The origins of the Soar architecture can be traced back to the seminal research of Allen Newell and Herbert Simon on symbol systems, heuristic search, goals, problem spaces, and production systems. Since its official inception in 1982, Soar has evolved through six major releases, as both an AI architecture and as the basis for a unified theory of cognition. This paper traces this evolutionary path, starting with Soar's intellectual roots, and then proceeding through the stages defined by the six major system releases. Each stage is characterized with respect to a hierarchy of four levels of analysis: the knowledge level, the problem space level, the symbolic architecture level, and the implementation level.

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals. You reason about conditional relations because much of your knowledge is conditional. If you get caught speeding, then you pay a fine. If you have an operation, then you need time to recuperate. If you have money in the bank, then you can cash a check. Conditional reasoning is a central part of thinking, yet people do not always reason correctly. The lawyer Jan Schlictmann in a celebrated trial (see Harr, 1995, pp. 361–362) elicited the following information from an expert witness about the source of a chemical pollutant trichloroethylene (TCE):

This paper is about syllogistic reasoning, i.e., reasoning from such pairs of premises as, All the chefs are musicians; some of the musicians are painters. We present a computer model that implements the latest account of syllogisms, which is based on the theory of mental models. We also report four experiments that were designed to test this account. Experiments 1 and 2 examined the strategies revealed by the participants ’ use of paper and pencil as aids to reasoning. Experiment 3 used a new technique to externalize thinking. The participants had to refute, if possible, putative conclusions by constructing external models that were examples of the premises but counterexamples of the conclusions. Experiment 4 used the same techniques to examine the participants ’ strategies as they drew their own conclusions from syllogistic premises. The results of the experiments showed that individuals not trained in logic can construct counterexamples, that they use similar operations to those implemented in the computer model, but that they rely on a much greater variety of interpretations of premises and of search strategies than the computer model does. We re-evaluates current theories of syllogistic reasoning in the light of these results. I.

Unified theories regularly appear in psychology. They also regularly fail to fulfil all of their goals. Newell (1990) called for their revival, using computer modelling as a way to avoid the pitfalls of previous attempts. His call, embodied in the Soar project has so far, however, failed to produce the breakthrough it promised. One of the reasons for the lack of success of Newell's approach is that the methodology commonly used in psychology, based on controlling potentially confounding variables by using group data, is not the best way forward for developing unified theories of cognition. Instead, we propose an approach where (a) the problems related to group averages are alleviated by analysing subjects individually; (b) there is a close interaction between theory building and experimentation; and (c) computer technology is used to routinely test versions of the theory on a wide range of data. The advantages of this approach heavily outweigh the disadvantages.

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One of the most debated questions in psychology and cognitive science is the nature and the functioning of the mental processes involved in deductive reasoning. However, all existing theories refer to a specific deductive domain, like syllogistic, propositional or relational reasoning. Our goal is to unify the main types of deductive reasoning into a single set of basic procedures. In particular, we bring together the microtheories developed from a mental models perspective in a single theory, for which we provide a formal foundation. We validate the theory through a computational model (UNICORE) which allows fine-grained predictions of subjects ’ performance in different reasoning domains. The performance of the model is tested against the performance of experimental subjects—as reported in the relevant literature—in the three areas of syllogistic, relational and propositional reasoning. The computational model proves to be a satisfactory artificial subject, reproducing both correct and erroneous performance of the human subjects. Moreover, we introduce a developmental trend in the program, in order to simulate the performance of subjects of different ages, ranging from children (3–6) to adolescents (8–12) to adults (>21). The simulation model performs similarly to the subjects of different ages.

Four experiments involving 123 university students tested directionality effects in the comprehension of spatial relations, quantified statements, and propositional connectives with a sentence-picture verification task. Presentation of the referents of terms in the statements was separated by 1 s, and presentation order was congruent or incongruent with the order of terms in the statement. Some relations showed faster verification times for congruent display order, others for incongruent display order, and still others showed no directionality effect. The authors proposed a 2-step process model for the construction of semantic representations of relational statements, in which a reference object is established f'trst, and then the second object is attached in relation to it. This theory explains the various directionality effects as a general preference to process information about the reference object before information about the target object. One of the central questions in research on deductive reasoning is, How do people understand the premises? In other words, what is the content and the form of the knowledge base that people extract from the information given and to which they apply whatever reasoning process they have available to draw a deductive

We argue that perspective effects in the Wason 4-card selection task are a product of the linguistic interpretation of the rule in the context of the problem text and not of the reasoning process underlying card selection. In three experiments, participants recalled the rule they used in either a selection or a plausibility rating task. The results showed that: (a) participants tended to recall rules compatible with their card selection and not with the rule as stated in the problem; and (b) recall was not affected by whether or not participants performed card selection. We conclude that perspective effects in the Wason selection task do not concern how card selection is reasoned about, but instead reflect the inferential text processing involved in the comprehension of the problem text. Together with earlier research that showed selection performance in non-deontic contexts to be indistinguishable from selection performance in deontic contexts (Almor & Sloman, 1996; Sperber, Cara, & G...

the two terms linked in premises of typical deductive reasoning tasks. With three experiments we investigated the effect of inherent directionality on the time to integrate two premises and for the derivation of a conclusion. We varied figure (i.e., order of terms in the premises) and direction of inference (i.e., order of terms in the conclusion) in deduction tasks from various domains (propositional reasoning, syllogisms, spatial, temporal, and linear order reasoning). Effects of figure on premise reading times varied with the directionality of the relations. Effects of direction of inference reflected the same directionality for a subset of relations. We propose that two factors are jointly responsible for a large part of observed directionality effects in premise integration: the inherent directionality of relational statements and a general advantage for a given–new order of terms in the second premise. Difficulty of deriving a conclusion is affected by the directionality or relations if and only if the relation is semantically asymmetric, so that the directionality must be preserved in the integrated mental model. Deductive reasoning means drawing a conclusion that follows with logical necessity from given premises. This usually requires integrating two or more premises. Often, each premise expresses a relation between objects, categories, or situations—for example, the premises of

The paper presents the conjunctive bias in memory—a novel phenomenon that helps to clarify rep- resentations of logical connectives. The conjunctive bias is a tendency toward more accurate recall and recognition of conjunctive forms than of forms based on other logical connectives and a tendency to recall and recognize other logical forms as if they were conjunctions. Three experiments, in which par- ticipants’ memory representations associated with different logical connectives were examined, were conducted to test the conjunctive bias hypothesis. In Experiment 1, participants learned picture– proposition pairs involving either conjunctions or disjunctions and then had to recall each proposition when cued with its picture. In Experiments 2 and 3, recognition memory for conjunctions, disjunc- tions, and conditionals was examined with an old/new recognition procedure. The findings of these ex- periments provide evidence for the conjunctive bias. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 3 suggest that conjunctive bias is not simply a pragmatically caused preference for conjunctions. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for current theories of deductive reasoning.