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39
Competitive Auctions
, 2002
"... We study a class of singleround, sealedbid auctions for items in unlimited supply, such as digital goods. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is truthful (i.e., encourages buyers to bid their utility) and yields profit that is roughly within a constant factor of ..."
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Cited by 81 (10 self)
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We study a class of singleround, sealedbid auctions for items in unlimited supply, such as digital goods. We introduce the notion of competitive auctions. A competitive auction is truthful (i.e., encourages buyers to bid their utility) and yields profit that is roughly within a constant factor of the profit of optimal fixed pricing for all inputs. We justify the use of optimal fixed pricing as a benchmark for evaluating competitive auction profit. We show that several randomized auctions are truthful and competitive and that no truthful deterministic auction is competitive. Our results extend to bounded supply markets, for which we also get truthful and competitive auctions.
Knapsack Auctions
 Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA
, 2006
"... We consider a game theoretic knapsack problem that has application to auctions for selling advertisements on Internet search engines. Consider n agents each wishing to place an object in the knapsack. Each agent has a private valuation for having their object in the knapsack and each object has a pu ..."
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Cited by 58 (9 self)
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We consider a game theoretic knapsack problem that has application to auctions for selling advertisements on Internet search engines. Consider n agents each wishing to place an object in the knapsack. Each agent has a private valuation for having their object in the knapsack and each object has a publicly known size. For this setting, we consider the design of auctions in which agents have an incentive to truthfully reveal their private valuations. Following the framework of Goldberg et al. [10], we look to design an auction that obtains a constant fraction of the profit obtainable by a natural optimal pricing algorithm that knows the agents ’ valuations and object sizes. We give an auction that obtains a constant factor approximation in the nontrivial special case where the knapsack has unlimited capacity. We then reduce the limited capacity version of the problem to the unlimited capacity version via an approximately efficient auction (i.e., one that maximizes the social welfare). This reduction follows from generalizable principles. 1
CollusionResistant Mechanisms for SingleParameter Agents
 In Proceedings of the 16th Annual ACMSIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
, 2005
"... We consider the problem of designing mechanisms with the incentive property that no coalition of agents can engage in a collusive strategy that results in an increase in the combined utility of the coalition. For single parameter agents, we give a characterization that essentially restricts such mec ..."
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Cited by 41 (7 self)
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We consider the problem of designing mechanisms with the incentive property that no coalition of agents can engage in a collusive strategy that results in an increase in the combined utility of the coalition. For single parameter agents, we give a characterization that essentially restricts such mechanisms to those that post a “take it or leave it ” price to for each agent in advance. We then consider relaxing the incentive property to only hold with high probability. In this relaxed model, we are able to design approximate profit maximizing auctions and approximately efficient auctions. We also give a general framework for designing mechanisms for single parameter agents while maintaining the coalition incentive property with high probability. In addition, we give several results for a weaker incentive property from the literature known as group strategyproofness.
Concurrent Auctions across the Supply Chain
, 2001
"... In this paper we design protocols for exchange of information between a sequence of markets along a single supply chain. These protocols allow each of these markets to function separately, while the information exchanged guarantees efficient global behavior across the supply chain. Each market form ..."
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Cited by 32 (1 self)
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In this paper we design protocols for exchange of information between a sequence of markets along a single supply chain. These protocols allow each of these markets to function separately, while the information exchanged guarantees efficient global behavior across the supply chain. Each market form a link in the supply chain operates as a double auction, where the bids on one side of the double auction come from bidders in the corresponding segment of the industry, and the bids on the other side are synthetically generated by the protocol to express the combined information from all other links in the chain. The double auctions in each of the markets can be of several types, and we study several variants of incentive compatible double auctions, comparing them in terms of their efficiency and of the market revenue.
Revenue monotonicity in combinatorial auctions
 In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI
, 2007
"... Intuitively, one might expect that a seller’s revenue from an auction weakly increases as the number of bidders grows, as this increases competition. However, it is known that for combinatorial auctions that use the VCG mechanism, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this ..."
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Cited by 20 (3 self)
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Intuitively, one might expect that a seller’s revenue from an auction weakly increases as the number of bidders grows, as this increases competition. However, it is known that for combinatorial auctions that use the VCG mechanism, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this problem can occur under other dominantstrategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity ” are not limited to mechanisms that achieve efficient allocations. Instead, they can occur under any dominantstrategy direct mechanism that sets prices using critical values, and that always chooses an allocation that cannot be augmented to make some bidder better off, while making none worse off.
No Justified Complaints: On Fair Sharing of Multiple Resources
"... Fair allocation has been studied intensively in both economics and computer science, and fair sharing of resources has aroused renewed interest with the advent of virtualization and cloud computing. Prior work has typically focused on mechanisms for fair sharing of a single resource. We provide a ne ..."
