Dallas, and the First Annual Texas Finance Festival for discussions and comments helpful to the evolution of the paper. Pattarake Sarajoti provided valuable assistance. Mann acknowledges the support of the Charles Tandy American Enterprise Center. A good portion of this work was completed while Locke was on the staff of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. However, the views expressed are the authors ’ only and do not purport to represent the views of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission or its staff. Do Professional Traders Exhibit Loss Realization Aversion? Recent evidence (e.g. Odean, 1998a) describes investor behavior that is at odds with traditional economic theory. These alternative behaviors, such as those consistent with the disposition effect or overconfidence, form the basis for recent "behavioral " explanations for asset returns (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998a and 1998b, Odean 1998b, and Shumway, 1998). Notably, the evidence of alternative investor behavior is based largely on retail customer accounts- those of amateur traders. In this paper we examine trades by populations of professional futures traders for evidence of activity best described by the “behavioral finance ” literature. The data provide

We present a model in which an asset bubble can persist despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs. The resilience of the bubble stems from the inability of arbitrageurs to temporarily coordinate their selling strategies. This synchronization problem together with the individual incentive to time the market results in the persistence of bubbles over a substantial period. Since the derived trading equilibrium is unique, our model rationalizes the existence of bubbles in a strong sense. The model also provides a natural setting in which news events, by enabling synchronization, can have a disproportionate impact relative to their intrinsic informational content.

Exchange for providing the requisite data, and Lawrence Glosten and an anonymous reviewer for their extensive and insightful comments and suggestions. This paper is dedicated to Teppo Martikainen who contributed substantially to earlier versions of this paper but did not live to witness its completion.

Many people believe in the "Law of Small Numbers," exaggerating the degree to which a small sample resembles the population from which it is drawn. To model this, I assume that a person exaggerates the likelihood that a short sequence of i.i.d. signals resembles the long-run rate at which those signals are generated. Such a person believes in the "gambler's fallacy", thinking early draws of one signal increase the odds of next drawing other signals. When uncertain about the rate, the person over-infers from short sequences of signals, and is prone to think the rate is more extreme than it is. When the person makes inferences about the frequency at which rates are generated by different sources --- such as the distribution of talent among financial analysts --- based on few observations from each source, he tends to exaggerate how much variance there is in the rates. Hence, the model predicts that people may pay for financial advice from "experts" whose expertise is entirely ...

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We examine the stock price reaction to earnings announcements in the five years following seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). On average, post-SEO earnings announcements are met with a significantly negative abnormal stock price reaction. Although this negative reaction accounts for a disproportionately large portion of long-run post-SEO abnormal stock returns, on average, abnormal stock price reactions to post-SEO earnings announcements are reliably negative only within the smallest quartile of equity issuers. For small firms, therefore, these findings are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that firms issue equity when the market over-estimates the firm’s future earnings performance.

Our model of the initial public offering process links the three main empirical IPO ‘anomalies’ – underpricing, hot issue markets, and long-run underperformance – and traces them to a common source of inefficiency. We relate hot IPO markets (such as the 1999/2000 market for Internet IPOs) to the presence of a class of investors who are ‘irrational’ in the sense of having exuberant expectations regarding future performance. Underpricing and long-run underperformance emerge as underwriters attempt to maximize profits from the sale of equity, at the expense of these exuberant investors. Underpricing serves to compensate regular IPO investors for their role in restricting the supply of available shares and maintaining prices. The model is shown to be consistent with many aspects of the IPO process. It also generates a number of new empirical predictions.

We use city-level data to analyze the relationship between homeowner borrowing patterns and house-price dynamics. Our principal finding is that in cities where a greater fraction of homeowners are highly leveraged—i.e., have high loan-to-value ratios— house prices react more sensitively to city-specific shocks, such as changes in percapita income. This finding is consistent with recent theories that emphasize the role of borrowing in shaping the behavior of asset prices. 1.

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The field of modern financial economics assumes that people behave with extreme rationality, but they do not. Furthermore, people’s deviations from rationality are often systematic. Behavioral finance relaxes the traditional assumptions of financial economics by incorporating these observable, systematic, and very human departures from rationality into standard models of financial markets. We highlight two common mistakes investors make: excessive trading and the tendency to disproportionately hold on to losing investments while selling winners. We argue that these systematic biases have their origins in human psychology. The tendency for human beings to be overconfident causes the first bias in investors, and the human desire to avoid regret prompts the second. There is one important caveat to the notion that we live in a new economy, and that is human psychology... which appears essentially immutable.