Abstract: Functionalists about consciousness identify consciousness with a role; physicalists identify consciousness with an implementer of that role. The global workspace theory of consciousness fits the functionalist perspective, but the physicalist sees consciousness as a biological phenomenon that implements global accessibility. Dehaene and Naccache, Dennett and Jack and Shallice “see convergence coming from many different quarters on a version of the neuronal global workspace model ” (Dennett, p. 1). (Boldface references are to papers in this volume.) On the contrary, even within this volume, there are commitments to very different perspectives on consciousness. And these differing perspectives are based on tacit differences in philosophical starting places that should be made explicit. Indeed, it is not clear that different uses of “consciousness ” and “awareness ” in this volume can be taken to refer to the same phenomenon. More specifically, I think there are three different concepts of consciousness in play in this issue. The global workspace model makes much more sense on one of these than on the others.

Evidence for unconscious learning has typically been based on dissociations between direct and indirect tests of learning. Because of some inherent problems with dissociation logic, we applied the logic of opposition to 2 artificial grammar learning experiments. In Experiment 1, participants were exposed to 2 different sets of letter strings, generated from 2 different grammars, and later rated test strings for grammaticality with either in concert (rate "grammatical" strings consistent with either structure) or opposition (rate "grammatical" only strings from 1 of the structures) instructions. Manipulating response deadline affected controlled, but not automatic influences. In Experiment 2, after similar training, a source monitoring test was administered from which the in concert and opposition conditions were derived. The test indicated that varying the retention interval affected controlled, but not automatic influences. The results are discussed in terms of awareness, knowledge representation and metacognitive processing. Beyond Dissociation Logic: Evidence for Controlled and Automatic Influences in Artificial Grammar Learning The study of various types of unconscious influence on behavior is one of the most hotly debated and widely researched topics in psychology. Traditionally, Freudian psychologists have assumed that unconscious influences stem from repressed sexual and aggressive urges and fantasies. In contrast, modern researchers in cognitive psychology assume that unconscious influences are broader and not necessarily linked to repression. For example, people might treat a mundane, previously encountered stimulus differently from a novel one, despite the fact that they do not consciously recall having encountered it before (e.g., they may claim to like an ol...

this article, recollection and familiarity have been considered from the framework of dual-process models of recognition memory. Recollection and familiarity have been assumed to be functionally independent and discrete processes that mediate memory pedormance. Within this framework, recollection reflects the controlled reuieval of episodic information, whereas familiarity reflects automatic undifferenfiated feelings of memory. The present results, considered within this framework, suggest that both of these bases of recognition are reliant on conceptual processes and, further, that the familiarity process contributing to recognition is functionally distinct from perceptual repetition prim- ing

Introduction: the challenge of a science of consciousness Understanding consciousness has become the ultimate intellectual challenge of this new millennium. Even if philosophers now accept the notion that it is a "real , natural, biological phenomenon literally located in the brain" (Revonsuo, 2001), a view in harmony with the neuroscientist conception that "consciousness is entirely caused by neurobiological processes and realized in brain structures" (Changeux, 1983; Crick, 1994; Edelman, 1989), the real issue becomes: how to elaborate a science of consciousness? This challenging problem raises two questions. A first one is how to empirically define experimental paradigms in order to delineate a relevant and ultimately causal relationship between subjective phenomena and objective measurements of neural activity. Cognitive psychologists have now defined a variety of minimal experimental protocols which allow a fair comparison between conscious and non-conscious processing of informa

Research on consciousness is currently enjoying a spectacular revival of interest in the cognitive sciences. From an empirical point of view, the NCC program --- the search for the "Neural Correlates of Consciousness" --- holds the promise of establishing correlations between physiological and phenomenal states in a way that directly resembles G. T. Fechners (1860) so-called "inner psychophysics". Should the NCC program be entirely successful, we would thus be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. we would be able to predict phenomenal states based on physiological states. In this paper, we explore some of the conceptual and methodological difficulties of this approach. In both neurobiology and psychology, there are serious measurement problems that stand in the way of correlation research, even after the "hard problem" has been set aside. Thus, even if one had identified certain internal functional states as indicators of phenomenal states, the ...

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In this chapter we establish what it is for something to be implicit. The approach to implicit knowledge is taken from Dienes and Perner (1999) and Perner and Dienes (1999), which relates the implicit-explicit distinction to knowledge representations. To be clear about exactly what our claims are we first discuss what a representation is, what it is for a representation to represent something implicitly or explicitly and apply those concepts to knowledge. Next we show how maximally explicit knowledge is naturally associated with consciousness (according to the higher order thought theory). Then we discuss the relationships between explicit knowledge and metacognition, where metacognition is considered in terms of both its monitoring and control aspects, to shed light on conscious and unconscious perception, episodic memory, and volitional control. We will then show how implicit learning should be viewed in metacognitive terms, and conclude that people' s relative lack of metaknowledge in implicit learning paradigms justifies the claim that people have acquired genuinely implicit knowledge. In Izaute, M., Chambres, P., Marescaux, P.-J. (Eds), Metacognition: Process, function, and use. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, forthcoming. 1.

Abstract — This paper reviews the different methods that have been employed recently to study consciousness. At least two of those methods, the neuropsychological approach and the cognitive approach, have converged on a set of characteristics that separate conscious processes from unconscious ones. These characteristics: durable, explicit representations; novel combinations of operations; and intentional behaviors intersect with the necessary requirements for the development of expertise using deliberate practice. This intersection is described in detail and its potential implications for cross-species comparisons, understanding the evolution of human consciousness, and consciousness in machines is discussed. Copyright c ○ 2003-2005 Yang’s Scientific

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