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Securing Vehicular Communications - Assumptions, Requirements, and Principles
- WORKSHOP ON EMBEDDED SECURITY IN CARS
, 2006
"... Among civilian communication systems, vehicular networks emerge as one of the most convincing and yet most challenging instantiations of the mobile ad hoc networking technology. Towards the deployment of vehicular communication systems, security and privacy are critical factors and significant chall ..."
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Cited by 18 (7 self)
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Among civilian communication systems, vehicular networks emerge as one of the most convincing and yet most challenging instantiations of the mobile ad hoc networking technology. Towards the deployment of vehicular communication systems, security and privacy are critical factors and significant challenges to be met. Thanks to the substantial research efforts carried out by the community so far, we make the following contributions in this paper: we outline security requirements for vehicular communication systems, we provide models for the system and the communication, as well as models for the adversaries, and propose a set of design principles for future security and privacy solutions for vehicular communication systems.
Cryptographically Sound Theorem Proving
- In Proc. 19th IEEE CSFW
, 2006
"... We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in the strong sense of reactive simulatability/UC, which essentially entails the preservation of arbitrary security proper ..."
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Cited by 15 (4 self)
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We describe a faithful embedding of the Dolev-Yao model of Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. This model is cryptographically sound in the strong sense of reactive simulatability/UC, which essentially entails the preservation of arbitrary security properties under active attacks and in arbitrary protocol environments. The main challenge in designing a practical formalization of this model is to cope with the complexity of providing such strong soundness guarantees. We reduce this complexity by abstracting the model into a sound, light-weight formalization that enables both concise property specifications and efficient application of our proof strategies and their supporting proof tools. This yields the first tool-supported framework for symbolically verifying security protocols that enjoys the strong cryptographic soundness guarantees provided by reactive simulatability/UC. As a proof of concept, we have proved the security of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol using our framework.
Lecture Notes on Cryptography
, 2001
"... This is a set of lecture notes on cryptography compiled for 6.87s, a one week long course on cryptography taught at MIT by Shafi Goldwasser and Mihir Bellare in the summers of 1996–2001. The notes were formed by merging notes written for Shafi Goldwasser’s Cryptography and Cryptanalysis course at MI ..."
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Cited by 13 (0 self)
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This is a set of lecture notes on cryptography compiled for 6.87s, a one week long course on cryptography taught at MIT by Shafi Goldwasser and Mihir Bellare in the summers of 1996–2001. The notes were formed by merging notes written for Shafi Goldwasser’s Cryptography and Cryptanalysis course at MIT with notes written for Mihir Bellare’s Cryptography and network security course at UCSD. In addition, Rosario Gennaro (as Teaching Assistant for the course in 1996) contributed Section 9.6, Section 11.4, Section 11.5, and Appendix D to the notes, and also compiled, from various sources, some of the problems in Appendix E. Cryptography is of course a vast subject. The thread followed by these notes is to develop and explain the notion of provable security and its usage for the design of secure protocols. Much of the material in Chapters 2, 3 and 7 is a result of scribe notes, originally taken by MIT graduate students who attended Professor Goldwasser’s Cryptography and Cryptanalysis course over the years, and later edited by Frank D’Ippolito who was a teaching assistant for the course in 1991. Frank also contributed much of the advanced number theoretic material in the Appendix. Some of the material in Chapter 3 is from the chapter on Cryptography, by R. Rivest, in the Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science. Chapters 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10, and Sections 9.5 and 7.4.6, were written by Professor Bellare for his Cryptography and network security course at UCSD.
On the Decidability of Cryptographic Protocols with Open-ended Data Structures
, 2002
"... Formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has mainly concentrated on protocols with closed-ended data structures, where closed-ended data structure means that the messages exchanged between principals have fixed and finite format. However, ..."
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Cited by 12 (5 self)
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Formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has mainly concentrated on protocols with closed-ended data structures, where closed-ended data structure means that the messages exchanged between principals have fixed and finite format. However,
Generic Insecurity of Cliques-Type Authenticated Group Key Agreement Protocols
- In 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundation Workshop, CSFW
, 2004
"... The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group key agreement protocols showed to be flawed at CSFW 2001. Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variants of them) have been rediscovered in several different frameworks, no fixed version of these protocols has been proposed until now. ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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The A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 authenticated group key agreement protocols showed to be flawed at CSFW 2001. Even though the corresponding attacks (or some variants of them) have been rediscovered in several different frameworks, no fixed version of these protocols has been proposed until now.
