This paper presents an implemented system for recognizing the occurrence of events described by simple spatial-motion verbs in short image sequences. The semantics of these verbs is specified with event-logic expressions that describe changes in the state of force-dynamic relations between the participants of the event. An efficient finite representation is introduced for the infinite sets of intervals that occur when describing liquid and semi-liquid events. Additionally, an efficient procedure using this representation is presented for inferring occurrences of compound events, described with event-logic expressions, from occurrences of primitive events. Using force dynamics and event logic to specify the lexical semantics of events allows the system to be more robust than prior systems based on motion profile. 1.

The agent-based approach emphasizes the importance of learning through organism-environment interaction. This approach is part of a recent trend in computational models of learning and development toward studying autonomous organisms that are embedded in virtual or real environments. In this paper we introduce the concepts of online and offline sampling and highlight the role of online sampling in agent-based models. After comparing the strengths of each approach for modeling particular developmental phenomena and research questions, we describe a recent agent-based model of infant causal perception. We conclude by discussing some of the present limitations of agent-based models and suggesting how these challenges may be addressed. © 2001 Academic Press Computational models of learning and development are playing an increasingly critical role in child development research (Cassidy, 1990;

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Evolutionary approaches to judgment under uncertainty have led to new data showing that untutored subject reliably produce judgments that conform to may principles of probability theory when (a) they are asked to compute a frequency instead of the probability of a single event, and (b) the relevant information is expressed as frequencies. But are the frequencycomputation systems implicated in these experiments better at operating over some kinds of input than others? Principles of object perception and principles of adaptive design led us to propose the individuation hypothesis: that these systems are designed to produce wellcalibrated statistical inferences when they operate over representations of “whole ” objects, events, and locations. In a series of experiments on Bayesian reasoning, we show that human performance can be systematically improved or degraded by varying whether a correct solution requires one to compute hit and false-alarm rates over “natural ” units, such as whole objects, as opposed to inseparable aspects, views, and other parsings that violate evolved principles of object construal. The ability to make well-calibrated probability judgments depends, at a very basic level, on the ability to count. The

There is a growing debate among developmental theorists concerning the perception of causality in young infants. Some theorists advocate a top-down view, e.g., that infants reason about causal events on the basis of intuitive physical principles. Others argue instead for a bottom-up view of infant causal knowledge, in which causal perception emerges from a simple set of associative learning rules. In order to test the limits of the bottom-up view, we propose an optimal control model (OCM) of infant causal perception. OCM is trained to find an optimal pattern of eye movements for maintaining sight of a target object. We first present a series of simulations which illustrate OCM's ability to anticipate the outcome of novel, occluded causal events, and then compare OCM's performance with that of 9-month-old infants. The implications for developmental theory and research are discussed.

Please do not cite or quote without permission. Preparation of the chapter and much of the research reported in it were supported by Grant

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Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not—and should not be—absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others. Memory is a gift of nature, the ability of living organisms to retain and to utilize acquired information or knowledge.... Owners of biological memory systems are capable of behaving more appropriately at a later time because of their experiences at an earlier time, a feat not possible for organisms without memory. (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751) If there is one proposition on which all psychologists seem to

Evolution brought brains and minds into a world initially devoid of inteUlgent life. The evolutionary process designed the neural machinery that generates in-tehgent behavior, and important insights into how this machinery works can be gained by understanding how evolution constructs organisms. This is the ratio-nale that underlies research in evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychology was founded on interloclang contributions from evolutionary biology, cognitive science, psychology, anthropology, and neuro-science. It reflects an attempt to think through, from first principles, how cur-rent knowledge from these various fields can be integrated into a single, consistent, sciennfic framework for the study of the mind and brain (Cosmides

While computational models are playing an increasingly important role in developmental psychology, at least one lesson from robotics is still being learned: modeling epigenetic processes often requires simulating an embodied, autonomous organism. This paper first contrasts prevailing models of infant cognition with an agent-based approach. A series of infant studies by Baillargeon (1986; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1991) is described, and an eye-movement model is then used to simulate infants' visual activity in this study. I conclude by describing three behavioral predictions of the eyemovement model, and discussing the implications of this work for infant cognition research.