Results 1 -
4 of
4
Exposure-Resilient Functions and All-Or-Nothing Transforms
, 2000
"... We study the problem of partial key exposure. Standard cryptographic de nitions and constructions do not guarantee any security even if a tiny fraction of the secret key is compromised. We show how to build cryptographic primitives that remain secure even when an adversary is able to learn almo ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 50 (7 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We study the problem of partial key exposure. Standard cryptographic de nitions and constructions do not guarantee any security even if a tiny fraction of the secret key is compromised. We show how to build cryptographic primitives that remain secure even when an adversary is able to learn almost all of the secret key.
On Perfect and Adaptive Security in Exposure-Resilient Cryptography
, 2001
"... . We consider the question of adaptive security for two related ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 32 (6 self)
- Add to MetaCart
. We consider the question of adaptive security for two related
Exposure-Resilient Cryptography
, 2000
"... We develop the notion of Exposure-Resilient Cryptography. While standard cryptographic definitions and constructions do not guarantee any security even if a tiny fraction of the secret entity (e.g., cryptographic key) is compromised, the objective of Exposure-Resilient Cryptography is to build infor ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 20 (1 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We develop the notion of Exposure-Resilient Cryptography. While standard cryptographic definitions and constructions do not guarantee any security even if a tiny fraction of the secret entity (e.g., cryptographic key) is compromised, the objective of Exposure-Resilient Cryptography is to build information structures such that almost complete (intentional or unintentional) exposure of such a structure still protects the secret information embedded in this structure. The key to our approach is a new primitive of independent interest, which we call an Exposure-Resilient Function (ERF) -- a deterministic function whose output appears random (in a perfect, statistical or computational sense) even if almost all the bits of the input are known. ERF's by themselves eciently solve the partial exposure of secrets in the setting where the secret is simply a random value, like in the private-key cryptography. They can also be viewed as very secure pseudorandom generators and have many other applica...
Chinese Academy of Sciences
"... The most popular method to construct hash functions is to iterate a compression function on the input message. This method is called Merkle-Damgård method. Most hash functions used in practice such as MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 are based on this method. However this method is not always the best. For ex ..."
Abstract
- Add to MetaCart
The most popular method to construct hash functions is to iterate a compression function on the input message. This method is called Merkle-Damgård method. Most hash functions used in practice such as MD4, MD5, SHA-0, SHA-1 are based on this method. However this method is not always the best. For example, this method can not resist multi-collision attack. Recently some modifications of this method are proposed. These modified methods are based on Merkle-Damgård method and some improvements are made. A hash function based on All-or-Nothing property is one of these improvements. All-or-nothing property is an encryption mode for block ciphers. It has the property that one must decrypt all cipher blocks to determine any plain-text block. All-ornothing hash function is a kind of hash function constructed with the all-or-nothing property. The authors of it claim that it is more secure than those common hash functions. In this paper, we will show that this is not true and there are still some flaws on this improved method.

