We describe ways in which the transmission control protocol of the Internet may evolve to support heterogeneous applications. We show that by appropriately marking packets at overloaded resources and by charging a fixed small amount for each mark received, end-nodes are provided with the necessary information and the correct incentive to use the network efficiently.

Much of economic analysis stems from the joint assumptions of rationality and individual greed. Common sense and experimental and field evidence point to the limits of this

the state of the literature. We develop a framework for organizing the literature based on the input-mediatoroutput-input (IMOI) model from the small groups literature. We present a quantitative summary of articles selected for the review and then discuss findings of this literature categorized into issues pertaining to inputs (e.g., member characteristics, technology use and project characteristics), processes (software development and social processes), emergent states (e.g., trust and task related states) and outputs (e.g. team performance, FLOSS implementation and project evolution). Based on this review, we suggest topics for future research, as well as identifying methodological and theoretical issues for future inquiry in this area, including issues relating to sampling and the need for more longitudinal studies.

. We present a simulation of a society of agents where some of them have "moral sentiments" towards the agents that belong to the same social group, using the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma as a metaphor for the social interactions. Besides the well-understood phenomenon of short-sighted, self-interested agents performing well in the short-term but ruining their chances of such performance in the long run in a world of reciprocators, the results suggest that, where some agents are more generous than that, these agents have a positive impact on the social group to which they belong, without compromising too much their individual performance (i.e., the group performance improves). The inspiration for this project comes from a discussion on Moral Sentiments by M.Ridley. We describe various simulations where conditions and parameters over determined dimensions were arranged to account for different types and compositions of societies. Further, we indicate several lessons that arise from the a...

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The Internet has fostered a faster, more interactive and e#ective model of scholarly publishing. However, as the quantity of information available is constantly increasing, its quality is threatened, since the traditional quality control mechanism of peer review is often not used (e.g., in online repositories of preprints, and by people publishing on their Web pages whatever they want). This paper

We present the results of a simulation of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma where some agents behave rationally and others have moral sentiments towards those from the same social group. They suggest that in societies where agents can possess such characteristics, to behave rationally, in the usual sense in Game Theory, is not the best attitude for good performance in the long run, both individually and for the group. Introduction Understanding the ability to show cooperative behaviour has concerned scientists in many areas of human knowledge. The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) has been used as a metaphor to formalise the conflict between two individuals who can involve themselves in either mutual support (cooperation) or selfish exploitation (defection). Since there is a risk for one of the individuals to end up with the sucker's payoff, to defect is always a good tactic to follow. However, when played repeatedly, in which case it is called the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), mutual defect...

commitment, conscientiousness, costly signaling theory, equilibrium selection, emotion, empathy, ethics, evolutionary psychology, fitness indicators, genetic correlations, good genes, good parents, good partners, human courtship, kin selection, kindness, individual differences, intelligence, mate choice, mental health, moral virtues, mutation load, mutual choice, person perception, personality, reciprocal altruism, sexual fidelity, sexual selection, social cognition, virtue ethics “Human good turns out to be the activity of the soul exhibiting excellence.” Aristotle (350 BC) Moral evolution theories have emphasized kinship, reciprocity, group selection, and equilibrium selection. Yet, moral virtues are also sexually attractive. Darwin suggested that sexual attractiveness may explain many aspects of human morality. This paper updates his argument by integrating recent research on mate choice, person perception, individual differences, costly signaling, and virtue ethics. Many human virtues may have evolved in both sexes through mutual mate choice to advertise good genetic quality, parenting abilities, and/or partner traits. Such virtues may include kindness, fidelity, magnanimity, and heroism, as well as quasi-moral traits like conscientiousness, agreeableness, mental health, and intelligence. This theory leads to many testable predictions about the phenotypic features, genetic bases, and social-cognitive responses to human moral virtues. A

In the basic ultimatum bargaining game two players, P 1 and P 2, must divide a pie (π). P 1 proposes a division in which he gets π − x and P 2 gets x. P 2 can then accept the division, in which the π is split according to P 1’s proposal, or reject the proposal, in which case neither player gets anything. The current paper reviews empirical research on ultimatum bargaining games. It covers early work starting with Güth et al. (1982), but largely focuses on more recent work (post Roth (1995)). Taken together, the research suggests that P 1’s behavior in largely in accord with game theoretic income-maximization, but P 2’s behavior cannot be easily reconciled with standard game-theoretic assumptions. Rather, P 2 seems to be driven by a sense of fairness, specifically, a desire to be treated fairly by P 1. Both P 1 and P 2 behavior are in agreement with equity theory. The most important conclusion that falls out of this review is that players’ motivations, which often are not

We present a simulation of a society of agents where some of them have \moral sentiments " towards the agents that belong to the same social group, using the Iterated Prisoner 's Dilemma as a metaphor for the social interactions. Besides the well-understood phenomenon of short-sighted, self-interested agents performing well in the short-term but ruining their chances of such performance in the long run in a world of reciprocators, the results suggest that, where some agents are more generous than that, these agents have a positive impact on the social group to which they belong, without compromising too much their individual performance (i.e., the group performance improves). The inspiration for this project comes from a discussion on Moral Sentiments by M.Ridley. We describe various simulations where conditions and parameters over determined dimensions were arranged to account for dierent types and compositions of societies. Further, we indicate several lessons that arise from the analysis of the results and comparison of the dierent experiments. We also relate this work to our previous anthropological approach to the adaptation of migrant agents, and argue that allowing agents to possess suitably-chosen emotions can have a decisive impact on Multi-Agent Systems. This implies that some common notions of agent autonomy (and related concepts) should be reexamined.