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Cited by 16 (0 self)
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Fair allocation has been studied intensively in both economics and computer science, and fair sharing of resources has aroused renewed interest with the advent of virtualization and cloud computing. Prior work has typically focused on mechanisms for fair sharing of a single resource. We provide a new definition for the simultaneous fair allocation of multiple continuouslydivisible resources. Roughly speaking, we define fairness as the situation where every user either gets all the resources he wishes for, or else gets at least his entitlement on some bottleneck resource, and therefore cannot complain about not getting more. This definition has the same desirable properties as the recently suggested dominant resource fairness, and also handles the case of multiple bottlenecks. We then prove that a fair allocation according to this definition is guaranteed to exist for any combination of user requests and entitlements (where a user’s relative use of the different resources is fixed). The proof, which uses tools from the theory of ordinary differential equations, is constructive and provides a method to compute the allocations numerically.
Strategyproof Auctions for Balancing Social Welfare and Fairness
 in Secondary Spectrum Markets,” in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM 2011, April 2011. et al.: DESIGNING TWODIMENSIONAL SPECTRUM AUCTIONS FOR MOBILE SECONDARY USERS 613
"... Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating natur ..."
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Cited by 12 (6 self)
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Abstract—Secondary spectrum access is emerging as a promising approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity in wireless networks. Coordinated spectrum access for secondary users can be achieved using periodic spectrum auctions. Recent studies on such auction design mostly neglect the repeating nature of such auctions, and focus on greedily maximizing social welfare. Such auctions can cause subsets of users to experience starvation in the long run, reducing their incentive to continue participating in the auction. It is desirable to increase the diversity of users allocated spectrum in each auction round, so that a tradeoff between social welfare and fairness is maintained. We study truthful mechanisms towards this objective, for both local and global fairness criteria. For local fairness, we introduce randomization into the auction design, such that each user is guaranteed a minimum probability of being assigned spectrum. Computing an optimal, interferencefree spectrum allocation is NPHard; we present an approximate solution, and tailor a payment scheme to guarantee truthful bidding is a dominant strategy for all secondary users. For global fairness, we adopt the classic maxmin fairness criterion. We tailor another auction by applying linear programming techniques for striking the balance between social welfare and maxmin fairness, and for finding feasible channel allocations. In particular, a pair of primal and dual linear programs are utilized to guide the probabilistic selection of feasible allocations towards a desired tradeoff in expectation. I.
Quadratic CoreSelecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
"... We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the VickreyClarkeGroves payments. Analyzing the K ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the VickreyClarkeGroves payments. Analyzing the KarushKuhnTucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Further, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.
Auctions with online supply
 In Fifth Workshop on Ad Auctions
, 2009
"... We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unitdemand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make the allocation and payment decisions online with the goal of maximizing social welfare. We consider ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unitdemand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make the allocation and payment decisions online with the goal of maximizing social welfare. We consider two models of unknown supply: the adversarial supply model, in which the mechanism must produce a welfare guarantee for any arbitrary supply, and the stochastic supply model, in which supply is drawn from a distribution known to the mechanism, and the mechanism need only provide a welfare guarantee in expectation. Our main result is a separation between these two models. We show that all truthful mechanisms, even randomized, achieve a diminishing fraction of the optimal social welfare (namely, no better than a Ω(log log n) approximation) in the adversarial setting. In sharp contrast, in the stochastic model, under a standard monotone hazardrate condition, we present a truthful mechanism that achieves a constant approximation. We show that the monotone hazard rate condition is necessary, and also characterize a natural subclass of truthful mechanisms in our setting, the set of onlineenvyfree mechanisms. All of the mechanisms we present fall into this class, and we prove almost optimal lower bounds for such mechanisms. Since auctions with unknown supply are regularly run in many onlineadvertising settings, our main results emphasize the importance of considering distributional information in the design of auctions in such environments. 1
Chain: A dynamic double auction framework for matching patient agents
 Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
, 2007
"... In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, twosided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain ..."
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Cited by 7 (4 self)
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In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, twosided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be constructed from a truthful, singleperiod (i.e. static) doubleauction rule. The pricing and matching method of the Chain construction is unique amongst dynamicauction rules that adopt the same building block. We examine experimentally the allocative efficiency of Chain when instantiated on various singleperiod rules, including the canonical McAfee doubleauction rule. For a baseline we also consider nontruthful double auctions populated with “zerointelligence plus”style learning agents. Chainbased auctions perform well in comparison with other schemes, especially as arrival intensity falls and agent valuations become more volatile. 1.