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M.: Indifferentiable security analysis of popular hash functions with prefixfree padding
 ASIACRYPT 2006. LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. Understanding what construction strategy has a chance to be a good hash function is extremely important nowadays. In TCC’04, Maurer et al. [13] introduced the notion of indifferentiability as a generalization of the concept of the indistinguishability of two systems. In Crypto’2005, Coron ..."
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Abstract. Understanding what construction strategy has a chance to be a good hash function is extremely important nowadays. In TCC’04, Maurer et al. [13] introduced the notion of indifferentiability as a generalization of the concept of the indistinguishability of two systems. In Crypto’2005, Coron et al. [5] suggested to employ indifferentiability in generic analysis of hash functions and started by suggesting four constructions which enable eliminating all possible generic attacks against iterative hash functions. In this paper we continue this initial suggestion and we give a formal proof of indifferentiability and indifferentiable attack for prefixfree MD hash functions (for single block length (SBL) hash and also some double block length (DBL) constructions) in the random oracle model and in the ideal cipher model. In particular, we observe that there are sixteen PGV hash functions (with prefixfree padding) which are indifferentiable from random oracle model in the ideal cipher model. 1
LowCost RFID Systems: Confronting Security and Privacy
 In: AutoID Labs Research Workshop
, 2005
"... In the implementation of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems concerns have been raised regarding information security and violations of enduser privacy. There is a large collection of literature available on efficient and inexpensive cryptographic engines, but they are still extravagant s ..."
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Cited by 11 (0 self)
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In the implementation of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems concerns have been raised regarding information security and violations of enduser privacy. There is a large collection of literature available on efficient and inexpensive cryptographic engines, but they are still extravagant solutions for low cost RFID systems. Security and privacy provided by low cost RFID is both directly and indirectly limited by a number of factors that are unique to low cost RFID. This paper examines security and privacy issues regarding RFID and presents the challenges that arise in view of the unique environment presented by low cost RFID systems.
How to Build a Hash Function from any CollisionResistant Function
, 2007
"... Recent collisionfinding attacks against hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 motivate the use of provably collisionresistant (CR) functions in their place. Finding a collision in a provably CR function implies the ability to solve some hard problem (e.g., factoring). Unfortunately, existing provab ..."
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Cited by 11 (3 self)
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Recent collisionfinding attacks against hash functions such as MD5 and SHA1 motivate the use of provably collisionresistant (CR) functions in their place. Finding a collision in a provably CR function implies the ability to solve some hard problem (e.g., factoring). Unfortunately, existing provably CR functions make poor replacements for hash functions as they fail to deliver behaviors demanded by practical use. In particular, they are easily distinguished from a random oracle. We initiate an investigation into building hash functions from provably CR functions. As a method for achieving this, we present the MixCompressMix (MCM) construction; it envelopes any provably CR function H (with suitable regularity properties) between two injective “mixing” stages. The MCM construction simultaneously enjoys (1) provable collisionresistance in the standard model, and (2) indifferentiability from a monolithic random oracle when the mixing stages themselves are indifferentiable from a random oracle that observes injectivity. We instantiate our new design approach by specifying a blockcipherbased construction that
Towards Secure and Fast Hash Functions
, 1999
"... this paper [15], [16] (m, 2m) block cipher this paper this paper Suppose that ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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this paper [15], [16] (m, 2m) block cipher this paper this paper Suppose that
Hash Functions Based on Block Ciphers and Quaternary Codes
 Advances in Cryptology ASIACRYPT
, 1996
"... . We consider constructions for cryptographic hash functions based on mbit block ciphers. First we present a new attack on the LOKIDBH mode: the attack finds collisions in 2 3m=4 encryptions, which should be compared to 2 m encryptions for a brute force attack. This attack breaks the last remai ..."
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Cited by 9 (1 self)
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. We consider constructions for cryptographic hash functions based on mbit block ciphers. First we present a new attack on the LOKIDBH mode: the attack finds collisions in 2 3m=4 encryptions, which should be compared to 2 m encryptions for a brute force attack. This attack breaks the last remaining subclass in a wide class of efficient hash functions which have been proposed in the literature. We then analyze hash functions based on a collision resistant compression function for which finding a collision requires at least 2 m encryptions, providing a lower bound of the complexity of collisions of the hash function. A new class of constructions is proposed, based on error correcting codes over GF(2 2 ) and a proof of security is given, which relates their security to that of single block hash functions. For example, a compression function is presented which requires about 4 encryptions to hash an mbit block, and for which finding a collision requires at least 2 m encryptions...
Breaking the ICE  finding multicollisions in iterated concatenated and expanded (ICE) hash functions
 In Proceedings of FSE ’06
, 2006
"... Abstract. The security of hash functions has recently become one of the hottest topics in the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives. Since almost all the hash functions used today (including the MD and SHA families) have an iterated design, it is important to study the general security pro ..."
