Three theories currently compete to explain the conceptual deficits that result from brain damage: sensory-functional theory, domain-specific theory, and conceptual structure theory. We argue that all three theories capture important aspects of conceptual deficits, and offer different insights into their origins. Conceptual topography theory (CTT) integrates these insights, beginning with A. R. Damasio’s (1989) convergence zone theory and elaborating it with the similarity-in-topography (SIT) principle. According to CTT, feature maps in sensory-motor systems represent the features of a category’s exemplars. A hierarchical system of convergence zones then conjoins these features to form both property and category representations. According to the SIT principle, the proximity of two conjunctive neurons in a convergence zone increases with the similarity of the features they conjoin. As a result, conjunctive neurons become topographically organised into local regions that represent properties and categories. Depending on the level and location of a lesion in this system, a wide variety of deficits is possible. Consistent with the literature, these deficits range from the loss of a single category to the loss of multiple categories that share sensory-motor properties.

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We present a new account of the fine-grained structure of semantic categories derived from neuropsychological, behavioral, and developmental data. The account places theoretical emphasis on the functions of the referents of concepts. We claim (i) that the distinctiveness of functional features correlated with perceptual features varies across semantic domains; and (ii) that category structure emerges from the complex interaction of these variables. The representational assumptions that follow from these claims make strong predictions about what types of semantic information are preserved in patients showing category-specific deficits following brain damage. These claims are illustrated with a connectionist simulation which, when damaged, shows patterns of preservation of distinctive and shared functional and perceptual information which varies across semantic domains. The data model both dissociations between knowledge for artifacts and for living things and recent neuropsychological evidence concerning the robustness of functional information in the representation of concepts. © 2000 Academic Press

1.1. Conceptual systems 621 1.2. Semantic memory 621

A key issue in cognitive neuroscience concerns the neural representation of conceptual knowledge. Currently, debate focuses around the issue of whether there are neural regions specialised for the processing of specific semantic attributes or categories, or whether concepts are represented in an undifferentiated neural system. Neuropsychological studies of patients with selective semantic deficits and previous neuroimaging studies do not unequivocally support either account. We carried out a PET study to determine whether there is any regional specialisation for the processing of concepts from different semantic categories using picture stimuli and a semantic categorisation task. We found robust activation of a large semantic network extending from left inferior frontal cortex into the inferior temporal lobe and including occipital cortex and the fusiform gyrus. The only category effect that we found was additional activation for animals in the right occipital cortex, which we interpret as being due to the extra visual processing demands required in order to differentiate one animal from another. We also carried out analyses in specific cortical regions that have been claimed to be preferentially activated for various categories, but found no evidence of any differential activation as a function of category. We interpret these data within the framework of cognitive accounts in which conceptual knowledge is represented within a nondifferentiated distributed system.

Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism’s decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not—and should not be—absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others. Memory is a gift of nature, the ability of living organisms to retain and to utilize acquired information or knowledge.... Owners of biological memory systems are capable of behaving more appropriately at a later time because of their experiences at an earlier time, a feat not possible for organisms without memory. (Tulving, 1995a, p. 751) If there is one proposition on which all psychologists seem to

INTRODUCTION The goal of the present work is to examine whether the semantic representations of numbers and body parts are associated with partially distinct cortical territories. Clinical and cognitive neuropsychology studies associate semantic deficits in both domains to lesions coarsely localized to the left parietal lobe (McCarthy and Warrington, 1990). Furthermore, patients with left inferior parietal lesions often exhibit simultaneous deficits for numbers and body parts (Benton, 1992; Gerstmann, 1940). Such an association of neuropsychological deficits is however notoriously ambiguous, and has been the subject of much debate. It might suggest that there is a shared substrate for numbers and body parts in the left parietal region, perhaps based on a common functional system for spatial representation and manipulation (Gerstmann, 1940) or on the crucial role that finger counting plays in numerical development (Butterworth, 1999). However, it might also reflect the existence of dis

This article presents a sobering view of the discipline of cognitive neuropsychology as practised over the last three or four decades. Our judgement is that, although the study of abnormal cognition resulting from brain injury or disease in previously normal adults has produced a catalogue of fascinating and highly selective deficits, it has yielded relatively little advance in understanding how the brain accomplishes its cognitive business. We question the wisdom of the following three ‘choices ’ in mainstream cognitive neuropsychology: (a) single-case methodology, (b) dissociation between functions as the most important source of evidence, and (c) a central goal of diagramming the functional architecture of cognition rather than specifying how its components work. These choices may all stem from an excessive commitment to strict and fine-grained modularity. Although different brain regions are undoubtedly specialised for different functions, we argue that parallel and interactive processing is a better assumption about cognitive processing. The essential goal of specifying representations and processes can, we claim, be significantly assisted by

Over the last several years, researchers have begun to appreciate the ways in which questions of interest to personality and social psychologists can be addressed with neuropyschological case material (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998; Klein, Loftus, &

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