Previous research has shown that children go through a stage in which they know that the number words each refer to a distinct numerosity, yet do not know which numerosity each number word picks out (Wynn, 1992). How do children attain this level of knowledge? We explore the possibility that particular properties of how number words are used within sentences inform children of the semantic class to which they belong. An analysis of transcripts of the spontaneous speech of three one- and two-year-old children and their parents (from the CHILDES database; MacWhinney & Snow, 1990) suggests that the relevant cues are available as input in parents ’ speech to children, and that children generally honour these properties of number words in their own speech. Implications of this proposal for word learning more generally are discussed.

Three experiments explored the semantics of the mass-count distinction in young children and adults. In Experiments 1 and 2, the quantity judgments of participants provided evidence that some mass nouns refer to individuals, as such. Participants judged one large portion of stuff to be "more" than three tiny portions for substance-mass nouns (e.g. mustard, ketchup), but chose according to number for count nouns (e.g. shoes, candles) and object-mass nouns (e.g. furniture, jewelry). These results suggest that some mass nouns quantify over individuals, and that therefore reference to individuals does not distinguish count nouns from mass nouns. Thus, Experiments 1 and 2 failed to support the hypothesis that there exist one-to-one mappings between mass-count syntax and semantics for either adults or young children. In Experiment 3, it was found that for mass-count flexible terms (e.g. string, stone) participants based quantity judgments on number when the terms were used with count syntax, but on total amount of stuff when used with mass syntax. Apparently, the presence of discrete physical objects in a scene (e.g. stones) is not sufficient to permit quantity judgments based on number. It is proposed that object-mass nouns (e.g. furniture) can be used to refer to individuals due to lexically specified grammatical features that normally occur in count syntax. Also, we suggest that children learning language parse words that refer to individuals as count nouns unless given morpho-syntactic and referential evidence to the contrary, in which case object-mass nouns are acquired.

Exemplar, prototype, and connectionist models typically assume that events constitute the basic unit of learning and representation in categorization. In these models, each learning event updates a statistical representation of a category independently of other learning events. An implication is that events involving the same individual affect learning independently and are not integrated into a single structure that represents the individual in an internal model of the world. A series of experiments demonstrates that human subjects track individuals across events, establish representations of them, and use these representations in categorization. These findings are consistent with ‘‘representationalism,’ ’ the view that an internal model of the world constitutes a physical level of representation in the brain, and that the brain does not simply capture the statistical properties of events in an undifferentiated dynamical system. Although categorization is an inherently statistical process that produces generalization, pattern completion, frequency effects, and adaptive learning, it is also an inherently representational process that establishes an internal model of the world. As a result, representational structures evolve in memory to track the histories of individuals, accumulate information about them, and simulate

Flexible induction is the adaptation of probabilistic inferences to changing problems. Young children’s flexibility was tested in a word-learning task. Children 3 to 6 years old were told 3 novel words for each of several novel objects. Children generalized each word to other objects with the same body shape, the same material, or the same part as the first object. Each word was preceded by a different predicate (i.e., “looks like a …, ” “is made of …, ” or “has a …”) that implies a different attribute (shape, material, or part, respectively). Three-year-olds showed limited use of predicates to infer word meanings, and they used predicates from previous trials to infer the meanings of later words. 4- to 6-year-olds used predicate cues more consistently and made inferences that were implied by the most recent predicate cue. Notably, 3-year-olds performed near ceiling in a control task that eliminated the need to use probabilistic inductive cues (Experiment 3). The results suggest that flexibility develops as a function of (a) sensitivity to between-problem variability and indeterminacy and (b) ability to decontextualize the most recent verbal cue to guide of inductive inferences. The epitome of human reasoning is the ability to solve variable, novel problems while ignoring irrelevant information. This is difficult for adults (Dominowski,

This study investigates children's ability to use language to guide their choice of individuation criterion in the domains of objects and events. Previous work (Shipley, E. F., & Shepperson, B. (1990). Countable entities: developmental changes. Cognition, 34, 109 -- 136.) has shown that children have a strong bias to use a spatio-temporal individuation strategy when counting objects and that children will ignore a conflicting linguistic description in favor of this spatio-temporal bias. Experiment 1 asked children (3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds) and adults to count objects and events under different linguistic descriptions. In the object task, subjects counted pictures of familiar objects split into multiple pieces (as in Shipley, E. F., & Shepperson, B. (1990). Countable entities: developmental changes. Cognition, 34, 109 -- 136.) and described either using an appropriate kind label (e.g. "car") or the general term "thing". In the event task, subjects watched short animated movies consisting of a goal-oriented event achieved via multiple, temporally separated steps. The events were described either with an appropriate telic predicate targeting the goal (e.g. "paint a flower") or with an atelic predicate targeting the steps in the process (e.g. "paint") and the subjects' task was to count the events. Relative to adults, children preferred a spatio-temporal counting strategy in both tasks; there was no difference among the three groups of children. However, children were able to significantly change their counting strategy to follow the linguistic description in the event but not the object task. Experiment 2 extended the object task to include counting of other types of non-spatio-temporal units such as sub-parts of objects and collections. Results showed that children could ...

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