Value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks in markets around the world. For the period 1975 through 1995, the difference between the average returns on global portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks is 7.68 percent per year, and value stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of thirteen major markets. An international capital asset pricing model cannot explain the value premium, but a two-factor model that includes a risk factor for relative distress captures the value premium in international returns. INVESTMENT MANAGERS CLASSIFY FIRMS that have high ratios of book-to-market equity ~B0M!, earnings to price ~E0P!, or cash flow to price ~C0P! as value stocks. Fama and French ~1992, 1996! and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny ~1994! show that for U.S. stocks there is a strong value premium in average returns. High B0M, E0P, or C0P stocks have higher average returns than low B0M, E0P, or C0P stocks. Fama and French ~1995! and Lakonishok et al. ~1994! also show that the value premium is associated with relative distress.

This paper surveys the field of asset pricing. The emphasis is on the interplay between theory and empirical work and on the trade-off between risk and return. Modern research seeks to understand the behavior of the stochastic discount factor ~SDF! that prices all assets in the economy. The behavior of the term structure of real interest rates restricts the conditional mean of the SDF, whereas patterns of risk premia restrict its conditional volatility and factor structure. Stylized facts about interest rates, aggregate stock prices, and cross-sectional patterns in stock returns have stimulated new research on optimal portfolio choice, intertemporal equilibrium models, and behavioral finance. This paper surveys the field of asset pricing. The emphasis is on the interplay between theory and empirical work. Theorists develop models with testable predictions; empirical researchers document “puzzles”—stylized facts that fail to fit established theories—and this stimulates the development of new theories. Such a process is part of the normal development of any science. Asset pricing, like the rest of economics, faces the special challenge that data are generated naturally rather than experimentally, and so researchers cannot control the quantity of data or the random shocks that affect the data. A particularly interesting characteristic of the asset pricing field is that these random shocks are also the subject matter of the theory. As Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay ~1997, Chap. 1, p. 3! put it: What distinguishes financial economics is the central role that uncertainty plays in both financial theory and its empirical implementation. The starting point for every financial model is the uncertainty facing investors, and the substance of every financial model involves the impact of uncertainty on the behavior of investors and, ultimately, on mar-* Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts

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As a consequence of optimal investment choices, a firm’s assets and growth options change in predictable ways. Using a dynamic model, we show that this imparts predictability to changes in a firm’s systematic risk, and its expected return. Simulations show that the model simultaneously reproduces: ~i! the time-series relation between the book-to-market ratio and asset returns; ~ii! the cross-sectional relation between book-to-market, market value, and return; ~iii! contrarian effects at short horizons; ~iv! momentum effects at longer horizons; and ~v! the inverse relation between interest rates and the market risk premium. RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN FINANCE has focused on regularities in the cross section of expected returns that appear anomalous relative to traditional models. Stock returns are related to book-to-market, and market value. 1 Past returns have also been shown to predict relative performance, through the documented success of contrarian and momentum strategies. 2 Existing explanations for these results are that they are due to behavioral biases or risk premia for omitted state variables. 3 These competing explanations are difficult to evaluate without models that explicitly tie the characteristics of interest to risks and risk premia. For example, with respect to book-to-market, Lakonishok et al. ~1994! argue: “The point here is simple: although the returns to the B0M strategy are impressive, B0M is not a ‘clean ’ variable uniquely associated with eco-

We use a new database to perform a comprehensive analysis of the mutual fund industry. We find that funds hold stocks that outperform the market by 1.3 percent per year, but their net returns underperform by one percent. Of the 2.3 percent difference between these results, 0.7 percent is due to the underperformance of nonstock holdings, whereas 1.6 percent is due to expenses and transactions costs. Thus, funds pick stocks well enough to cover their costs. Also, high-turnover funds beat the Vanguard Index 500 fund on a net return basis. Our evidence supports the value of active mutual fund management. DO MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS WHO actively trade stocks add value? Academics have debated this issue since the seminal paper of Jensen ~1968!. Although some controversy still exists, the majority of studies now conclude that actively managed funds ~e.g., the Fidelity Magellan fund!, on average, underperform their passively managed counterparts ~e.g., the Vanguard Index 500 fund!. 1 For example, Gruber ~1996! finds that the average mutual fund underperforms

Recent imperfect capital market theories predict the presence of asymmetries in the variation of small and large firms' risk over the economic cycle. Small firms with little collateral should be more strongly affected by tighter credit market conditions in a recession state than large, better collateralized ones. This paper adopts a flexible econometric model to analyse these implications empirically. Consistent with theory, small firms display the highest degree of asymmetry in their risk across recession and expansion states and this translates into a higher sensitivity of these firms' expected stock returns with respect to variables that measure credit market conditions. Recent imperfect capital market theories (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)) predict that changing credit market conditions can have very different effects on small and large firms' risk. Agency costs induced by asymmetry in the information held by firms and their creditors make...

