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To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems
 INTERNATIONAL SERIES IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, SPRINGER (HARDCOVER) 16 C.H. (2006), “HETEROGENEOUS AGENT MODELS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE,” HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS, LEIGH TESFATSION
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Network Routing
 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A,337
, 1991
"... How should flows through a network be organized, so that the network responds sensibly to failures and overloads? The question is currently of considerable technological importance in connection with the development of computer and telecommunication networks, while in various other forms it has a lo ..."
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Cited by 27 (2 self)
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How should flows through a network be organized, so that the network responds sensibly to failures and overloads? The question is currently of considerable technological importance in connection with the development of computer and telecommunication networks, while in various other forms it has a long history in the fields of physics and economics. In all of these areas there is interest in how simple, local rules, often involving random actions, can produce coherent and purposeful behaviour at the macroscopic level. This paper describes some examples from these various fields, and indicates how analogies with fundamental concepts such as energy and price can provide powerful insights into the design of routing schemes for communication networks.
A MultiAgent, PolicyGradient approach to Network Routing
 In: Proc. of the 18th Int. Conf. on Machine Learning
, 2001
"... Network routing is a distributed decision problem which naturally admits numerical performance measures, such as the average time for a packet to travel from source to destination. Olpomdp, a policygradient reinforcement learning algorithm, was successfully applied to simulated network routing unde ..."
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Cited by 20 (1 self)
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Network routing is a distributed decision problem which naturally admits numerical performance measures, such as the average time for a packet to travel from source to destination. Olpomdp, a policygradient reinforcement learning algorithm, was successfully applied to simulated network routing under a number of network models. Multiple distributed agents (routers) learned cooperative behavior without explicit interagent communication, and they avoided behavior which was individually desirable, but detrimental to the group's overall performance. Furthermore, shaping the reward signal by explicitly penalizing certain patterns of suboptimal behavior was found to dramatically improve the convergence rate.
Braess' Paradox in a Loss Network
, 1995
"... Braess' paradox is said to occur in a network if the addition of an extra link leads to worse performance. It has been shown to occur in transportation networks (such as road networks) and also in queueing networks. Here, we show that it can occur in loss networks. ..."
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Cited by 17 (0 self)
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Braess' paradox is said to occur in a network if the addition of an extra link leads to worse performance. It has been shown to occur in transportation networks (such as road networks) and also in queueing networks. Here, we show that it can occur in loss networks.
Stationary Ergodic Jackson Networks: Results and CounterExamples
, 1996
"... This paper gives a survey of recent results on generalized Jackson networks, where classical exponential or i.i.d. assumptions on services and routings are replaced by stationary and ergodic assumptions. We first show that the most basic features of the network may exhibit unexpected behavior. Sever ..."
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Cited by 8 (1 self)
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This paper gives a survey of recent results on generalized Jackson networks, where classical exponential or i.i.d. assumptions on services and routings are replaced by stationary and ergodic assumptions. We first show that the most basic features of the network may exhibit unexpected behavior. Several probabilistic properties are then discussed, including a strong law of large numbers for the number of events in the stations, the existence, uniqueness and representation of stationary regimes for queue size and workload.
Avoiding Paradoxes in Routing Games
 Proceedings of the 17th International Teletraffic Congress
, 2001
"... Strange behavior may occur in networks due to the noncooperative nature of decision making, when the latter are taken by individual agents. In particular, the well known... ..."
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Cited by 5 (3 self)
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Strange behavior may occur in networks due to the noncooperative nature of decision making, when the latter are taken by individual agents. In particular, the well known...
Properties of Equilibria in Competitive Routing with Several User Types
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST IEEE CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL
, 2001
"... In recent years there has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decisions are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the routes so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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In recent years there has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decisions are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the routes so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of noncooperative game theory and the Nash equilibrium concept for optimality. In the special case in which each decision maker wishes to find a minimal path for each routed object (e.g. a packet) then the solution concept is the Wardrop equilibrium. It is well known that equilibria may exhibit inefficiencies and paradoxical behaviour, such as the famous Braess paradox (in which the addition of a link to a network results in worse performance to all users). This raises the challenge for the network administrator of how to upgrade the network so that it indeed results in improved performance. We present in this paper some guidelines for that.
Avoiding Paradox in Routing Games in Networks when Travel Demand is Elastic
 Proceedings of the Tenth Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications
, 2002
"... In recent years has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decision are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network ) that chooses the route so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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In recent years has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decision are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network ) that chooses the route so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of noncooperative game theory and the Nash equilibrium concept for optimality.
Economic Efficiency of Decentralized Unit Commitment from a Generator’s Perspective
"... In this chapter, we study the optimal commitment of generation units in a decentralized market from the perspective of an individual market participant. We start by comparing the theoretic economic efficiencies of centralized and decentralized unit commitment (UC). We prove that under certain circum ..."
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In this chapter, we study the optimal commitment of generation units in a decentralized market from the perspective of an individual market participant. We start by comparing the theoretic economic efficiencies of centralized and decentralized unit commitment (UC). We prove that under certain circumstances and in contrast to current teaching, centralized UC can lead to overall higher social welfare than decentralized UC, even in the case of complete market information. We then closer explore a selfscheduling generator’s ability to maximize profit using only publicly available price forecasts. Deploying the dynamic programming formulation from section [** * Crossreference Eric ***], we motivate the usage of fat tail Cauchy stochastic price models instead of the more commonly used Normal distributions. Finally, we use a simple model to show how prices above marginal cost arise in a decentralized UC scheme as a natural consequence of the decentralized decision process explained before. This result challenges economic literature stating that market prices above marginal cost would clearly indicate gaming and the abuse of market power. 1 Centralized versus Decentralized Unit Commitment In this section, we disprove the commonly stated assumption that, in theory and under the condition of perfect information, decentralized and centralized UC would lead to the same power quantities traded and, hence, to the same optimal social welfare. We show that, even in the absence of any uncertainties, independent optimization of the individual performance objectives by the decentralized market participants can actually lead to lower efficiency than centralized minimization of total operating cost. This result concerns shortterm supply optimization for a given demand, and does not consider longterm investment issues.
Braess Paradox in the Laboratory: . . .
, 2005
"... The Braess Paradox (BP) in traffic and communication networks is a powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium solution. It shows that, paradoxically, when one or more links are added to a weighted network with linear costs that depend on congestion wi ..."
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The Braess Paradox (BP) in traffic and communication networks is a powerful illustration of the possible counterintuitive implications of the Nash equilibrium solution. It shows that, paradoxically, when one or more links are added to a weighted network with linear costs that depend on congestion with an attempt to improve it, and each user independently seeks her best possible route, then the equilibrium cost of travel of all users may increase. Extending previous research by Rapoport et al. (2005), we report the results of a new experiment with a richer topology and asymmetric link costs of travel designed to assess the descriptive power of the BP. Our results show that with experience in traversing the network players ’ choice frequencies approach the equilibrium solution as implied by the BP.