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To Queue or Not to Queue: Equilibrium Behavior in Queueing Systems
 INTERNATIONAL SERIES IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, SPRINGER (HARDCOVER) 16 C.H. (2006), “HETEROGENEOUS AGENT MODELS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE,” HANDBOOK OF COMPUTATIONAL ECONOMICS, LEIGH TESFATSION
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Network Routing
 Phil. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. A,337
, 1991
"... How should flows through a network be organized, so that the network responds sensibly to failures and overloads? The question is currently of considerable technological importance in connection with the development of computer and telecommunication networks, while in various other forms it has a lo ..."
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Cited by 24 (2 self)
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How should flows through a network be organized, so that the network responds sensibly to failures and overloads? The question is currently of considerable technological importance in connection with the development of computer and telecommunication networks, while in various other forms it has a long history in the fields of physics and economics. In all of these areas there is interest in how simple, local rules, often involving random actions, can produce coherent and purposeful behaviour at the macroscopic level. This paper describes some examples from these various fields, and indicates how analogies with fundamental concepts such as energy and price can provide powerful insights into the design of routing schemes for communication networks.
A MultiAgent, PolicyGradient approach to Network Routing
 In: Proc. of the 18th Int. Conf. on Machine Learning
, 2001
"... Network routing is a distributed decision problem which naturally admits numerical performance measures, such as the average time for a packet to travel from source to destination. Olpomdp, a policygradient reinforcement learning algorithm, was successfully applied to simulated network routing unde ..."
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Cited by 18 (1 self)
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Network routing is a distributed decision problem which naturally admits numerical performance measures, such as the average time for a packet to travel from source to destination. Olpomdp, a policygradient reinforcement learning algorithm, was successfully applied to simulated network routing under a number of network models. Multiple distributed agents (routers) learned cooperative behavior without explicit interagent communication, and they avoided behavior which was individually desirable, but detrimental to the group's overall performance. Furthermore, shaping the reward signal by explicitly penalizing certain patterns of suboptimal behavior was found to dramatically improve the convergence rate.
Braess' Paradox in a Loss Network
, 1995
"... Braess' paradox is said to occur in a network if the addition of an extra link leads to worse performance. It has been shown to occur in transportation networks (such as road networks) and also in queueing networks. Here, we show that it can occur in loss networks. ..."
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Cited by 15 (0 self)
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Braess' paradox is said to occur in a network if the addition of an extra link leads to worse performance. It has been shown to occur in transportation networks (such as road networks) and also in queueing networks. Here, we show that it can occur in loss networks.
Stationary Ergodic Jackson Networks: Results and CounterExamples
, 1996
"... This paper gives a survey of recent results on generalized Jackson networks, where classical exponential or i.i.d. assumptions on services and routings are replaced by stationary and ergodic assumptions. We first show that the most basic features of the network may exhibit unexpected behavior. Sever ..."
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Cited by 7 (1 self)
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This paper gives a survey of recent results on generalized Jackson networks, where classical exponential or i.i.d. assumptions on services and routings are replaced by stationary and ergodic assumptions. We first show that the most basic features of the network may exhibit unexpected behavior. Several probabilistic properties are then discussed, including a strong law of large numbers for the number of events in the stations, the existence, uniqueness and representation of stationary regimes for queue size and workload.
Avoiding Paradoxes in Routing Games
 Proceedings of the 17th International Teletraffic Congress
, 2001
"... Strange behavior may occur in networks due to the noncooperative nature of decision making, when the latter are taken by individual agents. In particular, the well known... ..."
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Cited by 5 (3 self)
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Strange behavior may occur in networks due to the noncooperative nature of decision making, when the latter are taken by individual agents. In particular, the well known...
Properties of Equilibria in Competitive Routing with Several User Types
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST IEEE CONFERENCE ON DECISION AND CONTROL
, 2001
"... In recent years there has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decisions are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the routes so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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In recent years there has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decisions are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the routes so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of noncooperative game theory and the Nash equilibrium concept for optimality. In the special case in which each decision maker wishes to find a minimal path for each routed object (e.g. a packet) then the solution concept is the Wardrop equilibrium. It is well known that equilibria may exhibit inefficiencies and paradoxical behaviour, such as the famous Braess paradox (in which the addition of a link to a network results in worse performance to all users). This raises the challenge for the network administrator of how to upgrade the network so that it indeed results in improved performance. We present in this paper some guidelines for that.
Avoiding Paradox in Routing Games in Networks when Travel Demand is Elastic
 Proceedings of the Tenth Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications
, 2002
"... In recent years has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decision are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network ) that chooses the route so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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In recent years has been a growing interest in mathematical models for routing in networks in which the decision are taken in a noncooperative way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network ) that chooses the route so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of noncooperative game theory and the Nash equilibrium concept for optimality.
www.elsevier.com/locate/geb Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox
, 2005
"... The Braess Paradox consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behavioral ..."
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The Braess Paradox consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that differ from each other in their topology. Both experiments include relatively large groups of participants who independently and repeatedly choose travel routes in one of two types of traffic networks, one with the added links and the other without them. Our results reject the hypothesis that the paradox is of marginal value and its force diminishes with experience. Rather, they strongly support the alternative hypothesis that with experience in traversing the networks financially motivated players converge to choosing the equilibrium routes in the network with added capacity despite sustaining a sharp decline in earnings.
Choice of Routes in Congested . . .
, 2005
"... The Braess paradox (Braess, 1968) consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the parado ..."
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The Braess paradox (Braess, 1968) consists of showing that, in equilibrium, adding a new link that connects two routes running between a common origin and common destination may raise the travel cost for each network user. We report the results of two experiments designed to study whether the paradox is behaviorally realized in two simulated traffic networks that differ from each other in their topology. Implementing a withinsubjects design, both experiments include finite populations of paid participants in a computercontrolled setup who independently and repeatedly choose travel routes in one of two types of traffic networks, one without the added links and the other with the added links, to minimize their travel costs. Our results reject the hypothesis that the paradox is of marginal value and its force, if at all evident, diminishes with experience. Rather, they strongly support the alternative hypothesis that with experience in traversing the traffic network players converge to choosing the Pareto deficient equilibrium routes despite sustaining a sharp decline in their earnings.