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Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individua ..."
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Cited by 167 (24 self)
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This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decisiontheoretically traded o against computation cost. A normative, application and protocolindependent theory of coalitions among boundedrational agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are signi cantly a ected by the agents ' algorithms ' performance pro les and the cost of computation. This relationship is rst analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classi cation including rational and boundedrational agents is introduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with real data from ve dispatch centers. This problem is NPcomplete and the instances are so large thatwith current technologyany agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity. 1
Negotiation Among Selfinterested Computationally Limited Agents
, 1996
"... A Dissertation Presented by TUOMAS W. SANDHOLM ..."
Coalition formation among bounded rational agents
, 1995
"... This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate efficiently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem), the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individ ..."
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Cited by 74 (12 self)
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This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate efficiently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem), the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted, where computation resources are costly. It is not worth solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decisiontheoretically traded off against computation cost. A normative, protocolindependent theory of coalitions among bounded rational (BR) agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are significantly affected by the agents' algorithms' performance profiles (PPs) and the unit cost of computation. This relationship is first analyzed theoretically. A domain classification including rational and BR agents is introduced. Experimental results are presented in the distributed vehicle routing domain using real data from 5 dispatch centers; the optimal coalition structure for BR agents differs significantly from the one for rational agents. These problems are NPcomplete and the instances are so large that, with current technology, any agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity.
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions
, 2001
"... This paper analyzes individuallyrational ex post equilibrium in the VC (VickreyClarke) combinatorial auctions. If \Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in \Sigma. The \SigmaVC combinatorial aucti ..."
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Cited by 47 (8 self)
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This paper analyzes individuallyrational ex post equilibrium in the VC (VickreyClarke) combinatorial auctions. If \Sigma is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the participants by requiring them to submit their bids only for bundles in \Sigma. The \SigmaVC combinatorial auctions (multigood auctions) obtained in this way are known to be individuallyrational truthtelling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with nonrestricted VC auctions, in which the buyers restrict themselves to bids on bundles in \Sigma, because it is rational for them to do so. That is, it may be that when the buyers report their valuation of the bundles in \Sigma, they are in an equilibrium. We fully characterize those \Sigma that induce individually rational equilibrium in every VC auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The number of bundles in \Sigma represents the communication complexity of the equilibrium. A special case of bundling equilibrium is partitionbased equilibrium, in which \Sigma is a field, that is, it is generated by a partition. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium, focusing in particular on partitionbased equilibrium.
Coherent Allocation of Risk Capital
 Journal of Risk
, 1999
"... The allocation problem stems from the diversification e#ect observed in risk measurements of financial portfolios: the sum of the risk measures of many portfolios is typically larger than the risk of all portfolios taken together. The allocation problem is to apportion this "diversification advantag ..."
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Cited by 42 (0 self)
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The allocation problem stems from the diversification e#ect observed in risk measurements of financial portfolios: the sum of the risk measures of many portfolios is typically larger than the risk of all portfolios taken together. The allocation problem is to apportion this "diversification advantage" to the portfolios in a fair manner, to obtain new, firminternal risk evaluations of the portfolios. Our approach is axiomatic, in the sense that we first establish arguably necessary properties of an allocation scheme, and then study schemes that fulfill the properties. Important results from the area of game theory find a direct application, and are used here. Keywords: allocation of risk; coherent risk measure; game theory; Shapley value; AumannShapley prices; RORAC; riskadjusted performance measure. 1 Introduction The underlying theme of this paper is the sharing of costs within the di#erent constituents of a firm. We call this sharing "allocation", as it is assumed that a higher au...
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core
, 2002
"... Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among selfinterested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However, ..."
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Cited by 42 (5 self)
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Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among selfinterested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently. However,
Complexity of Constructing Solutions in the Core Based on Synergies among Coalitions
 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
, 2006
"... Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among selfinterested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to abide by a solut ..."
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Cited by 34 (1 self)
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Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotiation among selfinterested agents, and other multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents cannot, or can accomplish them more efficiently. Motivating the agents to abide by a solution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in cooperative game theory: the set of solutions that satisfy it is known as the core. The computational questions around the core have received less attention. When it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that represent realworld parties), these questions become increasingly explicit. In this
What Is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?
 FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS, EDITED BY K. ARROW AND S. HONKAPOHJA
, 1985
"... The language of game theory—coalitions, payo¤s, markets, votes— suggests that it is not a branch of abstract mathematics; that it is motivated by and related to the world around us; and that it should be able to ..."
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Cited by 34 (0 self)
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The language of game theory—coalitions, payo¤s, markets, votes— suggests that it is not a branch of abstract mathematics; that it is motivated by and related to the world around us; and that it should be able to