We use a new database to perform a comprehensive analysis of the mutual fund industry. We find that funds hold stocks that outperform the market by 1.3 percent per year, but their net returns underperform by one percent. Of the 2.3 percent difference between these results, 0.7 percent is due to the underperformance of nonstock holdings, whereas 1.6 percent is due to expenses and transactions costs. Thus, funds pick stocks well enough to cover their costs. Also, high-turnover funds beat the Vanguard Index 500 fund on a net return basis. Our evidence supports the value of active mutual fund management. DO MUTUAL FUND MANAGERS WHO actively trade stocks add value? Academics have debated this issue since the seminal paper of Jensen ~1968!. Although some controversy still exists, the majority of studies now conclude that actively managed funds ~e.g., the Fidelity Magellan fund!, on average, underperform their passively managed counterparts ~e.g., the Vanguard Index 500 fund!. 1 For example, Gruber ~1996! finds that the average mutual fund underperforms

We develop a simple rational model of active portfolio management that provides a natural benchmark against which to evaluate observed relationship between returns and fund flows. Many effects widely regarded as anomalous are consistent with this simple explanation. In the model, investments with active managers do not outperform passive benchmarks because of the competitive market for capital provision, combined with decreasing returns to scale in active portfolio management. Consequently, past performance cannot be used to predict future returns, or to infer the average skill level of active managers. The lack of persistence in actively managed returns does not imply that differential ability across managers is nonexistent or unrewarded, that gathering information about performance is socially wasteful, or that chasing performance is pointless. A strong relationship between past performance and the flow of funds exists in our model: indeed, this is the market mechanism that ensures that no predictability in performance exists. Choosing parameters to match the flow-performance relationship and survivorship rates, we find these features of the data are consistent with the vast majority (80%) of active managers having at least

I review empirical research on the relation between capital markets and financial statements.The principal sources of demand for capital markets research in accounting are fundamental analysis and valuation, tests of market efficiency, and the role of accounting numbers in contracts and the political process.The capital markets research topics of current interest to researchers include tests of market efficiency with respect to accounting information, fundamental analysis, and value relevance of financial reporting.Evidence from research on these topics is likely to be helpful in capital market investment decisions, accounting standard setting, and corporate financial

We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean-reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership -- stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum. 1 "Herding" (a group of investors trading in the same direction over a period of time) and "feedback trading" (correlation between herding and lag returns) have the potential to explain a number of financial phenomena, e.g., excess volatility, momentum, and reversals in stoc...

Abstract: We develop a model of stock prices in which there are both differences of opinion among investors as well as short-sales constraints. The key insight that emerges is that breadth of ownership is a valuation indicator. When breadth is low i.e., when few investors have long positions in the stock this signals that the short-sales constraint is binding tightly, implying that prices are high relative to fundamentals and that expected returns are therefore low. Thus reductions in breadth should forecast lower returns, while increases in breadth should forecast higher returns. Using quarterly data on mutual fund holdings over the period 1979-1998, we find evidence supportive of this prediction: stocks whose change in breadth in the prior quarter places them in the lowest decile of the sample underperform those in the top change-in-breadth decile by 6.38 % in the first twelve months after portfolio formation. After adjusting for size, book-tomarket and momentum, the corresponding figure is 4.95%.

Stocks can be overpriced when short-sale constraints bind. We study the costs of short-selling equities from 1926 to 1933, using the publicly observable market for borrowing stock. Some stocks are sometimes expensive to short, and it appears that stocks enter the borrowing market when shorting demand is high. We find that stocks that are expensive to short or which enter the borrowing market have high valuations and low subsequent returns, consistent with the overpricing hypothesis. Size-adjusted returns are 1 % to 2 % lower per month for new entrants, and despite high costs it is profitable to short them.

We especially thank an anonymous referee and Rob Stambaugh, the editor, for helpful suggestions that greatly improved the article. Andrew Ang and Bob Hodrick both acknowledge support from the NSF.

We investigate the value of active mutual fund management by examining the stockholdings and trades of mutual funds. We find that stocks widely held by funds do not outperform other stocks. However, stocks purchased by funds have significantly higher returns than stocks that are sold—this is true for large stocks as well as small stocks, and for value stocks as well as growth stocks. Moreover, growth-oriented funds exhibit better stockselection skills than income-oriented funds, especially in picking large growth stocks. Finally, funds trading more frequently have, at best, marginally better stock-selection skills than funds that trade less often. The Value of Active Mutual Fund Management: An Examination of the Stockholdings and Trades of Fund Managers I.

This paper analyzes mutual-fund performance from an investor’s perspective. We study the portfolio-choice problem for a mean-variance investor choosing among a risk-free asset, index funds, and actively managed mutual funds. To solve this problem, we employ a Bayesian method of performance evaluation; a key innovation in our approach is the development of a flexible set of prior beliefs about managerial skill. We then apply our methodology to a sample of 1,437 mutual funds. We find that some extremely skeptical prior beliefs nevertheless lead to economically significant allocations to active managers. ACTIVELY MANAGED EQUITY MUTUAL FUNDS have trillions of dollars in assets, collect tens of billions in management fees, and are the subject of enormous attention from investors, the press, and researchers. For years, many experts have been saying that investors would be better off in low-cost passively managed index funds. Notwithstanding the recent growth in index funds, active managers still control the vast majority of mutual-fund assets. Are any of these active managers worth their added expenses? Should investors avoid all actively managed mutual funds? Since Jensen ~1968!, most studies have found that the universe of mutual funds does not outperform its benchmarks after expenses. 1 This evidence indicates that the average active mutual fund should be avoided. On the other hand, recent studies have found that future abnormal returns ~“alphas”! can be forecast using past returns or alphas, 2 past fund

This paper documents that hedge funds did not exert a correcting force on stock prices during the technology bubble. Instead, they were heavily invested in technology stocks. This does not seem to be the result of unawareness of the bubble: Hedge funds captured the upturn, but, by reducing their positions in stocks that were about to decline, avoided much of the downturn. Our findings question the efficient markets notion that rational speculators always stabilize prices. They are consistent with models in which rational investors may prefer to ride bubbles because of predictable investor sentiment and limits to arbitrage.