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Cited by 9 (0 self)
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Abstract. The security of hash functions has recently become one of the hottest topics in the design and analysis of cryptographic primitives. Since almost all the hash functions used today (including the MD and SHA families) have an iterated design, it is important to study the general security properties of such functions. At Crypto 2004 Joux showed that in any iterated hash function it is relatively easy to find exponential sized multicollisions, and thus the concatenation of several hash functions does not increase their security. However, in his proof it was essential that each message block is used at most once. In 2005 Nandi and Stinson extended the technique to handle iterated hash functions in which each message block is used at most twice. In this paper we consider the general case and prove that even if we allow each iterated hash function to scan the input multiple times in an arbitrary expanded order, their concatenation is not stronger than a single function. Finally, we extend the result to treebased hash functions with arbitrary tree structures.
A CollisionResistant Rate1 DoubleBlockLength Hash Function
"... (on the leave to BauhausUniversity Weimar, Germany) Abstract. This paper proposes a construction for collision resistant 2nbit hash functions, based on nbit block ciphers with 2nbit keys. The construction is analysed in the ideal cipher model; for n = 128 an adversary would need roughly 2 122 un ..."
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Cited by 8 (0 self)
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(on the leave to BauhausUniversity Weimar, Germany) Abstract. This paper proposes a construction for collision resistant 2nbit hash functions, based on nbit block ciphers with 2nbit keys. The construction is analysed in the ideal cipher model; for n = 128 an adversary would need roughly 2 122 units of time to find a collision. The construction employs “combinatorial ” hashing as an underlying building block (like Universal Hashing for cryptographic message authentication by Wegman and Carter). The construction runs at rate 1, thus improving on a similar rate 1/2 approach by Hirose (FSE 2006). 1
On the Impossibility of Highly Efficient BlockcipherBased Hash Functions
, 2004
"... We say a blockcipherbased hash function is highly efficient if it makes exactly one blockcipher call for each message block hashed, and all blockcipher calls use a single underlying key. Although a few highly efficient constructions have been proposed, no one has been able to prove their security. ..."
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Cited by 7 (3 self)
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We say a blockcipherbased hash function is highly efficient if it makes exactly one blockcipher call for each message block hashed, and all blockcipher calls use a single underlying key. Although a few highly efficient constructions have been proposed, no one has been able to prove their security. In this paper we prove, in the blackbox model, that it is impossible to construct a highly efficient blockcipherbased hash function which is provably secure. Our result implies, in particular, that the Tweakable Chain Hash (TCH) construction suggested by Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [3] is not correct under an instantiation suggested for this construction, nor can TCH be correctly instantiated by any other efficient means.
New Attacks on all Double Block Length Hash Functions of Hash Rate 1, including the ParallelDM
, 1995
"... . In this paper attacks on double block length hash functions using a block cipher are considered. We present attacks on all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1, that is, hash functions where in each round the block cipher is used twice, s.t. one encryption is needed per message block. ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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. In this paper attacks on double block length hash functions using a block cipher are considered. We present attacks on all double block length hash functions of hash rate 1, that is, hash functions where in each round the block cipher is used twice, s.t. one encryption is needed per message block. In particular, our attacks break the ParallelDM presented at Crypto'93[3]. 1 Introduction A hash function is an easily implementable mapping from the set of all binary sequences to the set of binary sequences of some fixed length. An iterated hash function is a hash function Hash(\Delta) determined by an easily computable function h(\Delta; \Delta) from two binary sequences of respective lengths m and l to a binary sequence of length m in the manner that the message M = (M1 ; M2 ; :::; Mn ), where M i is of length l, is hashed to the hash value H = Hn of length m by computing recursively H i = h(H i\Gamma1 ; M i ) i = 1; 2; :::; n; (1) where H0 is a specified initial value. The function...
A cellular automaton based fast oneway hash function suitable for hardware implementation
 In Public Key Cryptography, number 1431 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
, 1998
"... Abstract. Oneway hash functions are an important toolinachieving authentication and data integrity. The aim of this paper is to propose anovel oneway hash function based on cellular automata whose cryptographic properties have been extensivelystudiedover the past decade or so. Furthermore, securit ..."
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Cited by 6 (0 self)
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Abstract. Oneway hash functions are an important toolinachieving authentication and data integrity. The aim of this paper is to propose anovel oneway hash function based on cellular automata whose cryptographic properties have been extensivelystudiedover the past decade or so. Furthermore, security of the proposed oneway hash function is analyzed by the use of very recently published results on applications of cellular automata in cryptography. The analysis indicates that the oneway hash function is secure against all known attacks. An important feature of the proposed oneway hash function is that it is especially suitable for compact and fast implementation in hardware, which is particularly attractive to emerging security applications that employ smart cards, such asdigital identi cation cards and electronic cash payment protocols, 1