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19
Hypercomputation: computing more than the Turing machine
, 2002
"... In this report I provide an introduction to the burgeoning field of hypercomputation – the study of machines that can compute more than Turing machines. I take an extensive survey of many of the key concepts in the field, tying together the disparate ideas and presenting them in a structure which al ..."
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In this report I provide an introduction to the burgeoning field of hypercomputation – the study of machines that can compute more than Turing machines. I take an extensive survey of many of the key concepts in the field, tying together the disparate ideas and presenting them in a structure which allows comparisons of the many approaches and results. To this I add several new results and draw out some interesting consequences of hypercomputation for several different disciplines. I begin with a succinct introduction to the classical theory of computation and its place amongst some of the negative results of the 20 th Century. I then explain how the ChurchTuring Thesis is commonly misunderstood and present new theses which better describe the possible limits on computability. Following this, I introduce ten different hypermachines (including three of my own) and discuss in some depth the manners in which they attain their power and the physical plausibility of each method. I then compare the powers of the different models using a device from recursion theory. Finally, I examine the implications of hypercomputation to mathematics, physics, computer science and philosophy. Perhaps the most important of these implications is that the negative mathematical results of Gödel, Turing and Chaitin are each dependent upon the nature of physics. This both weakens these results and provides strong links between mathematics and physics. I conclude that hypercomputation is of serious academic interest within many disciplines, opening new possibilities that were previously ignored because of long held misconceptions about the limits of computation.
Accelerated Turing Machines
 Minds and Machines
, 2002
"... Abstract. Accelerating Turing machines are Turing machines of a sort able to perform tasks that are commonly regarded as impossible for Turing machines. For example, they can determine whether or not the decimal representation of π contains n consecutive 7s, for any n; solve the Turingmachine halti ..."
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Abstract. Accelerating Turing machines are Turing machines of a sort able to perform tasks that are commonly regarded as impossible for Turing machines. For example, they can determine whether or not the decimal representation of π contains n consecutive 7s, for any n; solve the Turingmachine halting problem; and decide the predicate calculus. Are accelerating Turing machines, then, logically impossible devices? I argue that they are not. There are implications concerning the nature of effective procedures and the theoretical limits of computability. Contrary to a recent paper by Bringsjord, Bello and Ferrucci, however, the concept of an accelerating Turing machine cannot be used to shove up Searle’s Chinese room argument.
Even Turing Machines Can Compute Uncomputable Functions
 Unconventional Models of Computation
, 1998
"... Accelerated Turing machines are Turing machines that perform tasks commonly regarded as impossible, such as computing the halting function. The existence of these notional machines has obvious implications concerning the theoretical limits of computability. 2 1. Introduction Neither Turing nor Post ..."
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Accelerated Turing machines are Turing machines that perform tasks commonly regarded as impossible, such as computing the halting function. The existence of these notional machines has obvious implications concerning the theoretical limits of computability. 2 1. Introduction Neither Turing nor Post, in their descriptions of the devices we now call Turing machines, made much mention of time (Turing 1936, Post 1936). 1 They listed the primitive operations that their devices perform  read a square of the tape, write a single symbol on a square of the tape (first deleting any symbol already present), move one square to the right, and so forth  but they made no mention of the duration of each primitive operation. The crucial concept is that of whether or not the machine halts after a finite number of operations. Temporal considerations are not relevant to the functioning of the devices as described, nor  so we are clearly supposed to believe  to the soundness of the proofs that Turi...
The many forms of hypercomputation
 Applied Mathematics and Computation
, 2006
"... This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess. ..."
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This paper surveys a wide range of proposed hypermachines, examining the resources that they require and the capabilities that they possess.
BioSteps Beyond Turing
 BIOSYSTEMS
, 2004
"... Are there `biologically computing agents' capable to compute Turing uncomputable functions? It is perhaps tempting to dismiss this question with a negative answer. Quite the opposite, for the first time in the literature on molecular computing we contend that the answer is not theoretically ..."