This paper addresses the following basic capital budgeting question: Suppose that crosssectional differences in stock returns can be predicted based on variables other than beta (e.g., book-to-market), and that this predictability reflects market irrationality rather than compensation for fundamental risk. In this setting, how should companies determine hurdle rates? I show how factors such as managerial tune horizons and financial constraints affect the optimal hurdle rate. Under some circumstances, beta can be useful as a capital budgeting tool, even if it is of no use in predicting stock returns.

This paper investigates nonlinear pricing kernels in which the risk factor is endogenously determined and preferences restrict the definition of the pricing kernel. These kernels potentially generate the empirical performance of nonlinear and multifactor models, while maintaining empirical power and avoiding ad hoc specifications of factors or functional form. Our test results indicate that preferencerestricted nonlinear pricing kernels are both admissible for the cross section of returns and are able to significantly improve upon linear single- and multifactor kernels. Further, the nonlinearities in the pricing kernel drive out the importance of the factors in the linear multi-factor model. A PRINCIPAL IMPLICATION OF THE Capital Asset Pricing Model ~CAPM! is that the pricing kernel is linear in a single factor, the portfolio of aggregate wealth. Numerous studies over the past two decades have documented violations of this restriction. 1 In response, researchers have examined the performance of alternative models of asset prices. These models have generally fallen into two classes: ~1! multifactor models such as Ross ’ APT or Merton’s ICAPM, in which factors in addition to the market return determine asset prices; or ~2! nonparametric models, such as Bansal et al. ~1993!, Bansal and Viswanathan ~1993!, and Chapman ~1997!, in which the pricing kernel is not

Motivated by the behavior of asset prices, trading volume and price volatility during historical episodes of asset price bubbles, we present a continuous time equilibrium model where overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. With short-sale constraints, an asset owner has an option to sell the asset to other overconfident agents when they have more optimistic beliefs. As in Harrison and Kreps (1978), this re-sale option has a recursive structure, that is, a buyer of the asset gets the option to resell it. Agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more. This causes a significant bubble component in asset prices even when small differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. In equilibrium, large bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and high price volatility. Our model has an explicit solution, which allows for several comparative statics exercises. Our analysis shows that while Tobin’s tax can substantially reduce speculative trading when transaction costs are small, it has only a limited impact on the size of the bubble or on price volatility. We also give an example where the price of a subsidiary is larger than its parent firm. This paper was previously circulated under the title “Overconfidence, Short-Sale Constraints and Bubbles.”

In a sample of 398 firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, firm-level differences in variables related to corporate governance had a strong impact on firm performance during the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 to 1998. Significantly better stock price performance is associated with firms that had indicators of higher disclosure quality (ADRs and auditors from Big Six accounting firms), with firms that had higher outside ownership concentration, and with firms that were focused rather than diversified. The results suggest that individual firms have some power to preclude expropriation of minority shareholders if legal protection is inadequate. JEL classification: G15; G32; G34 Keywords: Financial crises; Corporate governance; Disclosure; Ownership structure; Diversification I am grateful to Simon Johnson, Sendhil Mullainathan, David Scharfstein, and Jeremy Stein for advice and encouragement, and to Simeon Djankov, Kristin Forbes, Ken French, Kathy Kahle, S.P. Kothari, Grant McQueen, Andrei Shleifer, Keith Vorkink, Marc Zenner, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at Brigham Young University, MIT, Texas A&M University, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and the University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments. I thank Simeon Djankov for making data available that is used in Panel C of Table 3. This paper is a revised version of a chapter of my MIT Ph.D. thesis. All errors are mine. E-mail address: todd.mitton@byu.edu 0304-405X/00/$-see front matter 2002 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved 1 1.