Results 1 
9 of
9
A Survey of Models of Network Formation: Stability and Efficiency
, 2003
"... I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 196 (14 self)
 Add to MetaCart
I survey the recent literature on the formation of networks. I provide definitions of network games, a number of examples of models from the literature, and discuss some of what is known about the (in)compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links.
The Stability and Efficiency of Economic and Social Networks
 ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC DESIGN, EDITED BY S. KORAY AND M. SERTEL
, 2003
"... This paper studies the formation of networks among individuals. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. The paper reviews and synthesizes some previous results on the subject, and also provides new results on the existence of ..."
Abstract

Cited by 38 (11 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper studies the formation of networks among individuals. The focus is on the compatibility of overall societal welfare with individual incentives to form and sever links. The paper reviews and synthesizes some previous results on the subject, and also provides new results on the existence of pairwisestable networks and the relationship between pairwise stable and efficient networks in a variety of contexts and under several definitions of efficiency.
On the Formation of Networks and Groups
 MODELS OF THE STRATEGIC FORMATION OF NETWORKS AND GROUPS
, 2001
"... We provide an introduction to and overview of the volume on Models of the Strategic Formation of Networks and Groups. ..."
Abstract

Cited by 21 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We provide an introduction to and overview of the volume on Models of the Strategic Formation of Networks and Groups.
Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks
 IN: STOC.
, 2008
"... The study of bargaining has a long history, but many basic settings are still rich with unresolved questions. In particular, consider a set of agents who engage in bargaining with one another, but instead of pairs of agents interacting in isolation, agents have the opportunity to choose whom they wa ..."
Abstract

Cited by 20 (0 self)
 Add to MetaCart
The study of bargaining has a long history, but many basic settings are still rich with unresolved questions. In particular, consider a set of agents who engage in bargaining with one another, but instead of pairs of agents interacting in isolation, agents have the opportunity to choose whom they want to negotiate with, along the edges of a graph representing socialnetwork relations. The area of network exchange theory in sociology has developed a large body of experimental evidence for the way in which people behave in such networkconstrained bargaining situations, and it is a challenging problem to develop models that are both mathematically tractable and in general agreement with the results of these experiments. We analyze a natural theoretical model arising in network
Bargaining and network structure: An experiment
 Journal of Economic Theory
"... Abstract: We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. Such networks could arise due to proximity issues or restricted communication flows, as with information transmission of job openings, bus ..."
Abstract

Cited by 11 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract: We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. Such networks could arise due to proximity issues or restricted communication flows, as with information transmission of job openings, business opportunities, and transactions not easily regulated by external authorities. We perform an experimental test of a graphtheoretic model that allows us to decompose any twosided network into simple networks of three types, with unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. We begin with two separate simple networks, which are then joined by an additional link. Participants appear to quickly grasp important characteristics of the networks. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We find evidence of a form of social learning – the shares (publicly) allocated to others in the
Inefficiencies in Networked Markets
, 2010
"... In many markets relationship specific investments are necessary to enable trade. Typically there are multiple buyers, multiple sellers and heterogeneous gains from trade. In some markets a buyer and seller must make different and separate investments to trade, in others investments are jointly mad ..."
Abstract

Cited by 3 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In many markets relationship specific investments are necessary to enable trade. Typically there are multiple buyers, multiple sellers and heterogeneous gains from trade. In some markets a buyer and seller must make different and separate investments to trade, in others investments are jointly made and negotiated. These investments are subject to inefficiencies: underinvestment, due to potential holdup, and overinvestment to generate “outside options”. When investments are separate overinvestment is limited. In contrast, inefficiency from underinvestment cannot be bounded. This result reverses when investments are negotiated. In this setting there is no underinvestment. However, inefficiency from overinvestment cannot now be bounded.
BARGAINING IN STATIONARY NETWORKS JOB MARKET PAPER
"... Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players that reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are p ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players that reach agreement are replaced by new players at the same positions in the network. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium agreement links converge as players become patient. Several new concepts– mutually estranged sets, partners, and shortage ratios–provide insights into the relative strengths of the positions in the network. We develop a procedure to determine the limit equilibrium payoffs by iteratively applying the following results. Limit payoffs are lowest for the players in the largest mutually estranged set that minimizes the shortage ratio, and highest for the corresponding partners. In equilibrium, for high discount factors, the partners act as an oligopoly for the estranged players. In the limit, surplus within the induced oligopoly subnetwork is divided according to the shortage ratio. We characterize equitable networks, stable networks, and nondiscriminatory buyerseller networks. The results extend to heterogeneous discount factors and general matching technologies. 1.
BARGAINING ON NETWORKS
, 2007
"... Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected by a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium agreement links converge a ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected by a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. We prove that for each discount factor all equilibria are payoff equivalent. The equilibrium payoffs and the set of equilibrium agreement links converge as players become increasingly patient. We construct an algorithm that determines the limit equilibrium payoffs by iterating the finding that players with extreme limit equilibrium payoffs form oligopoly subnetworks. An oligopoly subnetwork consists of a set of mutually estranged players and their bargaining partners; in equilibrium, for high discount factors, the partners act as an oligopoly for the mutually estranged players. In the equilibrium limit, surplus within an oligopoly subnetwork is divided according to the shortage ratio of the mutually estranged players with respect to their partners, with all players on each side receiving identical payoffs. The algorithm is used to characterize equitable networks, stable networks, and nondiscriminatory buyerseller networks. The results extend to heterogeneous discount factors and general matching technologies. 1.
for extensive discussions, advice and guidance and to Rachel Kranton for very helpful comments on
, 2010
"... Abstract. In many markets relationship specific investments are necessary to enable trade. Typically there are multiple buyers, multiple sellers and heterogeneous gains from trade. In some markets a buyer and seller must make different and separate investments to trade, in others investments are joi ..."
Abstract
 Add to MetaCart
Abstract. In many markets relationship specific investments are necessary to enable trade. Typically there are multiple buyers, multiple sellers and heterogeneous gains from trade. In some markets a buyer and seller must make different and separate investments to trade, in others investments are jointly made and negotiated. These investments are subject to inefficiencies: underinvestment, due to potential holdup, and overinvestment to generate “outside options”. When investments are separate overinvestment is limited. In contrast, inefficiency from underinvestment cannot be bounded. This result reverses when investments are negotiated. In this setting there is no underinvestment. However, inefficiency from overinvestment cannot now be bounded.