We survey 392 CFOs about the cost of capital, capital budgeting, and capital structure. Large firms rely heavily on present value techniques and the capital asset pricing model, while small firms are relatively likely to use the payback criterion. We find that a surprising number of firms use their firm risk rather than project risk in evaluating new investments. Firms are concerned about maintaining financial flexibility and a good credit rating when issuing debt, and earnings per share dilution and recent stock price appreciation when issuing equity. We find some support for the pecking-order and trade-off capital structure hypotheses but little evidence that executives are concerned about asset substitution, asymmetric information, transactions costs, free cash flows, or personal taxes. Key words: capital structure, cost of capital, cost of equity, capital budgeting, discount rates, project valuation, survey. 1 We thank Franklin Allen for his detailed comments on the survey instrument and the overall project. We

: We develop a framework for analyzing the capital allocation and capital structure decisions facing financial institutions such as banks. Our model incorporates two key features: i) value-maximizing banks have a well-founded concern with risk management; and ii) not all the risks they face can be frictionlessly hedged in the capital market. This approach allows us to show how bank-level risk management considerations should factor into the pricing of those risks that cannot be easily hedged. We examine several applications, including: the evaluation of proprietary trading operations; and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives portfolios. I. Introduction One of the fundamental roles of banks and other financial intermediaries is to invest in illiquid financial assets--assets which, because of their information-intensive nature, cannot be frictionlessly traded in the capital markets. The standard example of such an illiquid asset is a loan to a small or medium-sized company. A m...

This paper addresses the following basic capital budgeting question: Suppose that crosssectional differences in stock returns can be predicted based on variables other than beta (e.g., book-to-market), and that this predictability reflects market irrationality rather than compensation for fundamental risk. In this setting, how should companies determine hurdle rates? I show how factors such as managerial tune horizons and financial constraints affect the optimal hurdle rate. Under some circumstances, beta can be useful as a capital budgeting tool, even if it is of no use in predicting stock returns.

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We use the link between financial constraints and a firm’s demand for liquidity to develop a new test of the effect of financial constraints on firm policies. The effect of financial constraints can be captured by a firm’s propensity to save cash out of incremental cash inflows (the cash flow sensitivity of cash). While constrained firms should have a positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, unconstrained firms ’ cash savings should not be systematically related to cash flows. We estimate the cash flow sensitivity of cash using a large sample of manufacturing firms over the 1971-2000 period and find that firms that are more likely to be financially constrained display a significantly positive cash flow sensitivity of cash, while unconstrained firms do not. Also consistent with our argument, we find that constrained firms ’ cash flow sensitivity of cash increases during recessions, while unconstrained firms ’ cash—cash flow sensitivity is unaffected by macroeconomic innovations. The use of cash flow sensitivities of cash appears to be a theoretically justified, empirically useful method to test for the importance of financial constraints.

Empirical evidence shows that the practice of risk management is limited and does not correspond to the prescriptions of the academic literature. In particular, the practice focuses on hedging transactions exposures and a firm’s hedge ratios depend on the views of the managers of that firm. In this paper, we provide a new approach to risk management that is consistent both with the main results of the academic literature but takes into account the fact that firms can have a comparative advantage in bearing some kinds of risks. We examine the implications of this new approach for the management of risk management and for risk measures such as Var. 1 1. Introduction. This article explores a paradox in the current practice of risk management. Academic research argues strongly that risk management creates value. Most of the academic research focuses on risk management that decreases variability of firm value or cash flows. Despite this academic literature, however, the practice of risk management is rather limited and it does not seem to correspond to the recommendations of academics. Does this

: Traditional theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and asymmetric information. They are designed to account for institutions which take deposits or issue insurance policies and channel funds to firms. However, in recent decades there have been significant changes. Although transaction costs and asymmetric information have declined, intermediation has increased. New markets for financial futures and options are mainly markets for intermediaries rather than individuals or firms. These changes are difficult to reconcile with the traditional theories. We discuss the role of intermediation in this new context stressing risk trading and participation costs. Keywords : intermediation, risk management delegated monitoring, banks, participation costs JEL Classification : 310, 020, 610 1. Introduction In this paper we review the state of intermediation theory and attempt to reconcile it with the observed behavior of institutions in modern capital markets. We argue...

In recent years, the number of downgrades in corporate bond ratings has exceeded the number of upgrades, leading some to conclude that the credit quality of U.S. corporate debt has declined. However, an alternative explanation of this apparent decline in credit quality is that the rating agencies are now using more stringent standards in assigning ratings. An ordered probit analysis of a panel of firms from 1978 through 1995 suggests that rating standards have indeed become more stringent, implying that at least part of the downward trend in ratings is the result of changing standards. BOND RATINGS PLAY A KEY ROLE in corporate financing and investment decisions. A corporation that can issue higher rated bonds usually receives better terms than one that can issue only lower rated bonds. By law or policy, some investors can purchase only bonds with an investment-grade rating, a restriction which in some asset pricing models would affect the relative prices of financial assets.

This paper studies the hedging policies of oil and gas producers between 1992 and 1994. My evidence shows that the extent of hedging is related to financing costs. In particular, companies with greater financial leverage manage price risks more extensively. My evidence also shows that the likelihood of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs and to the basis risk associated with hedging instruments. Larger companies and companies whose production is located primarily in regions where prices have a high correlation with the prices on which exchangetraded derivatives are based are more likely to manage risks. DESPITE THE PREVALENCE OF CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT and the effort that has been devoted to developing theoretical rationales for hedging, there are no widely accepted explanations for risk management as a corporate policy. Important questions remain regarding the determinants of the extent to which a company hedges, the impact of risk management on a firm’s value, and the interaction between a firm’s hedging policy and its other policy decisions. To address some of these questions, I examine the risk management activities of 100 oil and gas producers for 1992 to 1994. In particular, I investigate whether the fraction of production an oil and gas producer hedges against price fluctuations is related to its financing policy, tax status, compensation policy, ownership structure, and operating characteristics. I document a wide variation in hedging policies among oil and gas producers. My tests find that this variation is associated with several differences in the firms ’ characteristics. The fraction of production hedged is positively related to the differences in financial leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets, and it is greater for oil and gas producers

Systemic risk is modeled as the endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank's failure on the health of other banks give rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a bank's own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential regulation is shown to operate at a collectivelevel, regulating each bank as a function of both its joint (correlated) risk with other banks as well as its individual (bank-specific) risk.