Efficient Cryptographic Protocols Preventing “Man-in-the-Middle” Attacks
- Columbia University
, 2003
"... In the analysis of many cryptographic protocols, it is useful to distinguish two classes of attacks: passive attacks in which an adversary eavesdrops on messages sent between honest users and active attacks (i.e., “man-in-the-middle ” attacks) in which — in addition to eavesdropping — the adversary ..."
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Cited by 9 (2 self)
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In the analysis of many cryptographic protocols, it is useful to distinguish two classes of attacks: passive attacks in which an adversary eavesdrops on messages sent between honest users and active attacks (i.e., “man-in-the-middle ” attacks) in which — in addition to eavesdropping — the adversary inserts, deletes, or arbitrarily modifies messages sent from one user to another. Passive attacks are well characterized (the adversary’s choices are inherently limited) and techniques for achieving security against passive attacks are relatively well understood. Indeed, cryptographers have long focused on methods for countering passive eavesdropping attacks, and much work in the 1970’s and 1980’s has dealt with formalizing notions of security and providing provably-secure solutions for this setting. On the other hand, active attacks are not well characterized and precise modeling has been difficult. Few techniques exist for dealing with active attacks, and designing practical protocols secure against such attacks remains a challenge. This dissertation considers active attacks in a variety of settings and provides new, provablysecure protocols preventing such attacks. Proofs of security are in the standard cryptographic model and rely on well-known cryptographic assumptions. The protocols presented here are efficient and
Computationally Sound Secrecy Proofs by Mechanized Flow Analysis
- 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2006
, 2006
"... We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability /UC which ent ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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We present a novel approach for proving secrecy properties of security protocols by mechanized flow analysis. In contrast to existing tools for proving secrecy by abstract interpretation, our tool enjoys cryptographic soundness in the strong sense of blackbox reactive simulatability /UC which entails that secrecy properties proven by our tool are automatically guaranteed to hold for secure cryptographic implementations of the analyzed protocol, with respect to the more fine-grained cryptographic secrecy definitions and adversary models.
SAT-based Model-Checking for Security Protocols Analysis
"... We present a model checking technique for security protocols based on a reduction to propositional logic. At the core of our approach is a procedure that, given a description of the protocol in a multi-set rewriting formalism and a positive integer k, builds a propositional formula whose models (i ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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We present a model checking technique for security protocols based on a reduction to propositional logic. At the core of our approach is a procedure that, given a description of the protocol in a multi-set rewriting formalism and a positive integer k, builds a propositional formula whose models (if any) correspond to attacks on the protocol. Thus, finding attacks on protocols boils down to checking a propositional formula for satisfiability, problem that is usually solved very efficiently by modern SAT solvers. Experimental results indicate that the approach scales up to industrial strength security protocols with performance comparable with (and in some cases superior to) that of other state-of-the-art protocol analysers.
Invariant Generation Techniques in Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
- In PCSFW: Proceedings of The 13th Computer Security Foundations Workshop. IEEE Computer
, 2000
"... The growing interest in the application of formal methods of cryptographic protocol analysis has led to the development of a number of different techniques for generating and describing invariants that are defined in terms of what messages an intruder can and cannot learn. These invariants, which ca ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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The growing interest in the application of formal methods of cryptographic protocol analysis has led to the development of a number of different techniques for generating and describing invariants that are defined in terms of what messages an intruder can and cannot learn. These invariants, which can be used to prove authentication as well as secrecy results, appear to be central to many different tools and techniques. However, since they are usually developed independently for different systems, it is often not easy to see what they have in common with each other, or to tell whether or not they can be used in systems other than the ones for which they were developed. In this paper we attempt to remedy this situation by giving an overview of several of these techniques, discussing their relationships to each other, and developing a simple taxonomy. We also discuss some of the implications for future research. 1 Introduction Recently, a considerable body of work has grown up around th...

