We develop a theory in which the decision to pay dividends is driven by investor demand. Managers cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers and not paying when investors prefer nonpayers. To test this prediction, we construct four time series measures of the investor demand for dividend payers. By each measure, nonpayers initiate dividends when demand for payers is high. By some measures, payers omit dividends when demand is low. Further analysis confirms that the results are better explained by the catering theory than other theories of dividends.

We review extensive evidence about how psychological biases affect investor behavior and prices. Systematic mispricing probably causes substantial resource misallocation. We argue that limited attention and overconfidence cause investor credulity about the strategic incentives of informed market participants. However, individuals as political participants remain subject to the biases and self-interest they exhibit in private settings. Indeed, correcting contemporaneous market pricing errors is probably not government’s relative advantage. Government and private planners should establish rules ex ante to improve choices and efficiency, including disclosure, reporting, advertising, and default-option-setting regulations. Especially

I use a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to decompose an individual firm’s stock return into two components: changes in cash-flow expectations (i.e., cash-flow news) and changes in discount rates (i.e., expected-return news). The VAR yields three main results. First, firm-level stock returns are mainly driven by cash-flow news. For a typical stock, the variance of cash-flow news is more than twice that of expected-return news. Second, shocks to expected returns and cash flows are positively correlated for a typical small stock. Third, expected-return-news series are highly correlated across firms, while cash-flow news can largely be diversified away in aggregate portfolios.

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This paper tests the hypothesis that irrational market misvaluation a#ects firms' takeover behavior. We employ two contemporaneous proxies for market misvaluation, pre-takeover book/price ratios and pre-takeover ratios of residual income model value to price. Misvaluation of bidders and targets influences the means of payment chosen, the mode of acquisition, the premia paid, target hostility to the o#er, the likelihood of o#er success, and bidder and target announcement period stock returns. The evidence is broadly supportive of the misvaluation hypothesis

Commercial banks frequently encounter optimistic entrepreneurs whose perceptions are biased by wishful thinking. Bankers are left with a difficult screening problem: separating realistic entrepreneurs from optimists who may be clever, knowledgeable, and completely sincere. We build a game-theoretic model of the screening process. We show that although entrepreneurs may practice self-restraint to signal realism, competition may lead banks to be insufficiently conservative in their lending, thus reducing capital-market efficiency. High collateral requirements decrease efficiency further. We discuss bank regulation and bankruptcy rules in connection with the problems that optimistic entrepreneurs present. 1.

The paper discusses the current state of the behavioral finance literature. I argue that more direct evidence on investors ’ actions and expectations would make existing theories more convincing to outsiders and would help sort among behavioral theories for a given asset pricing phenomenon. Furthermore, evidence on the dependence of a given bias on investor wealth/sophistication would be useful for determining if the bias could be due to (fixed) information or transactions costs or is likely to require a behavioral explanation, and for determining which biases are likely to be most important for asset prices. I analyze a novel data set on investor expectations and actions obtained from UBS PaineWebber/Gallup. The data suggest that, even for high wealth investors, expected returns were high at the peak of the market, many investors thought the market was overvalued but would not correct quickly, and investors ’ beliefs depend strongly on their own investment experience. I then review evidence on the dependence of a series of “irrational ” investor behaviors on investor wealth and conclude that many such behaviors diminish substantially with wealth. As an example of the cost needed to explain a particular type of “irrational”

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The paper has also benefited from the comments of the participants at the Chicago Quantitative Alliance spring meeting, Federal Reserve Bank of New York finance workshop, Harvard University Department of Economics finance seminar, MIT Sloan School of Management finance brown-bag lunch and finance seminar, NBER Behavioral Finance working group meeting, and Stanford Business School finance seminar. Errors and omissions remain our responsibility. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

A growing number of researchers argue that time-series patterns in returns are due to investor irrationality and thus can be translated into abnormal profits. Continuation of short-term returns or momentum is one such pattern that has defied any rational explanation and is at odds with market efficiency. This paper shows that profits to momentum strategies can be explained by a set of lagged macroeconomic variables and payoffs to momentum strategies disappear once stock returns are adjusted for their predictability based on these macroeconomic variables. Our results provide a possible role for time-varying expected returns as an explanation for momentum payoffs. THIS PAPER EXAMINES THE RELATIVE importance of common factors and firmspecific information in explaining the profitability of momentum-based trading strategies, first documented by Jegadeesh and Titman ~1993!. The profitability of momentum strategies has been particularly intriguing, as it remains the only CAPM-related anomaly unexplained by the Fama–French