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Are there `biologically computing agents' capable to compute Turing uncomputable functions? It is perhaps tempting to dismiss this question with a negative answer. Quite the opposite, for the first time in the literature on molecular computing we contend that the answer is not theoretically negative. Our results will be formulated in the language of membrane computing (P systems). Some mathematical results presented here are interesting in themselves. In contrast with most speedup methods which are based on nondeterminism, our results rest upon some universality results proved for deterministic P systems. These results will be used for building "accelerated P systems". In contrast with the case of Turing machines, acceleration is a part of the hardware (not a quality of the environment) and it is realised either by decreasing the size of "reactors" or by speedingup the communication channels.
A new Gödelian argument for hypercomputing minds based on the busy beaver problem
 Applied Mathematics and Computation, in press, doi:10.1016/j.amc.2005.09.071
"... 9.9.05 1245am NY time Do human persons hypercompute? Or, as the doctrine of computationalism holds, are they information processors at or below the Turing Limit? If the former, given the essence of hypercomputation, persons must in some real way be capable of infinitary information processing. Using ..."
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9.9.05 1245am NY time Do human persons hypercompute? Or, as the doctrine of computationalism holds, are they information processors at or below the Turing Limit? If the former, given the essence of hypercomputation, persons must in some real way be capable of infinitary information processing. Using as a springboard Gödel’s littleknown assertion that the human mind has a power “converging to infinity, ” and as an anchoring problem Rado’s (1963) Turinguncomputable “busy beaver ” (or Σ) function, we present in this short paper a new argument that, in fact, human persons can hypercompute. The argument is intended to be formidable, not conclusive: it brings Gödel’s intuition to a greater level of precision, and places it within a sensible case against computationalism. 1
An argument for the uncomputability of infinitary mathematical expertise
 ‘Expertise in Context’, AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA
, 1997
"... To a majority of the people involved in the study of expertise from a computational perspective, `expertise' tends to refer to domains such as medical diagnosis, aircraft piloting, auditing, etc. The reasoning in domains like these appears to be readymade for computational packaging. But what ..."
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To a majority of the people involved in the study of expertise from a computational perspective, `expertise' tends to refer to domains such as medical diagnosis, aircraft piloting, auditing, etc. The reasoning in domains like these appears to be readymade for computational packaging. But what if we try to cast a broader, braver net in an attempt to catch varieties of expertise out there in the real world which don't, at least at first glance, look like they can be rendered in computational terms? In particular, what about mathematical expertise? In this chapter I focus on elementary &quot;infinitary &quot; expertise in the domain of mathematical logic. I argue that at least some of this expertise is indeed uncomputable. I end by briefly discussing the implications of this argument for the practice of AI and expert systems.
ACCELERATING MACHINES
, 2006
"... This paper presents an overview of accelerating machines. We begin by exploring the history of the accelerating machine model and the potential power that it provides. We look at some of the problems that could be solved with an accelerating machine, and review some of the possible implementation me ..."
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This paper presents an overview of accelerating machines. We begin by exploring the history of the accelerating machine model and the potential power that it provides. We look at some of the problems that could be solved with an accelerating machine, and review some of the possible implementation methods that have been presented. Finally, we expose the limitations of accelerating machines and conclude by posing some problems for further research.
SuperTasks, Accelerating Turing Machines and Uncomputability
"... Accelerating Turing machines are abstract devices that have the same computational structure as Turing machines, but can perform supertasks. I argue that performing supertasks alone does not buy more computational power, and that accelerating Turing machines do not solve the halting problem. To sh ..."
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Accelerating Turing machines are abstract devices that have the same computational structure as Turing machines, but can perform supertasks. I argue that performing supertasks alone does not buy more computational power, and that accelerating Turing machines do not solve the halting problem. To show this, I analyze the reasoning that leads to Thomson's paradox, point out that the paradox rests on a conflation of different perspectives of accelerating processes, and conclude that the same conflation underlies the claim that accelerating Turing machines can solve the halting problem.