tarskian semantics of second order logic : : : : : : : : : 15 3.2 Function and re
ON INTERPRETING CHAITIN’S INCOMPLETENESS THEOREM
, 1998
"... The aim of this paper is to comprehensively question the validity of the standard way of interpreting Chaitin’s famous incompleteness theorem, which says that for every formalized theory of arithmetic there is a finite constant c such that the theory in question cannot prove any particular number ..."
Abstract

Cited by 9 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The aim of this paper is to comprehensively question the validity of the standard way of interpreting Chaitin’s famous incompleteness theorem, which says that for every formalized theory of arithmetic there is a finite constant c such that the theory in question cannot prove any particular number to have Kolmogorov complexity larger than c. The received interpretation of theorem claims that the limiting constant is determined by the complexity of the theory itself, which is assumed to be good measure of the strength of the theory. I exhibit certain strong counterexamples and establish conclusively that the received view is false. Moreover, I show that the limiting constants provided by the theorem do not in any way reflect the power of formalized theories, but that the values of these constants are actually determined by the chosen coding of Turing machines, and are thus quite accidental.
A Finitary Treatment of the Closed Fragment of Japaridze's Provability Logic
, 2005
"... We study a propositional polymodal provability logic GLP introduced by G. Japaridze. The previous treatments of this logic, due to Japaridze and Ignatiev (see [11, 7]), heavily relied on some nonfinitary principles such as transfinite induction up to #0 or reflection principles. In fact, the cl ..."
Abstract

Cited by 5 (5 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study a propositional polymodal provability logic GLP introduced by G. Japaridze. The previous treatments of this logic, due to Japaridze and Ignatiev (see [11, 7]), heavily relied on some nonfinitary principles such as transfinite induction up to #0 or reflection principles. In fact, the closed fragment of GLP gives rise to a natural system of ordinal notation for #0 that was used in [1] for a prooftheoretic analysis of Peano arithmetic and for constructing simple combinatorial independent statements. In this
Prooftheoretic analysis by iterated reflection
 Arch. Math. Logic
"... Progressions of iterated reflection principles can be used as a tool for ordinal analysis of formal systems. Technically, in some sense, they replace the use of omegarule. We compare the information obtained by this kind of analysis with the results obtained by the more usual prooftheoretic techni ..."
Abstract

Cited by 4 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Progressions of iterated reflection principles can be used as a tool for ordinal analysis of formal systems. Technically, in some sense, they replace the use of omegarule. We compare the information obtained by this kind of analysis with the results obtained by the more usual prooftheoretic techniques. In some cases the techniques of iterated reflection principles allows to obtain sharper results, e.g., to define prooftheoretic ordinals relevant to logical complexity Π 0 1. We provide a more general version of the fine structure formulas for iterated reflection principles (due to U. Schmerl [24]). This allows us, in a uniform manner, to analyze main fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by restricted forms of induction, including IΣn, IΣ − n, IΠ − n and their combinations. We also obtain new conservation results relating the hierarchies of uniform and local reflection principles. In particular, we show that (for a sufficiently broad class of theories T) the uniform Σ1reflection principle for T is Σ2conservative over the corresponding local reflection principle. This bears some corollaries on the hierarchies of restricted induction schemata in arithmetic and provides a key tool for our generalization of Schmerl’s theorem. 1